Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 14913@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: add7ef69-b901-4756-9a67-34cf1125d96f
241 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
241 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
# Cross-border coupling in GADM
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**Status:** v0.1 (2026-10-13), ASSEMBLY-WP-0011-T01 (channel inventory) and
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T02 (coupling design). Implementation: T03.
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## 1. Why
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The calibrated model (`models/Calibration.md` v0.4) puts domination at or
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above the floor in every jurisdiction (US 0.68, EU 0.72, AR 0.75), and the
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largest contributions are measured. Three firms take 88 % of frontier-model
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spend, one search engine has 85–94 %, and two mobile operating systems divide
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the market. Outside the US, all of these operators are foreign. A closed
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model reads them as domestic, so the EU, already at rights-first levers,
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cannot lower its domination (BR-007). The coupled model must say whether, and
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through which channel, levers can act on operators set abroad.
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## 2. Channel inventory (T01)
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Foreign share f = share of the channel held by operators headquartered in
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another jurisdiction, as seen from the host.
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| # | Channel | Model quantities | Evidence (2026) | f for EU / AR (US) | Indicator | Priority |
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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
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| C1 | Discovery and membrane operators | Pd, Pmem; `disc`, `m` | Google 85–94 % search share; iOS + Android ≈ 100 % of mobile OS (StatCounter, Sept 2026) | ≈ 1.0 / ≈ 1.0 (0) | StatCounter shares × operator home | **1** |
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| C2 | Lineage import | Plin; `L`, `lin_open` | top-3 US developers 88 % of enterprise model spend (Menlo, Dec 2025); open-weight lineages from US, China and EU (Mistral) | ≈ 0.9 / ≈ 1.0 (≈ 0.1) | P4 + origin of open-weight downloads (Hugging Face) | **1** |
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| C3 | Compute and infrastructure | Pi; `std` | Amazon, Microsoft, Google 63 % of world cloud (Synergy Q2 2026); EU providers a small share of their home market | ≈ 0.75 (prior) / ≈ 0.9 (0) | P1 by region | **2** |
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| C4 | Investment and capital | `aO` inflow, K_Ω | US information-processing investment $1.92 trn SAAR (L5, 2026 Q2); frontier capex concentrated in the US | adoption follows the frontier set abroad | L5 per jurisdiction; FDI in data centres | **2** |
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| C5 | Regulatory spillover ("Brussels effect") | foreign part of Pd, Pmem, `expl` | DMA obligations (choice screens, interoperability) and AI Act transparency (since Aug 2026) bind global operators | host rules act on operators abroad | L7 and operator compliance changes | **2** |
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| C6 | Trade in organism output | demand `dem`, Y* | digital services exports | — | WDI ICT services exports | 3 |
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| C7 | Talent and founders | H, F | AI talent migration (AI Index) | — | AI talent flows | 3 |
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| C8 | Sentiment and media | Σ | sentiment trends move together across countries (Pew, Ipsos) | — | L6 across jurisdictions | 3 |
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Minimal set for T03: **C1, C2, C3** (where domination comes from) and **C5**
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(the only lever a host has on foreign operators), plus **C4** for adoption.
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C6–C8 come later, when a reading depends on them.
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## 3. Coupling structure (T02)
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### 3.1 Split channels
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For each host j and channel c ∈ {Pd, Pmem, Plin, Pi}, the channel level is
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a mix:
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P_c^j = (1 − f_c^j) · D_c^j + f_c^j · O_c^{h(c)}
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- `D_c^j` is the **domestic part**. Its dynamics are the current GADM
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channel equation under the host's own levers.
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- `O_c^h` is the **operator part**. It is the channel level of the
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operators' home jurisdiction h (for C1–C3 today: the US), under the home's
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levers, and **modified by the host's market-access rules** (C5):
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dO_c^{h→j} = (home channel dynamics)
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− a_c^j · O_c^{h→j} (host access rule, e.g. DMA)
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`a_c^j` ≥ 0 is the host's market-access lever. One host's rule lowers only
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its own operator part, unless the operator applies it globally. That is the
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spillover share `σ_c`: a fraction `σ_c` of every host's rule also acts in the
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home market and in all other hosts.
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- The foreign share `f_c^j` is a parameter set from data (§ 2). In later
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versions it can become a state that moves with relative quality and access
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rules.
