the-custodian/docs/changes/netkingdom-target-2026-10-17/native-identity-r1/owner-source.patch

--- a/tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-keycape.py
+++ b/tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-keycape.py
@@ -322,6 +322,23 @@
 
 
 def run_verifier(session, admission, payload):
+    # Select from the already-restored config before further private/runtime reads.
+    # This is not public preflight before archive decryption or its key prompt.
+    import yaml
+    cfg = yaml.safe_load(base64.b64decode(payload['files']['/etc/keycape/config.yaml'],validate=True))
+    if not isinstance(cfg,dict) or cfg.get('issuer') != admission['issuer']:
+        raise Refused()
+    consumer = admission['consumer']
+    clients = cfg.get('clients')
+    if not isinstance(clients,list) or any(not isinstance(client,dict) for client in clients):
+        raise Refused()
+    matches = [client for client in clients if client.get('clientId') == consumer['client_id']]
+    if len(matches) != 1:
+        raise Refused()
+    client = matches[0]
+    if (client.get('secretRef') != 'env:'+consumer['secret_env'] or client.get('clientType') != 'confidential'
+            or 'client_credentials' not in client.get('grantTypes',[])):
+        raise Refused()
     issuer = session['issuer']
     if {v['target'] for v in session.get('volumes',{}).values()}!={'/etc/keycape','/var/lib/keycape-policy','/etc/keycape-factor','/recovery-tls'}:raise Refused()
     from urllib.parse import urlsplit
@@ -352,15 +369,7 @@
         if durable!={k:v for k,v in files.items() if k.startswith('/var/lib/keycape-policy/')}:
             raise Refused()
     equal()
-    # Reading YAML is data parsing only; no archived executable is evaluated.
-    import yaml
-    cfg = yaml.safe_load(files['/etc/keycape/config.yaml'])
-    if cfg['issuer'] != admission['issuer']:
-        raise Refused()
-    consumer = admission['consumer']
-    client = next(x for x in cfg['clients'] if x['clientId']==consumer['client_id'])
-    if (client['secretRef']!='env:'+consumer['secret_env'] or client['clientType']!='confidential'
-            or 'client_credentials' not in client['grantTypes'] or not env.get(consumer['secret_env'])):
+    if not env.get(consumer['secret_env']):
         raise Refused()
     from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
     key=serialization.load_pem_private_key(files['/etc/keycape/key.pem'],password=None)
--- a/tests/test_isolated_keycape_recovery.py
+++ b/tests/test_isolated_keycape_recovery.py
@@ -53,6 +53,34 @@
         for row in self.manifest['files']:
             if row['path'].endswith('/deployment/keycape.json'):row.update(bytes=len(raw),sha256=hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest())
         with self.assertRaises(a.Refused):self.payload()
+
+
+class OriginalSelectorTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Already-restored public fixture config; no archive/key/native action."""
+    def assert_refused_before_further_inputs(self,clients):
+        import yaml
+        cfg={'issuer':'https://issuer.example','clients':clients}
+        payload={'files':{'/etc/keycape/config.yaml':base64.b64encode(yaml.safe_dump(cfg).encode()).decode(),
+                          '/etc/keycape/key.pem':'deliberately-not-base64'}}
+        admission={'issuer':'https://issuer.example','consumer':{'client_id':'existing','secret_env':'KEYCAPE_ORIGINAL_SECRET'}}
+        # Empty session/no env and an undecodable key also expose early private access.
+        from contextlib import ExitStack
+        with ExitStack() as stack:
+            blocked=[stack.enter_context(patch.object(a,name,side_effect=AssertionError('later input or native call')))
+                     for name in ('container_file','runtime_file','runtime_files','command','check_jwks','process')]
+            with self.assertRaises(a.Refused):a.run_verifier({},admission,payload)
+            for call in blocked:call.assert_not_called()
+    def client(self):
+        return {'clientId':'existing','clientType':'confidential','secretRef':'env:KEYCAPE_ORIGINAL_SECRET',
+                'grantTypes':['client_credentials']}
+    def test_absent_original_selector_refused_before_further_inputs(self):
+        self.assert_refused_before_further_inputs([dict(self.client(),clientId='unrelated')])
+    def test_identical_duplicate_selector_refused_before_further_inputs(self):
+        self.assert_refused_before_further_inputs([self.client(),self.client()])
+    def test_conflicting_duplicate_selector_refused_before_further_inputs(self):
+        self.assert_refused_before_further_inputs([self.client(),dict(self.client(),secretRef='env:OTHER')])
+    def test_empty_registry_refused_before_further_inputs(self):
+        self.assert_refused_before_further_inputs([])
 
