tegwick
9f6d038507
secrets-engine found that flex-auth hashes context into the request digest while the dual-control pattern carries the claim in context.approval, so a pdp_digest recorded at issue cannot equal the digest of the request that carries the claim. The resolution is forced by ordering rather than chosen: issue precedes the decision, so pdp_digest is necessarily the digest of the underlying action request before any claim is embedded in it. A claim cannot carry the digest of a document containing that claim -- the value would have to be known before it could be computed. Record that, and record the limit of our authority: the exact exclusion rule belongs to the PDP's digest contract, not here. This engine stores what it was given at issue and does not compute it. Warn consumers not to guess the exclusion, because comparing digests derived under different rules fails open toward accepting a claim bound to a different request. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TvyJPAaVCGsVheVhcCwNND Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 411227@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: d566f6d3-bcaf-43c3-bc5e-3ddd0f64b535 |
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|---|---|---|
| approval_engine | ||
| deploy | ||
| docs | ||
| examples | ||
| history | ||
| intakes | ||
| schemas | ||
| tests | ||
| workplans | ||
| .custodian-brief.md | ||
| .gitignore | ||
| .repo-classification.yaml | ||
| AGENTS.md | ||
| cadence.yaml | ||
| Containerfile | ||
| INTENT.md | ||
| layer.yaml | ||
| Makefile | ||
| pyproject.toml | ||
| README.md | ||
| SCOPE.md | ||
| WORK-RECORDS.md | ||
approval-engine
The approval as a durable, authenticated, consumable object — issued before an action, verified at the moment of use, and provably not replayable.
An Engine, role PIP, in the NetKingdom security layer model (statute v0.7,
accepted; operative form net-kingdom/SECURITY-COMPANION.md). It answers one
question, totally and decidably:
Is this approval valid right now — for this exact action, target, actor, and purpose — and has it already been used?
It does not decide whether the action is permitted. That is access-engine,
which stays NetKingdom's only policy decision point. An approval is one input to
that decision.
Deliberately small, boring, and strict: atomic supersession and single
consumption are what make Canon test T-06 — Approval Replay passable.
Flexibility here would be a defect. Graded, evidence-based progression belongs to
maturity-engine; the two engines are deliberate opposites.
See INTENT.md and SCOPE.md. Declaration: layer.yaml.
Claim: docs/approval-claim.md.
Consume: docs/approval-consumption.md.
Caller auth: docs/caller-authentication.md.
PEP sequence: docs/pep-integration.md.
Origin: flex-auth FLEX-DEC-2026-001, raised while assenting to the security
layer model.
make test
approval-engine migrate --db approvals.sqlite
approval-engine verify --db approvals.sqlite
approval-engine serve --db approvals.sqlite \
--jwt-issuer https://auth.netkingdom.local \
--jwt-audience approval-engine \
--jwks-url http://key-cape.sso.svc.cluster.local:8080/jwks
POST /v1/approvals/{id}/consume implements GH-DEC-2026-003: the PEP
atomically spends the approval before the protected side effect. Same-digest
retries are idempotent; a different digest conflicts.
Production operations, caller scopes, audit delivery, and PEP sequencing are
documented in docs/storage-operations.md, docs/caller-authentication.md,
docs/outbox-contract.md, and docs/pep-integration.md. The checked-in
StatefulSet deliberately refuses production startup without a migrated
persistent store, KeyCape JWT verification, and authenticated audit delivery.