access-engine/docs/tenant-engine-action-vocabulary.md

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# tenant-engine Action Vocabulary
This document defines the action vocabulary for `tenant-engine` as a
flex-auth protected system (`FLEX-WP-0008-T01`). Action names here match
`tenant-engine`'s own `authz.FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer` mapping exactly
(`tenant_engine/src/tenant_engine/authz.py`) — coordinated between the two
repos, not independently invented.
| Action | tenant-engine endpoint | Resource type | Decision effects |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `tenant.read` | `GET /tenants/{id}` | `tenant` | `allow`, `deny` |
| `tenant.create` | `POST /tenants` | `tenant` | `allow`, `deny` |
| `tenant.role.grant` | `POST /tenants/{id}/roles/grant` | `role-grant` | `allow`, `deny` |
| `tenant.role.revoke` | `POST /tenants/{id}/roles/revoke` | `role-grant` | `allow`, `deny` |
| `tenant.role.read` | `GET /tenants/{id}/roles` | `role-grant` | `allow`, `deny` |
| `tenant.role.read.live` | `GET /tenants/{id}/roles/live` | `role-grant` | `allow`, `deny` |
| `tenant.plan.assign` | `POST /tenants/{id}/plan` | `plan-assignment` | `allow`, `deny` |
| `tenant.update` | `PATCH /tenants/{id}` | `tenant` | `allow`, `deny` |
| `tenant.retire` | `POST /tenants/{id}/retire` | `tenant` | `allow`, `deny` |
| `tenant.reactivate` | `POST /tenants/{id}/reactivate` | `tenant` | `allow`, `deny` |
| `tenant.guardrail.read` | `GET /tenants/{id}/guardrails` | `guardrail` | `allow`, `deny` |
| `tenant.guardrail.set` | `PUT` / `DELETE /tenants/{id}/guardrails/{limit_key}` | `guardrail` | `allow`, `deny` |
The lifecycle trio is from `FLEX-WP-0010` / `TEN-WP-0005`. The last two are
the TEN-WP-0006 guardrail actions (`FLEX-WP-0014`). They are two actions
rather than one `tenant.guardrail` so policy can grant a PDP the read
without granting the write. That split is used today: `flex-auth` may
`tenant.guardrail.read` and may not `tenant.guardrail.set`; `tenant-engine`
may do both. Reasoning is recorded in
`examples/tenant-engine/policy_package.md`.
These are the only twelve actions `tenant-engine` sends to `POST /v1/check` —
its `FlexAuthCheckClient` (`TEN-WP-0003`) never sends anything else.
Every tenant and role read is gated before the store is touched, preventing
both unauthorized data access and tenant-existence probing. `user-engine`
may read tenant records, `flex-auth` may perform the high-stakes live role
lookup, and no caller receives a role-read privilege through a mutation rule.
## Not in scope for this vocabulary
`tenant-engine`'s capability roles (`PLTF`/`IAM`/`VEN`/`CUS`, ADR-0014) are
**tenant** state — what a tenant is allowed to do on the platform. This
vocabulary governs a different question: which **operator/service
subjects** are allowed to call `tenant-engine`'s admin API at all. The
lifecycle actions do not change that boundary: `tenant.retire` asks whether
*this caller* may retire a tenant, not what a *retired tenant* may still do —
the latter is tenant state that tenant-engine enforces itself. The two
must not be conflated — a policy package that checked a *caller's* action
against a *tenant's* capability roles would be checking the wrong thing.
See `examples/tenant-engine/policy_package.md`'s Rules section for how the
distinction is enforced.
## Related
- `docs/tenant-engine-resource-namespace.md`
- `examples/tenant-engine/`