activity-core/workplans/ACTIVITY-WP-0025-ops-ui-sso-access.md

id	type	title	domain	repo	status	owner	topic_slug	created	updated	state_hub_workstream_id
ACTIVITY-WP-0025	workplan	SSO access control for ops console and Temporal UI	infotech	activity-core	active	codex	activity-core	2026-07-22	2026-07-22	c4e48358-df12-4bf4-9916-0e93f05f5fcf

SSO access control for ops console and Temporal UI

Origin

ACTIVITY-WP-0024 shipped the operator automation console (/ops/ui) with ClusterIP + port-forward access and a shared operator token for mutations. Operators also use Temporal Web UI (actcore-temporal-ui:8080) for workflow debugging; the ops UI now deep-links to it.

Pain: port-forward + kubeconfig switching is fragile; shared token is not identity-aware. Goal: proper browser access via SSO without port-forward.

Closes SCOPE G10 (API external access) for the ops and Temporal UIs (not necessarily for unauthenticated programmatic API from the public internet).

Goal

Expose activity-core ops UI and Temporal Web UI behind authenticated ingress with Keycloak / key-cape OIDC SSO, so an authorized operator can:

1. Open HTTPS URLs in a browser (no kubectl port-forward)
2. Authenticate with org SSO (MFA per IAM profile where required)
3. Use ops console mutations under their identity (not only a shared token)
4. Open Temporal UI under the same access policy

Non-goals

• Public anonymous access to /ops or Temporal UI
• Replacing Temporal’s own RBAC model with fine-grained multi-tenant Temporal namespaces for all of Coulomb (single activity-core Temporal is fine for MVP)
• Full API productization for third-party clients (focus is human UI access)
• Moving Temporal server hosting ownership out of the activity-core namespace (unless railiance-platform already owns that path)

Architecture sketch (proposed)

Browser
  │ HTTPS
  ▼
Ingress (TLS)  ──►  oauth2-proxy / key-cape edge  ── OIDC ──► Keycloak (key-cape)
  │                         │
  │  allowlisted groups     │ identity headers / session
  ▼                         ▼
actcore-api (/ops, /ops/ui)     actcore-temporal-ui
  mutations: require SSO subject
  (retire shared token as primary; keep break-glass optional)

Credential routing: key-cape owns OIDC/login (warden route show key-cape-oidc-login); flex-auth for authorization decisions if used; do not invent secrets in git or State Hub.

Design decisions to lock in T01

Decision	Options	Lean
Hostnames	e.g. activity.ops.… / temporal.ops.… vs path-based single host	Prefer two hostnames or one host with path prefixes
Auth edge	oauth2-proxy vs nginx auth_request vs key-cape native	Prefer oauth2-proxy or fleet-standard edge if one already exists
Mutation identity	SSO email/sub as principal; drop shared token for normal use	Shared token = break-glass only
Temporal UI auth	Same edge in front of actcore-temporal-ui	Yes for MVP
Who may access	Explicit Keycloak group (e.g. activity-core-operators)	Least privilege

Tasks

Task: Access policy brief and hostnames

id: ACTIVITY-WP-0025-T01
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "de28ac08-cae5-476b-b093-82fcf8e3fa5e"

1. Document intended audience (founders / operators), MFA expectation, and allowed IdP groups.
2. Propose hostnames + TLS cert path (cluster issuer / railiance DNS).
3. Align with railiance-platform / key-cape conventions; open coordination messages if host or client registration is external.
4. Update SCOPE G10 with the chosen posture (UI SSO vs full public API).

Done when: short design note in docs/ or this workplan is approved; hostnames and IdP group named.

Task: Inventory fleet SSO ingress patterns

id: ACTIVITY-WP-0025-T02
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "650db102-ad4e-4d8e-86c1-eee50f5bafcc"

1. Find an existing oauth2-proxy / OIDC ingress pattern on railiance01 or coulombcore (railiance-platform, state-hub dashboard, etc.).
2. Prefer reuse over inventing a new edge stack.
3. Record the pattern (manifest paths, secrets ownership, callback URLs).

Done when: “pattern to copy” is written with repo/file pointers.

Task: Ingress + TLS for ops API (read path)

id: ACTIVITY-WP-0025-T03
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "7084f7d5-4181-4dfa-b239-0dad15efbae9"

1. Add Ingress (or Gateway) for actcore-api serving at least /ops and /ops/ui (and health for probes as needed).
2. Terminate TLS with the platform cert strategy.
3. Gate with SSO edge; unauthenticated browser hits redirect to login.
4. Keep ClusterIP service; no LoadBalancer unless required.

Done when: authorized browser reaches /ops/ui over HTTPS without port-forward; unauthorized gets login or 403.

Task: Ingress + SSO for Temporal Web UI

id: ACTIVITY-WP-0025-T04
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "99b36f31-eb19-4f96-b3f1-9ac1ab02d78f"

1. Expose actcore-temporal-ui behind the same auth edge (hostname or path).
2. Ensure Temporal UI env (TEMPORAL_ADDRESS, public URL / CORS if required) works behind the external hostname.
3. Ops console ACTIVITY_CORE_TEMPORAL_UI_URL points at the public SSO URL.

Done when: Temporal UI opens from the ops nav link without a second port-forward, under SSO.

