access-engine/workplans/FLEX-WP-0024-decision-envelope-authenticity.md

id	type	title	domain	repo	status	owner	topic_slug	planning_priority	planning_order	depends_on_workplans	related_workplans	created	updated	state_hub_workstream_id
FLEX-WP-0024	workplan	Sign the decision envelope: the response channel is unauthenticated	infotech	flex-auth	active	claude	netkingdom	P1	240	FLEX-WP-0021	FLEX-WP-0019 FLEX-WP-0023	2026-09-06	2026-10-21	90577acd-6910-548d-a13e-1dbfdfb8ed27

FLEX-WP-0024 — Sign the decision envelope: the response channel is unauthenticated

Opened by FLEX-DEC-2026-010, from a question secrets-engine asked rather than answering locally: how is the response channel authenticated? They declined to choose a transport control for flex-auth's service on the grounds that it is not a consumer's call. Correct, and it is why this is a flex-auth workplan and not a mitigation in their repo.

The stance today: pins serve plain HTTP, flex-auth.decision-record.v1 carries no signature, and a responder that knows the package id and version — both published — can return a well-formed effect: allow that passes every check a consumer performs.

The two things not to get backwards

The digests do not authenticate the responder and cannot. Every input to them is either sent by the caller or published, so a forger reproduces request_digest, policy_package_digest, and registry_snapshot_digest exactly. Publishing more digests makes a forged envelope look more authenticated, not less.

Fail-closed does not cover this. It protects against a PDP that is absent, not against one that lies. An unreachable PDP denies; a lying PDP allows.

1. Publish the stance and stop publishing bare Service names

id: FLEX-WP-0024-T01
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "b8fad80d-5c44-5e26-a632-5096e0c0f3c5"

Owner: flex-auth.

Done 2026-09-06. docs/decision-record-contract.md states that digest recomputation is not responder verification, because the contract is the only document a consumer is guaranteed to read. docs/operator-caller-access-path.md carries the reproduced DNS probe and the channel analysis. The trailing-dot FQDN replaced the bare Service name in examples/secrets-engine/README.md, SCOPE.md, and the FLEX-WP-0021-T05 handover note — a bare *.svc.cluster.local name resolves through search ad.binect.de to one unrelated public host, and a name for a service that does not exist resolves to the same address.

2. Choose the signature shape and key custody

id: FLEX-WP-0024-T02
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "5482f3cd-36cb-55e0-8c52-0ca2340ed4d7"

Owner: flex-auth; key custody is not ours to invent.

• Detached signature over the canonical envelope, preferred over transport-only mTLS for two reasons: it survives the transport, so a decision audited later is still attributable, where mTLS authenticates a connection that no longer exists; and it composes with FLEX-DEC-2026-009, since a record that names its authenticated caller and carries flex-auth's signature is an audit artifact where either alone is a claim.
• Decide the canonical form to sign. The existing canonical-JSON rules from docs/canonical-request-digest.md are the obvious basis, but the signed material is the envelope, not the request, and it must exclude the signature field itself. Write it down before implementing: an implicit canonicalisation rule is what FLEX-DEC-2026-007 had to correct.
• Do not mint a key in this repo. Route custody via warden route find "decision envelope signing key" and OpenBao, per the estate credential-routing rule. flex-auth decides the shape; it does not own key material.
• State key rotation and how a consumer discovers the current public key, since a consumer that cannot rotate trust has a pinned key that will one day be wrong.

Gate: the canonical form, the algorithm, and the custody path are written down and reviewed before any signing code exists.

Done 2026-09-14. Written in docs/decision-envelope-signature.md: detached Ed25519 over json.Marshal of the envelope with signature omitted; unsigned is {mode: unsigned}; production key lives in OpenBao, not this repo (proposed catalog id flex-auth-decision-envelope-signing-key). Test-only seed is documented and is not the custody path.

3. Implement signing and verification

id: FLEX-WP-0024-T03
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "041612ea-1be4-5997-8c32-49f8bcc50855"

Owner: flex-auth.

