tegwick
87e55e2bca
GH-DEC-2026-005 moved the distinct-approver check off the PEP onto this engine's valid_now. secrets-engine has implemented the split and reports it no longer verifies the threshold independently. Gate House accepted that as correct on layering AND as a genuine reduction in defence in depth, and named the compensating control: not a second check at the PEP, which is the duplication the split removes, but reconstructability at the issuer under §9.6. The emitted events could not support that. approval.issuance carried required_count but never who satisfied it, and approval.use carried no threshold evidence at all, so an auditor replaying the stream could not recompute the evaluation without reading live rows -- rows that may since have been superseded, revoked, or expired. Both events now carry a threshold object: required_count, distinct_approver_count, threshold_met, and approvers with approved_at plus assurance and evidence_ref when recorded. Tests prove reconstruction from the use row alone, and that the claim still discloses no approver identities -- they are evidence for audit-core, not consumer-facing, and the claim keeps disclosing the least it can. Writing the tests showed distinctness is already a storage invariant: entries is UNIQUE on (approval_id, subject_id), so a repeat approver is refused at insert and a separate entry_count could never differ from the distinct count. Dropped that field rather than ship a number that cannot vary, and the test now asserts the refusal instead. 88 tests pass (4 new). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TvyJPAaVCGsVheVhcCwNND Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 411227@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: d566f6d3-bcaf-43c3-bc5e-3ddd0f64b535 |
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| approval_engine | ||
| deploy | ||
| docs | ||
| examples | ||
| history | ||
| intakes | ||
| schemas | ||
| tests | ||
| workplans | ||
| .custodian-brief.md | ||
| .gitignore | ||
| .repo-classification.yaml | ||
| AGENTS.md | ||
| cadence.yaml | ||
| Containerfile | ||
| INTENT.md | ||
| layer.yaml | ||
| Makefile | ||
| pyproject.toml | ||
| README.md | ||
| SCOPE.md | ||
| WORK-RECORDS.md | ||
approval-engine
The approval as a durable, authenticated, consumable object — issued before an action, verified at the moment of use, and provably not replayable.
An Engine, role PIP, in the NetKingdom security layer model (statute v0.7,
accepted; operative form net-kingdom/SECURITY-COMPANION.md). It answers one
question, totally and decidably:
Is this approval valid right now — for this exact action, target, actor, and purpose — and has it already been used?
It does not decide whether the action is permitted. That is access-engine,
which stays NetKingdom's only policy decision point. An approval is one input to
that decision.
Deliberately small, boring, and strict: atomic supersession and single
consumption are what make Canon test T-06 — Approval Replay passable.
Flexibility here would be a defect. Graded, evidence-based progression belongs to
maturity-engine; the two engines are deliberate opposites.
See INTENT.md and SCOPE.md. Declaration: layer.yaml.
Claim: docs/approval-claim.md.
Consume: docs/approval-consumption.md.
Caller auth: docs/caller-authentication.md.
PEP sequence: docs/pep-integration.md.
Origin: flex-auth FLEX-DEC-2026-001, raised while assenting to the security
layer model.
make test
approval-engine migrate --db approvals.sqlite
approval-engine verify --db approvals.sqlite
approval-engine serve --db approvals.sqlite \
--jwt-issuer https://auth.netkingdom.local \
--jwt-audience approval-engine \
--jwks-url http://key-cape.sso.svc.cluster.local:8080/jwks
POST /v1/approvals/{id}/consume implements GH-DEC-2026-003: the PEP
atomically spends the approval before the protected side effect. Same-digest
retries are idempotent; a different digest conflicts.
Production operations, caller scopes, audit delivery, and PEP sequencing are
documented in docs/storage-operations.md, docs/caller-authentication.md,
docs/outbox-contract.md, and docs/pep-integration.md. The checked-in
StatefulSet deliberately refuses production startup without a migrated
persistent store, KeyCape JWT verification, and authenticated audit delivery.