AUDIT-WP-0009-T11 — register informed-decision, and answer GH-DEC-2026-014

informed-decision is the browser-facing approver surface; GH-DEC-2026-012
limit 3 makes its evidence copy the one that must reach audit-core
independently of the emitter, because there the actor being audited and the
evidence source are the same component.

Registration accepted on every proposed field — exact source,
["tenant:platform"], write true, read false, load-bearing, secret_policy
redact. Prepared and inert: the scope overlay applies only to a sender the
Secret already carries, asserted by test rather than by reading. Ingress ANDs
namespace and pod label in one peer, following approval-engine rather than
user-engine's older breadth.

Gate House asked whether the record shape can carry a source-held-content
declaration with a retrieval expectation, and asked for a straight answer
rather than a rule the storage cannot meet. Both halves, which must travel
together:

  It CAN carry the declaration. data is stored verbatim into details.data and
  hash-chained, so content_exists and custody need no schema change and become
  as tamper-evident as the commitment they accompany.

  It CANNOT detect non-production. audit-core performs no retrieval and its
  egress permits Postgres and DNS only. Detection happens at retrieval, by the
  reviewer; the stored declaration is what turns a blank into a failure
  attributable to the named custodian.

Residual stated rather than left to be found: a custodian that never held the
content can emit a false content_exists. audit-core validates the declaration's
shape, never its truth — the same class as omission at source, and not closed
by the chain, by attestation, or by T04/T06. A test asserts no egress to the
emitter exists, because that claim silently stops being true if one appears.

Cadence: reconciliation plus heartbeat is right for a mixed-volume source, with
both scoped per class rather than per source — a per-source heartbeat is
satisfied by the high-volume presentation stream and says nothing about a quiet
month of dispositions. Bound: a compromised emitter suppresses the event and
its own count together.

Also recorded: commitment-only satisfies non-alteration and never
reconstructability, in this repo's documents as in theirs; and tenant
provenance under GH-DEC-2026-013 lands in the registration record, not the
envelope, since audit-core checks a value the credential may write rather than
resolving an identity claim.

No secret was created and no production manifest applied.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Nb7Q6ZmXppNDkTWytfYqfv

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 2069992@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 167dd7f8-2a25-4be1-aa46-3b6f1a5f94c6

workplans/AUDIT-WP-0009-evidence-role-conformance.md

@@ -287,6 +287,62 @@ intervals for a store another layer reads, which `platform-pg` is. List it and
 the State Hub now. Add a conformance script and test in the shape ops-warden
 offered estate-wide.
 
+```task
+id: AUDIT-WP-0009-T11
+status: progress
+priority: high
+```
+Register `informed-decision` as a distinct load-bearing source under
+`AUDIT-IN-0003`, and answer the doctrine question `GH-DEC-2026-014` put to
+audit-core: whether the record shape can carry a source-held-content
+declaration with a retrieval expectation.
+
+`informed-decision` is the browser-facing approver surface. `GH-DEC-2026-012`
+limit 3 makes its evidence copy the one that must reach audit-core
+independently of the emitter, because there the actor being audited and the
+evidence source are the same component. `GH-DEC-2026-014` then granted
+commitment-only payloads for Stage 1 under a condition Gate House added: the
+record must assert that committed content **exists** and where **custody**
+sits, so non-production is a finding attributable to the custodian rather than
+an unremarkable blank.
+
+**Done 2026-09-10, prepared and inert:**
+`docs/informed-decision-source-registration.md`, scope entries in
+`deploy/senders-scope.{json,yaml}`, and
+`audit-core-informed-decision-ingress` in `deploy/networkpolicies.yaml`
+(namespace AND pod label in one peer, following approval-engine rather than
+`user-engine`'s older breadth). Every proposed field accepted as-is: exact
+source, `["tenant:platform"]`, write true, read false, `load-bearing`,
+`secret_policy: redact`.
+
+**The answer to Gate House's condition, in two halves that must travel
+together.** The fabric *can* carry the declaration — `data` is stored verbatim
+into `details.data` and chained, so `content_exists` and `custody` need no
+schema change and become as tamper-evident as the commitment they accompany. It
+*cannot* detect non-production: audit-core performs no retrieval and its egress
+policy permits Postgres and DNS only, so it never learns whether a custodian
+would produce. Detection happens at retrieval, by the reviewer, and the stored
+declaration is what turns a blank into an attributable failure. Residual stated
+rather than left to be found: a custodian that never held the content can emit a
+false `content_exists`; audit-core validates the declaration's shape, never its
+truth. Not a requirement nobody can meet, and not the stronger thing it might be
+mistaken for.
+
+**Cadence answered:** reconciliation-per-class plus heartbeat for the low-volume
+classes is the right shape for a mixed-volume source, with both scoped **per
+class** rather than per source — a per-source heartbeat is satisfied by the
+high-volume presentation stream and says nothing about a quiet month of
+dispositions. Bound stated: where the emitter itself is compromised, it
+suppresses the event and its own count together, so neither control covers the
+residual `GH-DEC-2026-012` limit 3 exists for. Depends on T04/T06 for the
+detection half; declaring the cadence now is correct, describing it as operating
+is not.
+
+Remaining: token custody, the protected registry entry, operator manifest
+application, and live ingestion evidence. No secret was created and no
+production manifest applied.
+
+
 ## Acceptance
 
 - No custody claim is returned unconditionally where `docs/integrity.md`