tegwick
9c9528f5b2
Contracts first (T02–T04): approval claim schema with issuer, freshness,
and binding digest; local transactional outbox wire; load-bearing cadence
as heartbeat or reconciliation (layer.yaml declared).
Then the object (T06–T08): SQLite closed state machine, CAS supersession,
distinct-approver fail-closed, revocation without holder cooperation,
outbox insert in the same transaction. Tests fail the mutation when
emission fails, and revoke while the drain sink is down.
Introspection GET /v1/approvals/{id}/claim is a PIP fact, not a decision.
No public consume (T05 waits on GH-WP-0002-T06). Canon T-06 coverage for
wrong binding, expiry, revoke, and supersede.
FLEX-WP-0017 T03 is unblocked on this object; T05 remains blocked only on
consumption ordering.
Assistant: grok
Assistant-Session: 01a04ceb-2057-7e20-b0f9-c282964d5dd9
93 lines
3.4 KiB
Markdown
93 lines
3.4 KiB
Markdown
# Local transactional outbox contract
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Coordinates with `GH-WP-0002-T02`. Boundary and locality are in `INTENT.md`
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and statute §9.4; this is the wire.
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An implementer **cannot** satisfy this contract by emitting synchronously to
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`audit-core` inside the state-change transaction. That path is atomic and is
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forbidden: an audit outage would become an inability to revoke.
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## Rule
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Every issuance, use, supersession, and revocation **inserts an outbox row in
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the same transaction** that mutates the approval object. The durable queue
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lives in this engine's own store. Drain is asynchronous, at-least-once.
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`audit-core` dedupes on `event_id`; a replay does not fork the chain.
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If the outbox insert cannot be committed, the mutation does not commit.
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Emit-after-commit is a defect.
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Heartbeat rows (see [`emission-cadence.md`](emission-cadence.md)) use the
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same table and the same at-least-once drain. They are not coupled to an
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object mutation.
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## Event classes
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| Class | When | `audit-core` `action` |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| `issuance` | object becomes `approved` (threshold met) | `approval.issuance` |
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| `use` | object becomes `consumed` (internal CAS; not a public API until `GH-WP-0002-T06`) | `approval.use` |
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| `supersession` | object becomes `superseded` | `approval.supersession` |
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| `revocation` | object becomes `revoked` | `approval.revocation` |
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| `heartbeat` | signed *nothing to report* plus counts | `approval.heartbeat` |
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Expiry is a clock crossing, persisted on observation, and is **not** an
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emitted class. The validity window is already on the object.
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## Outbox row
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| Field | Type | Notes |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| `event_id` | UUID | Stable. Drain retries reuse it. |
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| `class` | enum above | |
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| `approval_id` | UUID or null | Null only for heartbeat. |
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| `payload` | object | The `audit-core.event.v1alpha1` record, ready to POST. |
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| `created_at` | RFC 3339 UTC | |
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| `drained_at` | RFC 3339 UTC or null | Set after a successful audit-core ack. |
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## Payload (audit-core v1alpha1)
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```json
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{
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"schema_version": "audit-core.event.v1alpha1",
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"event_id": "<same as outbox.event_id>",
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"observed_at": "<created_at>",
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"tenant": "platform",
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"scope": "netkingdom-approvals",
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"source": "approval-engine",
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"actor": "<actor or null for heartbeat>",
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"action": "approval.revocation",
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"resource": "approval:<approval_id>",
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"outcome": "success",
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"reason": null,
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"details": {
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"class": "revocation",
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"approval_id": "<uuid>",
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"binding_digest": "sha256:…",
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"superseded_by": null
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}
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}
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```
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No secret values. `details` may add non-secret identifiers; it must not add a
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validity verdict for consumers to branch on. `audit-core` MUST NOT expose an
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approval-validity query; this payload does not invite one.
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## Drain
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1. Select undrained rows, oldest first.
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2. POST each payload to `audit-core`.
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3. On success, set `drained_at`.
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4. On failure, leave the row; retry later. **Do not** roll back the object
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mutation — it already committed with the row.
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An `audit-core` outage therefore cannot block a revocation. This engine's
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own store being unavailable can, and should: the change could not have been
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recorded anyway.
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## Forbidden shapes
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- `audit-core` HTTP (or any client) inside `BEGIN` … `COMMIT` of a mutation.
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- Best-effort publish after commit with no row.
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- A second, non-local queue as the durability mechanism.
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- Deduping in this engine instead of relying on `event_id` at `audit-core`.
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