assembly-economics/models/AdoptionBand.md

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Created 2026-10-12 under ASSEMBLY-WP-0009-T01/T02. Implements
research/ScenarioBandMethod.md §§ 2 and 5 for GADM-0.4.
-->

# Adoption Band — Anchors and Probe Results

**Status:** v0.1. GADM-0.4 with grounded power, care and attention
parameters (`grounding.py`). The band anchors differ only in adoption
parameters. Each starts at its own equilibrium, with recalibrated channels.

## 1. Anchors (T01)

| Anchor | Adoption parameters | K_Ω at t 5 / 10 / 25 / 100 | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| **B1 conservative** | `aO` 0.10, `ell` 0.166 | 0.09 / 0.10 / 0.12 / 0.07 | Acemoglu (2024) |
| **B2 central** | `aO` 0.25, `ell` 0.415 | 0.20 / 0.27 / 0.28 / 0.16 | between LLM exposure and the tooling ceiling (Eloundou et al. 2023) |
| **B3 fast** | `aO` 0.50, `ell` 0.83 | 0.39 / 0.49 / 0.46 / 0.34 | tooling ceiling reached within a decade |
| **B4 aggressive** | B3 + self-enhancement `selfenh` 3.0 | 0.70 / 0.80 / 0.72 / 0.64 | AI accelerating its own development (Trammell & Korinek; Davidson et al.) |

**Self-enhancement loop (new in GADM-0.4, default off):** organism investment
and learning are scaled by \((1 + selfenh \cdot K_\Omega)\), so the more
capable organisms are, the faster they improve. `selfenh` = 3.0 is tuned so
B4 reaches about 0.8 within ten years. At `selfenh` ≥ 6, K_Ω saturates instead
of declining, which is a different trajectory regime. That variant is not an
anchor yet.

All anchors show a peak-and-decline path for K_Ω under baseline governance:
rising domination and eroding demand slow organism investment after the
first decade or two. This is a model property, to be checked against data
(ASSEMBLY-WP-0010).

## 2. Probe results (T02)

Full tables: `simulations/gadm02/results/band_probe.md`. 36 readings:
**22 robust, 7 quantitative shifts, 7 qualitative breaks.**

### 2.1 Robust across the whole band

- Generative regime best, automated capitalism worst, generative regime
  lowest domination.
- Generative regime gain over baseline: +0.29 to +0.34 VFAC.
- Commons-rich economy gain over baseline: +0.10 to +0.12.
- Organism lever order lineage > membrane > attention.
- P3: a wealth tax alone barely moves domination.
- Dominant domination channel in all non-generative regimes: lineage
  (membrane in the attention oligopoly).

### 2.2 Quantitative shifts

| Reading | B1 → B4 | Reading |
|---|---|---|
| Dividend abundance gain over baseline | +0.038 → +0.013 | dividends matter less as adoption accelerates |
| Automated capitalism loss vs. baseline | −0.099 → −0.047 | largest at B1, where the baseline itself does best |
| Lineage lever effect | +0.164 → +0.098 | the lever weakens as learning with use accelerates (P2: the critical lineage diffusion rises above the tested L = 0.8) |
| Membrane lever effect | +0.109 → +0.066 | as above |
| P3 effect size | −0.018 … −0.055 | small throughout |

### 2.3 Qualitative breaks

Recorded in `research/BreakRegister.md`.

1. **Regimes that bound domination only under conservative adoption.**
   Dividend abundance and the commons-rich economy keep P under its 0.7
   ceiling at B1, and breach it from B2 onward.
2. **Thresholds crossed with faster adoption.** Concentrated lineages breach
   the domination ceiling from B3. Attention extraction breaches the attention
   floor from B3, and the attention oligopoly breaches it at B4.
3. **Aggressive self-enhancement changes the structure of domination.** At
   B4, lineage control becomes the dominant domination channel even in the
   generative regime and its attention-extraction variant (B1–B3: market,
   or discovery).

### 2.4 Readings

1. **The program's core claims hold across the band.** What changes is
   *which policies are sufficient*: under conservative adoption, moderate
   reforms (dividends, commons) keep domination bounded. Under central to
   aggressive adoption, only the full generative package does.
2. **This bears directly on the "Europe lags" hypothesis.** A jurisdiction
   that adopts slowly (B1-like) can get by with moderate reforms. A fast
   adopter needs organism-specific governance early. Whether lagging is
   worse or better then depends on whether the slow adopter later imports
   B3/B4-speed organisms through foreign lineages. That needs open-economy
   structure the model does not have (ASSEMBLY-WP-0009-T04 / later).
3. **B4 needs lineage governance beyond the current lever range.** Under
   self-enhancement, even L = 0.8 and m = 0.8 leave lineage control dominant.
   Candidate mechanisms that GADM does not yet represent: public or commons
   lineages, compute commons, mandated lineage interoperability. This is a
   structural question, and the first candidate for "qualitatively different
   model" (break register entry BR-003).

