The statute is accepted at v0.7; the operative form is net-kingdom/SECURITY-COMPANION.md v0.2. INTENT now declares Engine / PIP in its own voice, carries the §9.6 threat decomposition, the load-bearing heartbeat obligation, issuer and freshness on the claim, consumption as a mutation, and the custody question closed rather than held open. SCOPE.md is the first-cut boundary (nothing shipped). layer.yaml is the machine-readable declaration. The review under history/ scores intent vs scope vs the empty implementation. APPROVAL-WP-0001 sequences contracts before code and keeps consumption unimplemented until GH-WP-0002-T06. Registered with State Hub as infotech / approval-engine. Assistant: grok Assistant-Session: 01a04ceb-2057-7e20-b0f9-c282964d5dd9
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SCOPE
Implemented-and-first-cut boundary for agents and contributors. Aspirational direction belongs in
INTENT.md; current work and operational gates belong inworkplans/. Derived from INTENT after alignment to the accepted NetKingdom Security Layer Model v0.7 and its working companion.
One-liner
approval-engine is the PIP for the approval object: a durable, authenticated,
consumable artifact that access-engine reads as an input claim and that this
engine alone mutates.
Core Idea
An approval is current-state, not a log and not a decision. This repository
owns the object, the closed state machine, the local outbox that makes every
transition evidence, and the claim access-engine consumes. It does not decide
whether the action is permitted, does not author the policy that requires an
approval, and does not archive the trail.
The first cut is the spine that makes Canon T-06 — Approval Replay passable
and unblocks FLEX-WP-0017 T03/T05 — and nothing that has to guess a contract
the other side has not assented to.
In Scope
- Durable approval objects with stable identifiers.
- Bindings captured at issue time: action, target, actor, principal, purpose, validity window, identified approvers.
- Authenticated approval entries and distinct-approver counting.
- The closed state machine
requested → approved → valid → consumed, withsuperseded / revoked / expiredas terminal exits fromvalid. - Atomic supersession and single consumption (compare-and-swap, never read-then-write).
- Revocation that does not require the holder's cooperation and is effective at the next use.
- A local transactional outbox in this engine's own store; no synchronous
audit-coredependency inside a state-change transaction. - An introspection API that returns an input claim: approval identifier, canonical-binding digest, issuer, freshness.
- Emission-cadence declaration for load-bearing classes, as a heartbeat or as
reconciliation against
audit-coreevent counts — not rate monitoring. - Machine-readable layer declaration (
layer.yaml) as Engine / PIP, with no decision surface and no Tooling contact. - Fail-closed when this engine's own store is unavailable. An
audit-coreoutage does not block a revocation.
Out of Scope
- Authorization decisions —
access-engine(statute §6). - Approval policy: which actions require approval, how many approvers, which
separations of duty —
gate-housedoctrine, arriving as claims or versioned policy rules. - Identity and authentication of approvers —
key-cape. - The evidence archive —
audit-core. This engine emits; it does not store the trail or answer "is this approval valid?" from records. - Stronger-than-shipped custody (WORM, object lock, transparency log) — decided against (statute §16).
- Credentials materialized after a decision —
secrets-engine. - Graded progression, readiness, gap register —
maturity-engine. - Workflow, ticketing, inbox, notifications — the artifact, not the meeting.
- A general state-machine service for other concepts.
- PEP shape, unreachable-engine stance maps, Railiance
rail-*/rapp-*/reef-*axes. An approval is not a workload (statute §20.1). - Consumption signaling relative to the decision, until
GH-WP-0002-T06settles it withaccess-engine. Guessing that contract is out of scope even as a prototype.
Relevant When
- A protected action exceeds normal policy and needs a durable approval object bound to the exact request.
access-engineneeds an input claim that distinguishes approved from approved for this exact action, target, actor, and purpose.- Distinct-approver requirements must be enforced rather than conventional.
- An approval must be revocable without the holder's cooperation.
- Canon
T-06 — Approval Replayis the test, orFLEX-WP-0017T03/T05 is blocked on the missing object. - An event about an approval (especially a revocation) must not be separable from the state change that made it true.
Not Relevant When
- The question is "may this actor do X" — that is a decision.
- The work is policy authoring, runbooks, or credential issuance.
- The need is an audit query, a hash chain, or a WORM store.
- The need is a workflow inbox, a meeting, or a notification surface.
- The need is graded readiness or a maturity ladder.
- The work is mapping Railiance operational axes onto security objects.
- Consumption ordering is being "solved" from this side alone.
Current State
- Status: seed. The repository holds
INTENT.md, this file,layer.yaml, and a README. There is no store, no API, no outbox, no tests, no runtime. - Layer declaration exists in this engine's own voice (INTENT frontmatter +
layer.yaml). Conformance checks against Tooling contact are vacuously clean: there is no code to contact anything. - Consumption ordering remains unresolved estate-wide (
GH-WP-0002-T06). - Taxonomy request-claim schema is proposed, not assigned (statute §17).
- Work:
APPROVAL-WP-0001.
How It Fits
gate-house designs the approval contract (Staff, doctrine)
key-cape authenticates approvers (Tooling → claims)
approval-engine owns and mutates the object (Engine, PIP) ← this repo
access-engine consumes the claim; never mutates (Engine, PDP)
audit-core archives what this engine emitted (Engine, Evidence)
secrets-engine materializes credentials after a decision (Engine, Lifecycle)
Staff never holds this object. access-engine never owns it. audit-core
never answers whether it is still valid. Railiance consumes it as a claim;
it does not become a Railiance axis.
Terminology
| Term | Meaning here |
|---|---|
| Approval | The durable object this engine owns. Not a decision, not a workflow item. |
| Claim | What access-engine reads. Identifier + binding digest + issuer + freshness. |
| PIP | Policy Information Point. Supplies facts; does not decide. |
| PDP | Policy Decision Point. access-engine only. |
| Consumption | A mutation in this engine. Never inferred from a decision record. |
| Load-bearing | A control's soundness depends on the event being present. Revocations are this. |
| Local outbox | Durable queue in this engine's own transactional store. |
| Heartbeat | Signed nothing to report for a quiet load-bearing class. |
Related / Overlapping
| Other | Relation | Do not confuse with |
|---|---|---|
access-engine / flex-auth |
Consumer of claims; owner of the decision. FLEX-WP-0017 T03/T05 wait on this object. |
This engine validating "may this actor do X". |
gate-house |
Doctrine; designs the contract. GH-WP-0002 is the evidence-integrity work this spine must satisfy. |
This engine authoring who may approve what. |
audit-core |
Evidence destination. AUDIT-IN-0001 conditions the outbox. |
This engine exposing an approval-validity query from records. |
maturity-engine |
Deliberate opposite: open graded ladder vs closed binary machine. | Levels as a substitute for valid/consumed. |
secrets-engine |
Downstream of a decision. | Approvals as credentials. |
State Hub /decisions/{uuid} |
Not this object. Free-form decided_by is what FLEX-WP-0017 T03 rejected as a substitute. |
Storing approvals in the hub. |
Provided Capabilities
None. The spine described above is INTENT and first-cut SCOPE, not a shipped surface. No store, no API, no claim, no outbox.
When the first surface ships, this section gains capability blocks for the
introspection API, the mutation API, and the outbox. Until then, declaring
capabilities would advertise a PIP that does not exist.