• Add the signature to schemas/decision_envelope.schema.json as additive, and state in the contract that request_digest is unaffected so no consumer re-pins — the same note that was needed for v2 and for approval_binding_digest.
• Emit unsigned when no key is configured, and say so in the envelope rather than omitting the field silently. Absence stated, not implied — the pdp_digest precedent.
• Ship a verification example and a fixture pair in examples/secrets-engine/replay/: a genuine signed envelope and one whose payload was altered after signing, so a consumer's verifier is tested against a real failure rather than only a real success. A verifier that has never seen an invalid signature is untested, which is the lesson from every fixture suite in FLEX-DEC-2026-008.

Gate: an altered envelope fails verification, an unaltered one passes, and a consumer can perform both from the fixtures alone.

Done 2026-09-14. Additive signature on the schema and envelope. Engine emits {mode: unsigned} when no key is configured. Fixture pair: examples/secrets-engine/replay/decision_rotate_signed.json verifies, decision_rotate_signed_tampered.json does not, same request_digest. Public key in keys.json. Tests in internal/sign.

4. Report the gap to gate-house

id: FLEX-WP-0024-T04
status: done
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "82d6b75e-e2c6-5e3d-a897-fbdfb7c9094e"

Owner: flex-auth.

§6.4 obligates the PEP to act on a decision and §9.3 splits degraded mode by owner, but nothing in the standard requires a PDP's response to be authenticable. So a fully conformant PEP can trust a forged allow while meeting every published obligation. That is a gap in the standard, not only in this implementation, and it belongs in the outstanding v0.8 assent round alongside the FLEX-DEC-2026-009 finding.

T04 closed — 2026-09-07

Done. Reported as FLEX-DEC-2026-011 F1, ranked blocking for calling the §6.4 PEP obligations complete and explicitly not blocking anyone's adoption of v0.8 — the condition already exists under v0.7 and is not created by this version. §16 already carries the same observation one layer up, about the standard's own publication path having no digest or freeze discipline; F1 is that observation applied to the artifact the standard regulates.

5. Wire owner signing into the decision pin and retained deployment charts

id: FLEX-WP-0024-T05
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "cfe4d275-9f02-5090-8391-06eea59d45c5"

2026-10-16 source follow-through: NetKingdom target Secrets Engine R2 owner review found that the completed T03 signature package was used only by fixtures. Add explicit mounted seed/kid configuration for serve, sign the final envelope before recording, and expose inert existing-Secret mounts in both retained/new charts. The API/sign verifier sources remain byte-identical. Local source validation and review are in the Custodian docs/changes/netkingdom-target-2026-10-16/access-verifier-review/. This is source preparation only, not signer admission or deployed acceptance.

6. Admit custody, consumer trust, exact packages and native signed decisions

id: FLEX-WP-0024-T06
status: progress
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "7f785b52-bf62-5884-8d34-670d70bc9023"

Wait on Platform/OpenBao key custody, independent public-key and issuer/policy-pin admission, exact image and existing-Secret values rollout, owner-bound caller/tunnel, and Secrets Engine verifier installation. Follow docs/decision-envelope-signature.md for overlap/removal semantics. Retain signed producer record/consumer acceptance, forged/altered/unsigned/wrong-pin/expired denial and rotation-removal receipts; then update actual deployed status. No signer or runtime trust is admitted by the source review. This task owns the producer-side native gate; SECRETS-WP-0014 owns consumer admission/enforcement. The old fixture completion never established this gate, so the workplan is reopened rather than claiming it already passed.

2026-10-16 owner native preparation: T06 is progress because Access still owns signer workload declaration, artifact/provenance and source/provider-join preparation; no unqualified cross-owner wait is claimed. Read-only actual release metadata and bounded proposal are in the Custodian docs/changes/netkingdom-target-2026-10-16/access-native-preparation/. The real Platform custody route flex-auth-decision-envelope-signing-key exists but is draft/nonresolvable; no production kid/public fingerprint, Secret projection or custody receipt is admitted. Coordinate that named commitment through CUST-WP-0080 instead of inventing a Platform task/approval. SECRETS-WP-0014-T03 owns installed consumer native verification and must not form a circular blocking dependency.

