approval-engine/docs/gate-house-decision-request-claim-envelope.md

# Decision request to gate-house — the claim envelope on the PEP path

**Requested by:** approval-engine
**Date:** 2026-09-06
**Governs:** `GH-DEC-2026-003` (approval consumption ordering)
**Blocks:** first live consume for `SECRETS-WP-0007-T04`; recorded on
`APPROVAL-WP-0002-T05`
**Does not block:** `APPROVAL-WP-0002-T03` (see "Scope" below)

This is a drafted request, not a decision. gate-house owns the outcome.

## The question

secrets-engine's PEP validator (`validate_action_authorization`) expects an
`ActionAuthorization` envelope, but calls
`GET /v1/approvals/{id}/claim`, which serves approval-engine's approval-claim.
The two are different objects. Which one is the step-1 artifact on the governed
PEP path?

## Why this is a confirmation, not a redesign

`GH-DEC-2026-003` already names step 1 by endpoint and by field:

```text
1. PIP  GET /v1/approvals/{id}/claim  → valid_now (a fact, not permission)
```

`valid_now` is an approval-claim field. `ActionAuthorization` has no `valid_now`.

`ActionAuthorization` is not a governed object. It appears zero times in
gate-house and zero times in state-hub. It originates in flex-auth's
`docs/action-bound-authorization-contract.md` (2026-08-23), whose own status
line calls it *"the **proposed** `ActionAuthorization` storage and transport
object"* — a proposed shape for the durable approval object, which the same
document assigns to approval-engine. It was never ratified, and
`GH-DEC-2026-003` was issued six days later without it.

One further conflict worth recording: the validator hard-requires
`provenance.authority == "state-hub"`, while flex-auth's own contract states
that State Hub decision records *"are not the runtime approval authority."*
The constant contradicts the document it came from.

## Requested disposition — confirm the claim (option A)

Confirm that:

1. The approval-claim (`approval-engine/docs/approval-claim.md`) is the step-1
   artifact on the `GH-DEC-2026-003` path.
2. `ActionAuthorization` is **not** required on the claim path, and
   approval-engine is not expected to serve it there.
3. A PEP validates across the two artifacts it already fetches: the claim for
   approval fact (binding digest, validity window, consumption state,
   freshness, issuer), and the flex-auth `DecisionEnvelope` from step 2 for
   exact `CheckRequest` match and policy package/version pin.

No safety property is dropped by (3). `ActionAuthorization` is a *bundle* of
approval fact plus decision envelope; splitting validation returns each check
to the layer that owns the data, rather than having the PIP republish the PDP's
decision.

### What changes if approved

| Repo | Change |
| --- | --- |
| approval-engine | none — the claim schema stands as published |
| secrets-engine | split `validate_action_authorization` into a claim check and a decision check; drop the `authority == "state-hub"` requirement |
| flex-auth | acknowledge the proposed `ActionAuthorization` is shelved on this path (see "Deferred option" — it is not withdrawn) |
| gate-house | record the confirmation against `GH-DEC-2026-003` |

## Deferred option D — a ratified post-decision `ActionAuthorization`

Recorded so it is not rediscovered. **Not** requested now.

A single composed post-decision artifact — canonical UUID, lifecycle status,
one complete `CheckRequest`, bounded validity, approval evidence, and the
matching `DecisionEnvelope` — remains a coherent design. flex-auth's schema and
its secrets-engine profile already exist as a starting point.

**Why not now:** it needs a named issuer and lifecycle owner (nobody holds
that today), and `GH-DEC-2026-003` already settles the sequence without it. The
cost is months; the present problem is resolved by a confirmation.

**Revisit if any of these appear:**

- a third or fourth PEP-shaped consumer, where per-consumer two-artifact
  validation starts duplicating logic worth centralizing;
- a requirement for a single signed, forwardable authorization artifact
  (offline verification, or an audit that must replay one object rather than a
  join);
- resolution of flex-auth's open G3 finding — `DecisionEnvelope` carries no
  lifetime — if that is settled by composition rather than by adding a lifetime
  field to the envelope;
- assent of the statute §17 Taxonomy request-claim schema (`APPROVAL-IN-0001`),
  which the approval-claim already declares it yields to. If Taxonomy lands
  first, converge there and **do not** revive this separately.

**Constraint on any future adoption:** such an object is post-decision by
construction. It cannot be served from the step-1 claim call, because a step-1
response cannot contain a step-2 decision. It would be a new artifact at a new
endpoint, not a change to the claim.

## Also considered and rejected

- **approval-engine serves `ActionAuthorization` at the claim endpoint.**
  Structurally impossible for step 1, per the constraint above, and it would
  require asserting a `state-hub` authority that this engine does not hold.
- **Additively extend the claim** with `approvals.required_count` / `entries`.
  Publishing approver identities to consumers is a deliberate least-disclosure
  non-goal, and it still would not satisfy `id`, `authority`, or `request`, so
  the consumer's validator changes regardless.

## Scope

This does not gate `APPROVAL-WP-0002-T03`. secrets-engine is fail-closed until
T03 and its own T04 both land; deploying publishes a URL and commits no one to
an envelope. The question gates the first live consume, not the deployment.

## Proposed record

```yaml
kind: decision
title: The approval-claim is the step-1 artifact on the PEP consumption path
status: proposed
owner: Bernd Worsch
repo: gate-house
standard: net-kingdom/canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.7.md
source_note: docs/contracts/approval-consumption.md
requested_dispositions:
- approved
- revised
- rejected
affects:
- gate-house
- approval-engine
- flex-auth
- secrets-engine
- ops-warden
```