chore(consistency): sync task status from DB [auto]

Updated by fix-consistency on 2026-08-09: - USER-WP-0022-T01: progress → wait
2026-08-09 22:27:34 +02:00 · 2026-08-09 22:27:34 +02:00 · b7378b7623
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+---
+id: USER-WP-0022
+type: workplan
+title: "Public registration and JIT application profiles"
+domain: communication
+repo: user-engine
+status: active
+owner: codex
+topic_slug: netkingdom
+created: "2026-08-09"
+updated: "2026-08-09"
+depends_on:
+  - USER-WP-0021
+  - NK-WP-0025
+state_hub_workstream_id: "97145e5b-5f8f-4cb1-9135-2593f5baac8f"
+---
+
+# USER-WP-0022 - public registration and application JIT
+
+Turn the existing provider-neutral registration domain into a safe public
+product flow and provide idempotent first-login application-profile creation.
+user-engine remains the user/profile source of truth but delegates login
+identity creation to NetKingdom.
+
+## T01 - Publish the public registration journey
+
+```task
+id: USER-WP-0022-T01
+status: wait
+priority: high
+state_hub_task_id: "43dd49b7-6dbc-4117-a401-6d9f6e59aa26"
+```
+
+Add accessible browser/API entry points for start, email verification,
+provider password-setup handoff, resume, expiry, cancel, and completion.
+Enable public registration only through explicit runtime configuration and
+signed allow-listed return context. Apply rate limits, anti-enumeration
+responses, CSRF, idempotency, and safe diagnostics.
+
+Done when the flow can be enabled per deployment without exposing whether an
+email or username already exists.
+
+Implementation contract established in NetKingdom at
+`docs/public-registration-orchestration-contract.md`. The current
+authenticated registration API will not be moved ahead of authentication;
+the public adapter will use opaque intent handles and construct a narrowly
+scoped applicant actor only from consumed verification evidence. First code
+slice added `RegistrationVerificationPort`, bound request/receipt/evidence
+types, and a fail-closed HTTP adapter with purpose checking and normalized
+mailbox evidence. Adapter tests and the full 123-test suite pass.
+
+## T02 - Orchestrate provider identity creation
+
+```task
+id: USER-WP-0022-T02
+status: progress
+priority: high
+state_hub_task_id: "74239ce4-5c1e-46cf-8abf-3cbec3f3f989"
+```
+
+Use the existing provisioning port to create or resume an ordinary NetKingdom
+identity only after required verification. Persist lifecycle intent and outbox
+state atomically; compensate or surface recoverable partial state on provider
+failure. Never accept or retain an LLDAP password, admin credential, MFA seed,
+or verification secret in the user-engine domain.
+
+Done when a registration can resume safely across timeout/retry and produces
+one external identity link.
+
+The existing provisioning port remains the privileged boundary. Public
+registration adds canonical username and uses the registration ID as its
+stable idempotency key; it accepts only the baseline ordinary-user group and
+the provider-owned password-setup handoff. `ProvisioningRequest` now carries
+an optional canonical `preferred_username` through the HTTP adapter without
+changing existing callers.
+
+## T03 - Create application profiles on first login
+
+```task
+id: USER-WP-0022-T03
+status: cancel
+priority: high
+state_hub_task_id: "01fa1a22-0f4a-4a36-a9b3-0f94d3c70be1"
+```
+
+Implement an idempotent ensure-application-profile operation keyed by
+application plus verified issuer and subject. Seed only approved profile
+defaults and preserve application ownership of application-specific data.
+Verified email may suggest an explicit link to an existing local profile but
+must never authorize an automatic takeover.
+
+Done when repeated OIDC callbacks return the same profile and collisions
+require explicit authenticated resolution.
+
+Cancelled here because application profiles are application-owned. The
+coulomb-social consumer implements this under CSOC-WP-0003 using its unique
+`(issuer, subject)` Member binding; user-engine continues to supply `/me`.
+
+## T04 - Carry assurance and step-up requirements
+
+```task
+id: USER-WP-0022-T04
+status: cancel
+priority: high
+state_hub_task_id: "d3bec8c6-e8d8-46d5-8fa2-b4675ff1ade8"
+```
+
+Model the application's minimum assurance and per-user/profile step-up policy
+as data consumed by KeyCape/application authorization. Do not let profile data
+issue tokens or weaken client minimums. Add a reauthentication/step-up handoff
+that returns to the intended action after fresh OIDC authentication.
+
+Done when a regular profile can be password-only while a profile or protected
+action can require MFA without changing global identity facts.
+
+Cancelled here in favor of KEY-WP-0008 client policy and CSOC-WP-0003 action
+step-up. user-engine must not become the token assurance authority.
+
+## T05 - Registration and JIT security matrix
+
+```task
+id: USER-WP-0022-T05
+status: todo
+priority: high
+state_hub_task_id: "0a5a5f3a-0d47-4d5d-bda5-e2c7c737fee6"
+```
+
+Cover enumeration resistance, duplicate username/email, verification
+replay/expiry, provider outage and compensation, return-state tampering, JIT
+replay, account-link collision, cross-tenant profile access, step-up downgrade,
+unlink, and deletion. Verify audit/outbox redaction and correlation.
+
+Done when the full suite and deployed consumer conformance both pass.