The first proposed native trial only signs the unchanged lifecycle package on the existing retained release; execute-ccr remains denied. Current service-pilot runtime_admission := false remains mandatory: the source ServicePilotInputs is not yet wired into HTTP, and public service_actor_binding never authenticates the caller. Later activation needs a complete reviewed provider join, exact policy and operation admission, artifact digests, owner execution/rollback proposal and native receipts. Preparation/local synthetic success grants none of those permissions.

2026-10-16 source-only native preparation adds the existing Secrets PDP ServiceAccount to tenancy.yaml with evidence in docs/native-signer-workload.json, makes the retained flex-auth audience explicit, pins CI archive fetch to the full source revision, and adds offline native signer receipt verification using the existing Secrets verifier. No key, trust, image publication or live activation is admitted. The managed workload's missing rapp declaration remains explicit migration debt; this source binding does not fabricate a package declaration or raise its grade.

2026-10-16 separate B1 source follow-through wires ServicePilotInputs through actual HTTP/TokenReview into a signed-DENY-only engine entry. Generic execute-ccr calls refuse across every policy, including the old separately named positive fixture; that proof stays pinned to ec21518e. Original context/submitted digest stay unchanged. Actual disposable serve/TLS TokenReview/HTTP signed-DENY and bypass/refusal tests are source evidence only. B2 depends on independently reviewed Approval fact contract and canonical vectors; B3 additionally needs exact source/normalization numeric representation and full trusted provider joins. No current policy false gate, production trust, native deployment or protected effect is enabled by B1.

2026-10-16 B2/B3 source successor preparation (separate from frozen B1): the isolated v2 source path now joins the fixed authenticated Approval reader, unchanged Approval-owner canonical/fact helper, original/fresh correspondence, raw numeric request/registry source retention, same policy evaluator and signed source provenance. Disposable actual HTTP and production serve subprocess prove synthetic signed ALLOW and fail-closed negative joins with exact response/record parity. See docs/trusted-service-task-source.md. T06 remains progress: this source proposal requires independent cross-owner review and full consumer/Platform successor integration, then separately admitted runtime custody, source trust, image provenance and rollout. No source-only proof establishes those runtime gates.

2026-10-16 B2/B3 R2 temporal correction (R1 retained): whole-stack review exposed that R1's 15s ALLOW and default Approval freshness30 cannot fit the declared minimum backendTTL30 plus existing cleanupreserve5. The v2 successor now derives exact ALLOW expiry from the immutable operationdeadline, requiring all original/ fresh approval/freshness/caller bounds, a conservative source maximum120 and remaining declaredTTL+5 after source I/O/evaluation. No consumer/native deadline or cleanup guard is relaxed. Max structural budgets that cannot fit refuse. The fixture declares backendTTL30/deadline60 and explicit source freshness120; owner runtime source freshness configuration and full native integration remain separate reviewed gates. See docs/trusted-service-task-source.md.

2026-10-16 B2/B3 R3 follows actual retained-registry integration failure: subject enrichment changed evaluated approval-free digest from the original proposal. The existing signed claim-free DENY now explicitly carries v2 approvalfree digest (equal evaluated requestdigest), enabling producer-owned preapproval facts under the already published enrichment contract. The final original proposal adds only the issued claim; registry drift/refreshed facts cannot silently rebind it. Retained-registry HTTP and production serve proofs and negative joins pass. R3 preserves precise notbefore pending separate Approval-owner timestamp fidelity repair; no rounding waiver, copied registry algorithm or empty-registry workaround.

