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An engine for modelling and managing decisions.
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tegwick 5203f46e47 State approval-engine's requirements on the informed-decision approver surface 
informed-decision (INFD-WP-0001) has claimed the browser-facing approver
UI this repo disowned. Write down what this engine requires of it, and
name the three places the current contract does not fit: the human client
lacks approval:read for the object it must render, the assurance claim is
the only place MFA survives into the record and must be given a shape,
and view_hash has nowhere to ride into an entry whose body is discarded
by design. Also record that there is no inbox endpoint and never will be.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HyybaE7DUXrWYrhbnESCTe

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 1275879@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: eb464208-f821-41b2-bc5a-a6c33d92a8ad
2026-09-09 12:48:34 +02:00
approval_engine Set the approval store tenant to exact tenant:platform 2026-09-06 22:33:50 +02:00
deploy Reconcile the release record; guard the image pin with tests 2026-09-07 09:04:34 +02:00
docs State approval-engine's requirements on the informed-decision approver surface 2026-09-09 12:48:34 +02:00
examples Publish the valid-but-unbound claim; the missing shape was confounded 2026-09-07 13:48:00 +02:00
history Align to security layer model v0.7 and open the engine spine 2026-08-29 11:58:28 +02:00
intakes Record GH-DEC-2026-005; strike the spent G3 revisit trigger 2026-09-06 01:36:03 +02:00
schemas Name the execute-time digest target; record the tenant collision 2026-09-06 20:35:59 +02:00
tests docs(admission): resolve approval audit tenant and redaction inputs 2026-09-08 17:01:42 +02:00
workplans docs(admission): resolve approval audit tenant and redaction inputs 2026-09-08 17:01:42 +02:00
.custodian-brief.md chore(consistency): sync task status from DB [auto] 2026-09-06 01:09:55 +02:00
.gitignore Implement the engine spine: claim, outbox, machine, API 2026-08-29 12:52:49 +02:00
.repo-classification.yaml Add repo classification to close C-24/C-35 2026-08-29 14:43:52 +02:00
AGENTS.md Finish approval engine spine 2026-09-01 23:45:48 +02:00
cadence.yaml Finish approval engine spine 2026-09-01 23:45:48 +02:00
Containerfile Adopt Alpine as the sanctioned base; release candidate scans clean 2026-09-06 23:01:41 +02:00
INTENT.md Finish approval engine spine 2026-09-01 23:45:48 +02:00
layer.yaml Implement the engine spine: claim, outbox, machine, API 2026-08-29 12:52:49 +02:00
Makefile Adopt Alpine as the sanctioned base; release candidate scans clean 2026-09-06 23:01:41 +02:00
pyproject.toml State pdp_digest explicitly; decline to publish a vocabulary mapping 2026-09-06 09:32:11 +02:00
README.md Harden the PEP harness and KeyCape registration request 2026-09-02 15:46:06 +02:00
SCOPE.md Harden the PEP harness and KeyCape registration request 2026-09-02 15:46:06 +02:00
WORK-RECORDS.md chore(consistency): record decision id for GH-DEC-2026-005 2026-09-06 08:05:00 +02:00

README.md

approval-engine

The approval as a durable, authenticated, consumable object — issued before an action, verified at the moment of use, and provably not replayable.

An Engine, role PIP, in the NetKingdom security layer model (statute v0.7, accepted; operative form net-kingdom/SECURITY-COMPANION.md). It answers one question, totally and decidably:

Is this approval valid right now — for this exact action, target, actor, and purpose — and has it already been used?

It does not decide whether the action is permitted. That is access-engine, which stays NetKingdom's only policy decision point. An approval is one input to that decision.

Deliberately small, boring, and strict: atomic supersession and single consumption are what make Canon test T-06 — Approval Replay passable. Flexibility here would be a defect. Graded, evidence-based progression belongs to maturity-engine; the two engines are deliberate opposites.

See INTENT.md and SCOPE.md. Declaration: layer.yaml. Claim: docs/approval-claim.md. Consume: docs/approval-consumption.md. Caller auth: docs/caller-authentication.md. PEP sequence: docs/pep-integration.md. Origin: flex-auth FLEX-DEC-2026-001, raised while assenting to the security layer model.

make test
approval-engine migrate --db approvals.sqlite
approval-engine verify --db approvals.sqlite
approval-engine serve --db approvals.sqlite \
  --jwt-issuer https://auth.netkingdom.local \
  --jwt-audience approval-engine \
  --jwks-url http://key-cape.sso.svc.cluster.local:8080/jwks

POST /v1/approvals/{id}/consume implements GH-DEC-2026-003: the PEP atomically spends the approval before the protected side effect. Same-digest retries are idempotent; a different digest conflicts.

Production operations, caller scopes, audit delivery, and PEP sequencing are documented in docs/storage-operations.md, docs/caller-authentication.md, docs/outbox-contract.md, and docs/pep-integration.md. The checked-in StatefulSet deliberately refuses production startup without a migrated persistent store, KeyCape JWT verification, and authenticated audit delivery.