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### 3.2 Lineage import (C2)
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The host's effective lineage levers are the import-weighted mix:
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L_eff^j = (1 − f_lin^j) · L^j + f_lin^j · L^h
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lin_open_eff^j = (1 − f_lin^j) · lin_open^j + f_lin^j · lin_open^h
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A rights-first host with open domestic lineages, which uses mostly imported
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closed lineages, therefore has low effective openness. That is the
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mechanism BR-007 suspects.
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### 3.3 Adoption and frontier (C4)
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Organism learning in the host draws on the frontier, not only on its own
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stock:
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learning term: ell · max(K_Ω^j, κ · K_Ω^frontier) · dem · Q
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with access κ ∈ [0, 1] (κ = 0 recovers the closed model). The frontier is the
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largest K_Ω among the coupled jurisdictions.
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### 3.4 Numerical scheme
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Synchronous step: at each time step, all jurisdictions compute their
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derivatives from the **previous** state of all others, then all update
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together. The step size stays at dt = 0.1 years.
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### 3.5 Required properties (tests for T03)
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1. **Uncoupled = closed.** With all f = 0, κ = 0 and a = 0, each jurisdiction
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reproduces `gadm04.simulate` exactly.
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2. **Symmetry.** Identical jurisdictions coupled symmetrically stay identical
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to each other and to one uncoupled jurisdiction.
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3. **Operator consistency.** With f = 1 and a = 0, a host's channel equals
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the home channel.
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4. **Lever reach.** A host rule a_c^j > 0 lowers the host's channel and
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leaves the home channel unchanged when σ = 0.
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### 3.6 Two scenario modes
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- **Global:** all jurisdictions (US, EU, AR, and a J4 reference bloc) are
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simulated together with this coupling.
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- **Local in context:** one host is simulated in full. The operator parts
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`O_c^h(t)` and the frontier `K_Ω^frontier(t)` are given paths (T04 context
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scenarios), taken from a global run or set by hand.
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The comparison between the two modes (T05) shows when the context
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approximation fails.
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### 3.7 Calibration hook
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Hosts start from `results/calibrated_starts.json`. Split the measured
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channel level into parts so that P_c^j stays at its calibrated value at t 0:
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`D_c^j(0) = O_c^h(0) = P_c^j(0)`. The coupling then changes the *dynamics*,
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not the measured starting point.
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## 4. First results: the BR-007 test (T05, first part)
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`simulations/gadm02/world.py` implements § 3 (tests `test_world.py`: closed
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equivalence, symmetry, operator tracking, lever reach, spillover, frontier
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access). `cross_border.py` runs US (operators' home), EU and AR (hosts) from
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Calibration v0.4 (`results/cross_border.md`). Foreign shares are from § 2;
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frontier access κ = 0.8 is a prior.
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| Lever (coupled model) | EU P at t 100 | US | AR |
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| current levers | 0.82 (floor broken) | 0.82 | 0.83 |
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| DMA as observed (a fitted ≈ 0, at most 0.006 per year) | 0.82 | 0.82 | 0.83 |
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| strong access rule, a = 0.15 per year on foreign Pd and Pmem | **0.68** | 0.82 | 0.83 |
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| strong access rule, applied globally by operators (σ 0.5) | 0.68 | 0.75 | 0.76 |
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| US moves to rights-first (J1) levers | **0.63** | 0.60 | 0.66 |
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| US J1 + strong EU access rule | **0.42** | 0.60 | 0.66 |
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**Calibrating the access rule.** The DMA has applied since March 2024.
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Google's share fell 6.5 points in Germany, 3.0 in France and 3.1 in the US
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(no DMA), comparing March 2023–February 2024 with October 2025–September 2026
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(StatCounter). The EU-specific excess is about −1.7 points (0 to −3.4). The
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coupled model without any rule already produces −2.6 points, because the
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EU's operator part converges toward the operator's home level. So the
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observed decline is consistent with **no measurable DMA effect on search
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concentration**, and the data allow at most a ≈ 0.006 per year. That is about
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1/25 of the strong rule.
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### Readings
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1. **BR-007 is explained.** The EU's domination channels are run by foreign
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operators, so its own rights levers act only on the small domestic part.
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This is not visible in a closed model, which attributes the channels to
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the host.
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2. **Two levers reach foreign-run channels:** a host access rule on foreign
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operators, and the home's own levers. The home's levers are the strongest
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single lever for every jurisdiction. A US move to rights-first levers
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brings all three under the floor (US 0.60, EU 0.63, AR 0.66).