## 3. Sentiment and legitimacy loop (T03)

### 3.1 Structure

`gadm04` gains two slow stocks, switched on by `sent = 1` (default off, so
all earlier results are unchanged):

- **Sentiment Σ (`Sig`)** moves at rate `sig_rate` (≈ 5 years) toward
  `0.5 + sig_gain × (pb − pb₀)`. Perceived net benefit
  `pb = 0.3 B + 0.3 G + 0.2 A + 0.2 (1 − P) − sig_disp × K_Ω (1 − m)` is judged
  against its value at the start: people compare with the situation they
  know.
- **Legislative stance `Lg`** follows Σ with lag `leg_lag` (5 years).

Σ and `Lg` scale the organism inflow (investment, learning, seeding) by
`(1 + 2 sig_adopt (Σ − 0.5)) (1 + 2 leg_perm (Lg − 0.5))`. A stance below
neutral also tightens membrane rights `m` and explainability `expl` by
`leg_m`, `leg_expl` × (0.5 − Lg). The parameters are uncalibrated; they set a
mechanism, not a measured strength.

Reproduce: `cd simulations/gadm02 && python3 -B legitimacy.py`
(`results/legitimacy.md`).

### 3.2 Results (baseline scenario, t = 100)

| Anchor | K_Ω peak off → on | K_Ω t 100 off → on | Σ end | VFAC off → on | loop behaviour |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| B1 | 0.12 → 0.10 | 0.07 → 0.06 | 0.40 | 0.396 → 0.480 | damping |
| B2 | 0.29 → 0.21 | 0.16 → 0.05 | 0.30 | 0.328 → 0.374 | damping |
| B3 | 0.50 → 0.35 | 0.34 → 0.08 | 0.26 | 0.298 → 0.357 | damping |
| B4 | 0.80 → 0.56 | 0.64 → 0.08 | 0.25 | 0.263 → 0.353 | oscillating (3 reversals ≥ 0.01) |

Variants: a stronger, faster response (gain 4, lag 2) also oscillates at B2
and B3. A slower legislature (lag 10) changes little, because Σ already
scales adoption directly. Starting sentiment matters only for the first
decade. At B4 a positive start (Σ = 0.7) gives a boom to 0.77 by year 5 and a
bust to 0.11 by year 25. A negative start (Σ = 0.3) gives a lower, later
peak (0.40 at year 10).

### 3.3 Readings

1. **The legitimacy loop is a brake on adoption throughout the band.** It
   lowers the K_Ω peak by 0.02 (B1) up to 0.24 (B4), and raises VFAC by
   0.05–0.09 through more membrane rights, more explainability and less
   attention extraction.
2. **At B4 the brake overshoots.** Fast self-enhancement drives sentiment
   down faster than legislation follows, and the system oscillates: boom,
   backlash, partial recovery. The loop does not stop the inner loop
   smoothly. It turns a fast rise into a boom-bust cycle (BR-005).
3. **The loop compresses the band.** With the loop, B2–B4 end at nearly the
   same K_Ω (0.05–0.08) and VFAC (0.35–0.37). The adoption anchor decides
   the first decade; legitimacy decides the long run. This holds only if
   sentiment really tracks perceived benefit, which is the main empirical
   question for the checkpoints (L6).
4. **Sentiment ends negative in every anchor, even B1.** Part of this is not
   about organisms: the baseline drifts toward higher domination P, and Σ
   reads that as lost benefit. The reading "AI adoption causes backlash" is
   therefore not separated from "rising domination causes backlash" in this
   model. A decomposition of `pb` per term belongs to the prediction register
   (T06), so that observed sentiment can tell the two apart.
5. **For the jurisdiction hypotheses (T04):** a positive starting sentiment
   (J2-like) buys early adoption but not a better end state. A negative start
   (J1-like) costs early adoption and ends at about the same place. Under
   this loop, "lagging" is not worse in the long run. This depends on the
   closed-economy assumption (§ 2.4, reading 2).

### 3.4 Limitations

- Σ is a single national mood. There is no polarization, no split by cohort
  and no media dynamics.
- Legislation responds symmetrically and without capture. Domination P
  does not weaken the legislative response, although the political channel
  `Ppol` suggests that it should.
- The weights in `pb` and all loop parameters are not yet chosen by data. The
  readings are qualitative until the L6 sentiment series constrain them.