Task: Map SSO identity into ops mutations

id: ACTIVITY-WP-0025-T05
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "77fff202-bfb6-49eb-b8e5-3760abacc8bd"

1. Accept trusted identity from the auth edge (e.g. X-Forwarded-User / X-Auth-Request-Email — exact headers depend on T02 pattern).
2. Prefer SSO principal over shared ACTIVITY_CORE_OPERATOR_TOKEN for mutations when present.
3. Audit log records SSO subject (never tokens).
4. Optional break-glass: keep operator token for emergency; document custody.

Done when: Run now / pause audit shows human identity from SSO; shared token not required for normal operator use.

Task: Keycloak client and group membership

id: ACTIVITY-WP-0025-T06
status: wait
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "b14e1f2c-1320-4218-8bd3-2a309295a69c"

1. Register OIDC client(s) via key-cape / netkingdom process (not ad-hoc).
2. Create/bind operator group; grant only named operators.
3. Document how to add/remove operators.

Done when: login works for a test operator and fails for an unprivileged account.

Task: Docs and runbook cutover

id: ACTIVITY-WP-0025-T07
status: done
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "c5945e64-c460-4830-a19e-a944bb44a67e"

1. Runbook: primary access = SSO URLs; port-forward = break-glass only.
2. k8s README: Ingress manifests and secret ownership.
3. Credential routing notes: key-cape for login; no secrets in git.

Done when: an operator can follow runbook without kubectl for daily use.

Task: Verify and harden

id: ACTIVITY-WP-0025-T08
status: done
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "f73eafbf-ad11-4d7d-b89e-e910c662ce86"

1. Confirm ClusterIP APIs without Ingress path remain not publicly reachable.
2. Confirm mutations without SSO (and without break-glass token) fail closed.
3. Smoke: inventory, status, Run now dry path, Temporal UI namespaces list.
4. Optional: network policies locking ingress → services.

Done when: checklist signed off in workplan closeout notes.

Success criteria

• HTTPS SSO URLs for ops console and Temporal UI (no port-forward required)
• Only authorized IdP group can access — MVP: any Authelia user; T06 residual
• Ops mutations attribute to SSO identity; audits show principal (sso:<user>)
• Ops nav Temporal link points at SSO Temporal URL
• Runbook documents SSO primary + break-glass port-forward
• SCOPE G10 updated to reflect UI SSO posture

Dependencies / coordination

• key-cape / Keycloak: OIDC clients, groups (warden route show key-cape-oidc-login)
• railiance-platform: DNS, cert-manager, ingress controller norms
• ACTIVITY-WP-0024: ops console exists; this WP unlocks production access

Implementation order

1. T01–T02 design + pattern reuse
2. T06 IdP client (can parallel with T03)
3. T03 ops Ingress + SSO
4. T04 Temporal UI Ingress + env URL
5. T05 mutation identity
6. T07–T08 docs and verify

References

• docs/runbook.md — operator console + dual port-forward (pre-SSO)
• src/activity_core/ops_api.py — ACTIVITY_CORE_TEMPORAL_UI_URL
• k8s/railiance/ — actcore-api, actcore-temporal-ui ClusterIP services
• ACTIVITY-WP-0024 operator automation console

Progress 2026-07-22

Task	Status	Notes
T01	done	Hosts: activity.coulomb.social + temporal.coulomb.social; docs/ops-sso-access.md
T02	done	Reuse Authelia + Traefik ForwardAuth (sso ns); not oauth2-proxy
T03	done	Ingress + cert Ready; unauth → 302 auth.coulomb.social
T04	done	Temporal Ingress + cert Ready; ACTIVITY_CORE_TEMPORAL_UI_URL + CORS set
T05	done	SSO Remote-User preferred; token break-glass; tests + redeploy
T06	wait	LLDAP group activity-core-operators + Authelia domain rules (net-kingdom)
T07	done	Runbook + k8s README + design doc: SSO primary, port-forward break-glass
T08	done	See verification checklist below

Verification checklist (T08) — 2026-07-22

Check	Result
DNS A → 92.205.62.239 for both hosts	ok
Certificate Ready (actcore-ops-tls, actcore-temporal-ui-tls)	ok
Unauth HTTPS /ops/ui → Authelia login redirect	ok
Unauth HTTPS Temporal host → Authelia login redirect	ok
Services remain ClusterIP (no public LB)	ok
Mutation without SSO/token → 401 fail-closed	ok
Mutation with Remote-User → auth passes (404 only if unknown def)	ok
ACTIVITY_CORE_TEMPORAL_UI_URL=https://temporal.coulomb.social	ok
TEMPORAL_CORS_ORIGINS includes public Temporal host	ok
Unit tests test_ops_auth + test_ops_console_api	18 passed
Image activity-core:railiance01-prod rebuilt, imported, api/worker/router rolled	ok
NetworkPolicy ingress→services	skipped (optional; ClusterIP + Authelia sufficient for MVP)
Full browser login + Run now under real MFA session	operator smoke (credentials not in agent)

Residual (keeps WP active)

T06 — restrict Authelia access to LLDAP group activity-core-operators (net-kingdom Authelia access_control rules). Until then any authenticated Authelia user can reach the UIs (org-wide SSO, not least-privilege).

Operator: open https://activity.coulomb.social/ops/ui once, confirm inventory loads and a safe mutation (or dry path) shows sso:<you> in /ops/audits.