2026-10-16 native admission prerequisite: fresh metadata confirms no namespace PVC exists, and current outbox had neither OS writer exclusion nor a byte/startup bound. Prepared existing-outbox hardening on exact canonical R3 base2b064ee: nonblocking Linux flock held through Close/process lifetime before recovery, 64MiB source journal ceiling,2MiB record/atomic-batch bounds, streaming startup, 4KiB cursor, all-effect commit refusal and fenced unconfirmed rollback. Actual process contention/crash release, capacity/prefix/restart and ENOSPC/fsync failure proofs are part of the owner package. No new service, live mount, deletion or custody grant; exact published successor, new PVC/PV retention/managed-package owner disposition and independent consumer admission remain prerequisites.

2026-10-16 owner package extraction record: canonical local package rapp-flex-auth-secrets-engine now exists at commit d52f811ed5ec0be27c9c367e71d476125b3228be, tree d4fbad71bdc8ef870603526ccd1f53195d0322af; authoritative declaration declarations/rapp.yaml SHA256 0b722431bc5162dd86f72b15f12424e149aca8f2a8790adf2c57e8511ea73b4c. Repo Manager exact local resolution under /home/worsch returns rapp-flex-auth-secrets-engine / workload flex-auth-secrets-engine / deployable flex-auth-secrets-engine, ownership access-engine, readiness draft. The retained lifecycle PDP is the only rollback boundary claimed; tenant/user/canary and retired rapp-secrets-engine remain excluded. Normative focused family validation passes; existing unrelated global rapp-forgejo error and reef projection warning remain visible. Package extraction keeps source 2b064eee510640224274ccdc7cefceb1ae13162e and current image sha256:05a03a8790c2210c48ea92391441c77ddf640d0cd32f5ec09838f5393171fcbd unchanged. Exact local source resolution is no central/private read-placement, reef binding, custody, native rollout or consumer trust admission. Future signer image/config adoption remains separate. T06 remains progress; no second work item duplicates this bounded dependency.

2026-10-16 bounded stopped-chart source preparation (Custodian access-native-admission/stopped-chart-r2): both outbox charts admit numeric replicaCount exactly 0 (maintenance stop) or 1 (single writer), with Recreate, process flock and bounded persistence unchanged. Fractions, strings, booleans, negative values and 2+ refuse; Helm decodes YAML/JSON integral 0.0/1.0 as the same numeric values as 0/1, so lexical float spelling is not distinguished. Actual Helm stopped/ready renders differ only in replicas and retain the same Platform source-rendered deployment projection. Owner preparation and independent coordinator checks approve this bounded source change only; 86 Helm renders and the existing outbox/delivery/receiver-port suite pass. No native stop, bootstrap, rollout, custody, public trust, resource or protected-effect approval follows. The proposed immutable image remains source revision 84c78e072c8f3daf2bc3b90f8efc8fbeb16c3cf0, ordinary CI402 verified digest sha256:09a83b273740133518cc7e7915fb211381e06545d347d2dd1974042525ac981f. This chart-only successor requires its own exact source/chart pin and reviewed runtime scope; it can explicitly select the unchanged verified 84 image without rebuilding it or claiming that its revision label names the new chart commit. These chart/test/workplan-only paths do not trigger the existing image workflow. Frozen rollout R1, Platform P2 and the package extraction2b/current05a remain unchanged. T06 stays progress; actual stopped-fence verification and all native admission gates remain open under the same existing task.

2026-10-16 Access owner exact native plan review (Custodian access-native-plan-review-next/): approved bounded Access workload/Helm/outbox/ stopped-only rollback plan for frozen rollout R2 manifest5be7a7f and Platform P4 manifest9eec861, chartdc0420/image84c78e OCI09a83b/projection8ce375f. Offline verification checks every R2 manifest/source digest and reproduces both exact Helm render bytes. The mandatory execution supplement names actual repo/Helm/CI paths and excludes unrelated legacy rollback recipes, records the owner/founder manual-writer acknowledgement, supplies a verified stopped-revision rollback shape, and separates120-second stop/readiness gates from atomic rollback and the600-second recovery decision. No production source change was needed. Existing read-only preflight admits all7exact resources but still observes unsigned05a/revision4running, no installed stopped fence or held window. T06 stays progress: actual founder entity/expiry/window/executor and five final external scope dispositions, custody/trust/caller, actual stopped Helm revision, PVC/PV Retain and native producer/consumer/restart/failure receipts remain open. No live mutation, credential access, new key, authority or protected effect follows.