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3. **The access rule works only far above its observed strength.** As
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practised so far (2024–2026), it has no measurable effect on search
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concentration. A rule about 25 times stronger would bring the EU under the
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floor. This is a quantitative statement about enforcement, not about the
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law's text.
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4. **Spillover helps others.** If operators apply the host's rule worldwide
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(σ 0.5), US and AR domination fall too (0.82 → 0.75, 0.83 → 0.76).
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5. **Lineage concentration (Plin ≈ 0.9) is reachable only through the home.**
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No host rule in this setup acts on imported lineages. An access rule for
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lineages (interoperability, model portability) is the open design
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question, and the most direct link to break-register entry BR-003.
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Caveats: the foreign shares and κ are first estimates. The access rule is a
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removal rate on the operator part, not a model of how regulation works. The
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legitimacy loop is off.
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## 5. Context scenarios and hypothesis re-test (T04, T05)
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`world.py` supports **local runs in a context**: `context(rows)` makes a
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jurisdiction follow given rows instead of being simulated (test: a local run
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against a context taken from a global run reproduces that run to nine
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decimals). `world_scenarios.py` (`results/world_scenarios.md`) runs four
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contexts globally (US, EU, AR and a J4 reference bloc) with the legitimacy
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loop off and on. Calibration v0.5 (Argentina's E measured too, 40 of 40
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targets in range).
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| Context | Definition |
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| X1 US-led concentrated frontier | current levers |
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| X2 open-lineage world | US moves to rights-first (J1) levers |
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| X3 accelerating frontier | US and J4 with self-enhancement (B4-like) |
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| X4 fragmented blocs | hosts' frontier access 0.2, foreign shares halved |
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Output is compared **relative to each jurisdiction's own start**. Model
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output levels are normalized and not comparable across jurisdictions.
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### 5.1 "Europe lags" (H1)
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| | loop off | loop on |
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| EU adoption below US and AR at t 10 | yes, in all four contexts | no, in all four contexts |
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| EU − US relative output, years 0–25 | −0.03 to −0.24 (largest when the frontier accelerates) | −0.04 to +0.08 |
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| EU − US VFAC at t 100 | +0.03 to +0.05, except open-lineage world −0.02 | +0.01 to +0.02, except open-lineage world −0.02 |
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After the BR-009 fix (sentiment anchored at measured levels), the verdicts
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stay the same. With the loop on, EU and US adoption at t 10 are now equal in
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X1 and X4 (0.27 / 0.26–0.27), and in X2 and X3 the US leads (0.44). The
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relative-output differences with the loop on become −0.09 to +0.05.
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Reading: Europe lags in adoption **only if sentiment does not matter**. With
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the measured sentiment levels (US Σ 0.29, EU 0.54) and the legitimacy loop,
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US adoption brakes and the EU no longer lags. Lagging costs output early,
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most in an accelerating-frontier world, but the EU ends with higher VFAC than
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the US unless the US itself moves to rights-first levers.
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### 5.2 "Argentina may thrive" (H2)
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Not supported in any context or loop setting. Relative to its start,
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Argentina grows less than the EU (−0.02 to −0.07 over years 0–25) and ends
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with lower VFAC (−0.04 to −0.06). It starts with the highest domination
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(0.75), all of it run from abroad (f = 1), under deregulated levers. That
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leaves no domestic lever on domination, and its frontier access does not
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compensate. Argentina gains most from the open-lineage world (X2), that is,
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from US policy, not from its own.
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### 5.3 When the context approximation fails
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For host outcomes, the local run in a context equals the global run (max |ΔP|
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< 0.001), including with a strong EU access rule and spillover. Hosts do not
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feed back on the home in the current coupling: spillover changes the
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*home's* path, and the host already applies its own rule. Global runs are
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therefore needed for the home's outcomes, for spillover effects on third
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jurisdictions, and for frontier leadership changes. Local runs suffice for a
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single host's questions.
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### 5.4 Limitations
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- Foreign shares f are fixed. In reality they would move with access rules
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and domestic alternatives.
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- Frontier access κ = 0.8 is a prior.
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- The J4 bloc is uncalibrated. It reuses the US start with J4 levers.
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- Trade, talent and sentiment contagion (C6–C8) are not modeled.
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- No host rule reaches imported lineages (BR-008).
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These are handed to ASSEMBLY-WP-0016.
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