tegwick
22935955cc
Assistant: codex Assistant-Model: gpt-6-astra Assistant-Session: 01a0e241-8285-7a63-8c0c-51c9cb824dc3
72 lines
4.6 KiB
Markdown
72 lines
4.6 KiB
Markdown
# Image-only release broker core
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ACTIVITY-WP-0041-T03 owns this implementation. **Not activated in production.**
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The new modules are not wired to an API, worker, schedule or credential source.
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Construction requires `admitted=True` from trusted deployment configuration; that
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switch is a local guard, not proof that an identity has actually been admitted.
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The current deployed revision is unchanged, so this code does not restart soak.
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## Implemented boundary
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`activity_core.release_broker.Receipts` checks Ed25519 signatures against a locally
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configured key-to-principal/role registry. Requests cannot introduce trusted keys.
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Build, independent review, health and retention attestations must all name the
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same fixed repository/application, full candidate and rollback commits, and exact
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before/after manifest hashes. Evidence expires within five minutes. Build and
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review require different principals **and keys**. Build evidence must cover exact
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candidate image digests and all three mandatory CI contexts. Retention must cover
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both live and rollback images. Health must attest continuous healthy observation
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of the prior revision for at least 24 hours. The trusted issuers must verify these
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facts against their authorities; signatures alone cannot make assertions true.
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`gitops_policy` is the shared image-only validator used by both broker and the
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existing CLI. It forbids non-image deployment changes and resource-set changes.
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`release_operations` constructs a one-field update of the validated platform child
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Application and fixed selective root/child sync payloads. No arbitrary command,
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repository path, application, prune flag or override is exposed by these builders.
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## Durable recovery
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A local SQLite ledger stores signed receipts, their hashes, the release binding,
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phase and transition history. One active row and an immediate transaction serialize
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all releases and adapter calls on that ledger. The database must reside on durable,
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operator-owned local storage, shared by all instances handling this application;
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this is not a distributed lock across independent databases or network filesystems.
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Phases are planned → publish_pending → published → synced → complete. Publication
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intent is committed before calling the adapter. Lost responses therefore cannot
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turn a possibly published change into an assumed cancellation. A release that
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expires before any attempt is cancelled; after intent, timeout or failed health
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enters rollback_planned → rollback_published → rollback_synced → rolled_back.
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Failed rollback retains the active slot. Retried publication/sync must be
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idempotent, using compare-and-swap and accepting already-at-target as success.
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The adapter must refuse any unexpected third revision rather than overwriting it.
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Tests use generated fixture keys and an in-memory adapter. They prove policy and
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state-machine behavior, including restart and failed-health rollback; they are
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**not** proof of production Git/ArgoCD rollback or admitted authority.
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## Still required before activation
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1. Implement and verify an authenticated transport adapter that resolves exact
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source commits, compares rendered manifests to the signed hashes, publishes
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only the platform child revision field, and runs the fixed selective syncs.
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Every network operation needs a bounded timeout; health must wait within that
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bound for the exact revision and verify deployments, report sink and schedules.
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It must persist/recover the platform commit across lost responses and serialize
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with other writers. A generic repository-write token is not path enforcement.
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2. Admit the dedicated principal and credential custody through the owner lane.
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ArgoCD Core has no API-server token lane. Kubernetes Application patch RBAC
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alone cannot restrict fields: keep it behind the reviewed broker boundary.
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Publish negative access tests and revocation behavior; no broad operator key.
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3. Supply independent trusted build/review/health/retention issuers and their key
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custody/rotation. The observer must measure continuous health; it must not
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manufacture a 24-hour interval from two snapshots. Preserve signing public
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keys for audit and protect the ledger from producer writes.
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4. Connect the durable dispatcher through activity-core/Temporal and sanitized
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evidence sinks. Prove authenticated transport failure, concurrency with other
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publishers, restart, denial and rollback in an isolated deployment environment.
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Then finish the production observation gate and enable the bounded scope.
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Platform enforcement contract: `railiance-platform/docs/activity-core-release-admission.md`.
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These requirements remain live work in ACTIVITY-WP-0041-T03 and RPF-WP-0048-T02.
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