Reliable multi-tenant auto setup audit capability
tegwick
c4016a70d5
informed-decision is the browser-facing approver surface; GH-DEC-2026-012 limit 3 makes its evidence copy the one that must reach audit-core independently of the emitter, because there the actor being audited and the evidence source are the same component. Registration accepted on every proposed field — exact source, ["tenant:platform"], write true, read false, load-bearing, secret_policy redact. Prepared and inert: the scope overlay applies only to a sender the Secret already carries, asserted by test rather than by reading. Ingress ANDs namespace and pod label in one peer, following approval-engine rather than user-engine's older breadth. Gate House asked whether the record shape can carry a source-held-content declaration with a retrieval expectation, and asked for a straight answer rather than a rule the storage cannot meet. Both halves, which must travel together: It CAN carry the declaration. data is stored verbatim into details.data and hash-chained, so content_exists and custody need no schema change and become as tamper-evident as the commitment they accompany. It CANNOT detect non-production. audit-core performs no retrieval and its egress permits Postgres and DNS only. Detection happens at retrieval, by the reviewer; the stored declaration is what turns a blank into a failure attributable to the named custodian. Residual stated rather than left to be found: a custodian that never held the content can emit a false content_exists. audit-core validates the declaration's shape, never its truth — the same class as omission at source, and not closed by the chain, by attestation, or by T04/T06. A test asserts no egress to the emitter exists, because that claim silently stops being true if one appears. Cadence: reconciliation plus heartbeat is right for a mixed-volume source, with both scoped per class rather than per source — a per-source heartbeat is satisfied by the high-volume presentation stream and says nothing about a quiet month of dispositions. Bound: a compromised emitter suppresses the event and its own count together. Also recorded: commitment-only satisfies non-alteration and never reconstructability, in this repo's documents as in theirs; and tenant provenance under GH-DEC-2026-013 lands in the registration record, not the envelope, since audit-core checks a value the credential may write rather than resolving an identity claim. No secret was created and no production manifest applied. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Nb7Q6ZmXppNDkTWytfYqfv Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 2069992@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 167dd7f8-2a25-4be1-aa46-3b6f1a5f94c6 |
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|---|---|---|
| .claude/rules | ||
| .forgejo/workflows | ||
| .repo-manager | ||
| audit_core | ||
| data/capability | ||
| deploy | ||
| docs | ||
| evidence | ||
| history | ||
| intakes | ||
| registry | ||
| scripts | ||
| spec | ||
| tests | ||
| workplans | ||
| .custodian-brief.md | ||
| .dockerignore | ||
| .gitignore | ||
| .repo-classification.yaml | ||
| AGENTS.md | ||
| CLAUDE.md | ||
| Containerfile | ||
| INTENT.md | ||
| layer.yaml | ||
| LICENSE | ||
| Makefile | ||
| pyproject.toml | ||
| README.md | ||
| SCOPE.md | ||
| TamqMessagingIntroduction.md | ||
| tenancy.yaml | ||
| WORK-RECORDS.md | ||
Reliable multi-tenant auto setup audit capability
Production on railiance01 (AUDIT-WP-0005): PostgreSQL custody, digest-pinned
image, operator procedures in
docs/operator-runbook.md. Manifests live in
deploy/.
Backend contract
The pluggable backend interface, event schema (audit-core.event.v1alpha1),
retention policy, and migration path from the mock file backend are documented
in docs/audit-backend-contract.md.
Development Mock Backend
The first implementation is intentionally tiny: a replaceable audit interface with a mock file backend.
By default it writes JSONL audit events to:
/tmp/audit-core/audit-YYYYMMDDTHH.jsonl
Files older than 7 days are removed when the backend writes or when cleanup is run explicitly. This backend is for local integration and bootstrap wiring. It is not durable audit custody.
Example:
python3 -m audit_core emit \
--source openbao \
--action openbao.authenticated_readiness_proof \
--resource openbao/openbao-0 \
--outcome success \
--detail file_audit_visible=true \
--detail backend=mock-file
Cleanup:
python3 -m audit_core cleanup
Make targets:
make test
make mock-audit-smoke
make mock-audit-cleanup
Environment:
AUDIT_CORE_MOCK_DIR: override the output directory.AUDIT_CORE_MOCK_RETENTION_DAYS: override the default 7-day cleanup window.