2026-08-22 00:24:00 +02:00
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# Session cutoff — 2026-08-22
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This is the clean stopping point for the session that prepared
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`WHITEHAT-WP-0001`. It separates implemented and calibrated work from target
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evidence that does not exist yet.
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## Safety state at cutoff
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- No live adversarial request was sent to `audit-core`, `tenant-engine`, or any
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other target.
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- No probe pod, fixture, credential, secret, database connection, or load was
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created.
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- `WH-ENG-20260821-AUDIT-E2` and `WH-ENG-20260821-TENANT-E2` are cancelled.
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Their identifiers are terminal and must not be reused.
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- No pass or finding was delivered to `risk-nexus`, because offline calibration
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is not target assurance.
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## Completed
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- Registered the repository, workplan, and tasks consistently in State Hub.
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- Established first-class repository intent, scope, ownership, rules of
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engagement, attacker model, evidence contract, and operator runbook.
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- Implemented a Python evidence harness with minimized, body-free reporting.
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- Implemented five differential read/list/create/update/delete probes.
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- Calibrated every probe against both an enforcing fixture and a deliberately
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vulnerable fixture; the vulnerable fixture is detected.
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- Added engagement authorization, expiry, route, rate, concurrency, credential
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TTL, production approval, owner acknowledgement, and cancellation gates.
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- Added E3 cadence/evaluation, capacity characterization, and pass/finding
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message formatting.
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- Added and reviewed an `audit-core` E2 adapter and exact attributed pod
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manifest. Target review found a missing `Idempotency-Key`; the adapter was
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corrected and its retry fixtures made deterministic.
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- Recorded why `tenant-engine` does not currently instantiate the stated E2
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attacker model instead of forcing a misleading probe.
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- The repository check suite passes with 23 tests, and both probe packs
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validate.
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## Not completed
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- No service has a dated target E2 artifact from this facility.
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- `audit-core` still needs formal target-owner acknowledgement of the final
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adapter and engagement revision, plus two sanctioned ordinary tenant-scoped
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`may_read`/`may_write` fixture identities with a maximum 900-second lifetime.
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- `tenant-engine` still needs an applicability decision: expose a real
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tenant-bound identity that models E2, or mark this target not applicable for
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E2 and test the authorization boundary where it actually exists.
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- Target adapters have not yet been calibrated against target-shaped known-bad
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implementations.
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- E3 still needs an authorized database consumer and live SQL runner on the
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declared 24-hour and pre-promotion cadence.
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- P1/P2 still needs a separately approved substrate/load window and ceilings.
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- No target pass/finding has been delivered to `risk-nexus`.
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## Required redesign before resuming
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Build a governed whitehat test plane rather than assembling authority during
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each run:
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1. A dedicated namespace and immutable runner identity, with default-deny
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networking and explicit target egress.
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2. A credential broker that accepts an engagement ID and projects two
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short-lived, tenant-scoped fixture identities directly into the runner,
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then expires and revokes them without exposing values to the operator or
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agent.
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3. A target registration contract containing the posture claim, attacker
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model, fixture lifecycle, exact routes, adapter, known-bad calibration,
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abort telemetry, and an honest not-applicable state.
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4. A pinned runner image, required engagement/admission labels, health and rate
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watchers, an independently usable kill switch, and automatic cleanup.
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5. Standing authorization only for low-rate, fixture-only registered E2 runs;
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database compromise, recovery, saturation, and destructive techniques keep
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separate explicit approval classes.
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6. Automatic delivery of both passing and finding reports to `risk-nexus`.
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Resume only with new engagement IDs after that plane can issue the correct test
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identities and enforce the complete envelope. The existing workplan remains the
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backlog: T01 and T02 are done; T03, T04, T05, T06, and T07 remain in progress.
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2026-08-22 00:44:21 +02:00
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## Progress after cutoff
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On 2026-08-22 the plane contract was encoded in this repository:
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[`docs/test-plane.md`](test-plane.md), `targets/`, `plane/`, and
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`whitehat_security.plane`. No live packet was sent. No credential was
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requested. Cancelled engagement IDs remain terminal.
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