tegwick
5c87ba8610
flex-auth published binding.approval_binding_digest (FLEX-DEC-2026-007) after
secrets-engine found that a claim-bearing request's request_digest covers the
carried claim, so it can never equal a pdp_digest recorded before that claim
existed. A consumer obeying GH-DEC-2026-008 against request_digest would have
failed closed permanently on every claim rather than on a bad one.
The value recorded at issue was already correct, so no code changes. What was
wrong was this repo's description of the comparison target: a reader would
reach for request_digest and fail closed forever. The schema and
docs/approval-claim.md now name approval_binding_digest as the execute-time
target and state that request_digest is never it, while leaving the issue-time
description as it stood.
Separately, docs/keycape-service-registrations.md now records a live collision
in the deployment inputs: the manifest serves --tenant platform while the
requested registrations issue tenant:coulomb, and ApiApplication.identity
compares them with exact string equality before any object lookup, so those
tokens would be denied 403 on every non-health route. flex-auth's
tenant:platform is a PDP subject this engine never reads and cannot bridge the
two. The values are left as-is on purpose — resolving it needs an owner
statement on whether the two name the same layer, and guessing grants
cross-tenant access to the approval store. The doc's stale issuer is corrected
to the live https://kc.coulomb.social from
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|---|---|---|
| approval_engine | ||
| deploy | ||
| docs | ||
| examples | ||
| history | ||
| intakes | ||
| schemas | ||
| tests | ||
| workplans | ||
| .custodian-brief.md | ||
| .gitignore | ||
| .repo-classification.yaml | ||
| AGENTS.md | ||
| cadence.yaml | ||
| Containerfile | ||
| INTENT.md | ||
| layer.yaml | ||
| Makefile | ||
| pyproject.toml | ||
| README.md | ||
| SCOPE.md | ||
| WORK-RECORDS.md | ||
approval-engine
The approval as a durable, authenticated, consumable object — issued before an action, verified at the moment of use, and provably not replayable.
An Engine, role PIP, in the NetKingdom security layer model (statute v0.7,
accepted; operative form net-kingdom/SECURITY-COMPANION.md). It answers one
question, totally and decidably:
Is this approval valid right now — for this exact action, target, actor, and purpose — and has it already been used?
It does not decide whether the action is permitted. That is access-engine,
which stays NetKingdom's only policy decision point. An approval is one input to
that decision.
Deliberately small, boring, and strict: atomic supersession and single
consumption are what make Canon test T-06 — Approval Replay passable.
Flexibility here would be a defect. Graded, evidence-based progression belongs to
maturity-engine; the two engines are deliberate opposites.
See INTENT.md and SCOPE.md. Declaration: layer.yaml.
Claim: docs/approval-claim.md.
Consume: docs/approval-consumption.md.
Caller auth: docs/caller-authentication.md.
PEP sequence: docs/pep-integration.md.
Origin: flex-auth FLEX-DEC-2026-001, raised while assenting to the security
layer model.
make test
approval-engine migrate --db approvals.sqlite
approval-engine verify --db approvals.sqlite
approval-engine serve --db approvals.sqlite \
--jwt-issuer https://auth.netkingdom.local \
--jwt-audience approval-engine \
--jwks-url http://key-cape.sso.svc.cluster.local:8080/jwks
POST /v1/approvals/{id}/consume implements GH-DEC-2026-003: the PEP
atomically spends the approval before the protected side effect. Same-digest
retries are idempotent; a different digest conflicts.
Production operations, caller scopes, audit delivery, and PEP sequencing are
documented in docs/storage-operations.md, docs/caller-authentication.md,
docs/outbox-contract.md, and docs/pep-integration.md. The checked-in
StatefulSet deliberately refuses production startup without a migrated
persistent store, KeyCape JWT verification, and authenticated audit delivery.