 class NativeTests(unittest.TestCase):
     def setUp(self):
--- a/tests/isolated-keycape-native-fixture-manifest.json
+++ b/tests/isolated-keycape-native-fixture-manifest.json
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
     "tests/run_isolated_keycape_native_fixture.py": "sha256:ecbadecc475622eaaf20a726110aebef5f4fe7af141110a98aca1640179b4a03",
     "tests/test_identity_bundle.py": "sha256:be5ce74097594cc7f7e77dbccd6cb53aa72f263cd1bb442ce5464038aed1116c",
     "tests/test_isolated_keycape_fixture_plan.py": "sha256:5945619f4c5957187763276cc900870a9f08f9475b63c240694688e0c2eca7dd",
-    "tests/test_isolated_keycape_recovery.py": "sha256:247e9a87f5be2ee9f20f7edbb4a9f612ab7cb0cd940392c3caeca8b046605f55",
+    "tests/test_isolated_keycape_recovery.py": "sha256:5f729e077db51dd6b17d00dc3eb71c0e652849f55fe68505a07befa663c91dea",
     "tests/test_isolated_keycape_session.py": "sha256:cbdf51efde26eff337e9303a2c431f80b333b8846d763eb62853f81eb3f13e2c",
     "tools/bootstrap-recovery/capture-identity.py": "sha256:47dca7c4dc96fa7eb9fb02c81fca9ca8dc5281aac918979eb7367148168ba705",
     "tools/bootstrap-recovery/check-privacyidea-database.py": "sha256:90f454c87998d7f5d625e3c6656c3418f8f56275dc1879a9d19ed605431b94a4",
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
     "tools/bootstrap-recovery/inventory-scaleway.py": "sha256:a219df205708fa4ed44b763a418585d63c820c25434bc0fd14e805eb5c2f79d3",
     "tools/bootstrap-recovery/inventory-storage-share.py": "sha256:673f9b17fb2f3fef6fcdb5c50a2bcca69e3df3157a9e5582a2d995c6b87640b5",
     "tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-keycape-session.py": "sha256:8fa38efe28167b59a6307f342b2ac8fcda78ecda60e6228f22017424d2343c22",
-    "tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-keycape.py": "sha256:f67627b7d1647d75187dd899874efe22383bc91de5d97dabb9801076668ab3c2",
+    "tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-keycape.py": "sha256:86f37add7221e4c73e3f9d878c09a3cc81061627cbf024ed6887d973d929b718",
     "tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-lldap.py": "sha256:35bfa8411186ad936a199bd450c7e18c2ad51059301a6db9650e6bd055ab1b81",
     "tools/bootstrap-recovery/isolated-privacyidea.py": "sha256:4df7196678aac1ad594f32abf45c68dc21a9d2760d9e8a536a215a4a3c5d277f",
     "tools/bootstrap-recovery/prepare-identity-coverage.py": "sha256:cd5f3067d28b4c7cc93ed08b8cf3869218bdecf7c54b5dffed22d697de71dbb1",
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@
     "synthetic_source_root": "private /dev/shm/nk49-keycape-fixture-<suffix>",
     "safe_result": "private /tmp/nk49-keycape-native-fixture-review-<suffix>/result.json"
   },
-  "scope": "candidate itself on complete synthetic format/integrity archive fixture; no native PI/LLDAP/Authelia proof, real custody, real factor or real client credential; successor binds sealed-descriptor custody preparation sources; synthetic fixture itself overrides custody with generated fixture key as before",
+  "scope": "candidate itself on complete synthetic format/integrity archive fixture; no native PI/LLDAP/Authelia proof, real custody, real factor or real client credential; successor binds sealed-descriptor custody preparation sources; synthetic fixture itself overrides custody with generated fixture key as before; unexecuted exact-one-selector adapter successor: no new native outcome inferred from earlier fixtures",
   "mutations": [
     "conditional creation of exact fresh local containers and local-driver tmpfs volumes",
     "private synthetic file import to those volumes",
--- a/workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md
+++ b/workplans/NK-WP-0049-bootstrap-secret-free-recovery-handoff.md
@@ -1130,6 +1130,24 @@
 `recovery-owner-handoffs-r1` source review; independent ID/UUID/status/remote
 readback is recorded separately when performed.
 
+2026-10-17 exact-selector source preparation: the adapter now requires exactly
+one selected client in the already-restored archived configuration before further
+runtime environment reads, signer-key parsing or native checker invocation.
+Absent, duplicate (identical or conflicting) and empty selectors refuse early;
+existing unique registration behavior is retained. This check cannot run before
+private archive decryption or its key prompt. Current KeyCape Go configuration
+also rejects duplicate IDs; this is an explicit adapter guard, not a claim that
+the pinned native issuer admitted duplicates. Tests use public/synthetic config
+and mocked native calls only. Changed adapter bytes require a fresh reviewed
+source/dependency and admission binding; old actual fixture receipts are retained.
+The exact eight-field current consumer selector independently passes its offline
+AST-only preflight. TLS public provenance/private custody, archive-time selector
+binding, current owner recovery assent and outage-compatible actual consumer
+proof remain open under T35/T36 and the existing owner tasks. No actual archive,
+key, Secret object, token exchange, OpenBao login, rotation or native action was
+performed. Source evidence and proposed owner declaration/consumer plan:
+Custodian docs/changes/netkingdom-target-2026-10-17/native-identity-r1/.
+
 ## Verify actual SOPS compatibility and sealed-descriptor read/write custody
 
 ```task