2026-10-18 source implementation under CUST-WP-0080 / NK-WP-0048-T43: the producer-owned normal Check client now authenticates exact policy/registry/ caller/request/lifetime bindings with a nonce and the optional lossless JSON profile. The default legacy decoder and unchanged signature/API contract remain intact. Root pkg/decisionpep is the source of truth; its Go1.24 consumer slice is generated by tools/export_decisionpep_adapter.py and checked by ordinary tests. The Forgejo example uses authoritative registry tenant/issuer facts and verified runtime identity in the admitted caller's request context. Actual producer regressions reproduce/refuse object-shaped group inputs; policy fixtures and Rego tests validate the original three-group contract. Full isolated root race suite: 494 test/subtest passes, three existing optional/fixture skips. Export parity and final group-shape regressions pass. Detailed source pins and retained failures are in Custodian apps-access-engine-integration-r2.

This is source delivery, not owner assent or native admission. Synthetic keys, registry and local callback proof establish no live signer/caller/policy grant. Existing rollout R2/image84 and their approvals remain frozen; they do not admit this source or a new image. T06 and all native custody/trust/rollout/recovery gates remain open. Forgejo's complete resource/operation/inverse and session-revocation coverage remains NK48-T43 / RAPPS16-T09 work.

2026-10-21 Access owner review of CCR-2026-0050 (railiance-platform fd2f808; CCR sha256 66b3ea12d3f3bb870fa0aa0e7598e32abdb9bf39efe1adcfac286407abeb98e4, policy b9f816da…85ef, native plan 22306d50…06e5): approved for Access scope and sent to railiance-platform via State Hub. Secret name/key/mount/0440/kid in the CCR projection match frozen rollout R2 activation values byte for byte; candidate 84c78e0 carries --envelope-signing-key-file. Public receipt prepared: docs/native-signer-public-pin.json (pin derived by running check at 84c78e0: flex-auth/local, standalone, secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle, v2, sha256:bd11c5fe…b8b4) and tools/prepare_signer_public_receipt.py, which projects the Platform signer-cas-receipt.v1 into the exact secrets-engine.pdp-trust.v1 bytes plus access-engine.signer-public-receipt.v1 (kid, public key, pin, provenance hashes only). Rollout proposal stays R2; no parallel one. No key exists yet; no rollout, trust or admission happened. Founder go is T07.

7. Founder go for the attended signer rollout

id: FLEX-WP-0024-T07
status: wait
priority: high
needs_human: true
decision_id: "4fab263d-686b-4a06-9cea-8df619c87c03"
blocking_reason: "Founder go/no-go (entity, window, expiry, executor) for the attended R2 signer rollout, after Platform custody exists under CCR-2026-0050"
state_hub_task_id: "f3ac7eb7-0196-5853-b699-7a7f10138bf7"

Founder go/no-go for one attended window, after Platform custody exists under CCR-2026-0050 (Platform-owned approval, not this task). Executes frozen R2 exactly: stop to 0, Platform CAS0 under fence, activation values (image sha256:09a83b27…, kid flex-auth-lifecycle-20261016-r1). Rollback to the stopped revision, then the reviewed unsigned 05a03a87 restore; never re-CAS or restore a seed. Afterwards: prepare_signer_public_receipt.py → commit receipt under docs/evidence/ → founder signs pdp-trust.json (SECRETS-WP-0014-T04, decision e4eee965) → verify_native_signer_receipt.py on one native allow and deny. Then T06 closes.