Live receiver now reports custody_class=operational with a cited
30-day recoverable window (sha256:05fe1c06). Next workplan is
integrity verification so tamper_evidence can become honest.
Postgres now reports custody_class=operational with a cited 30-day
recoverable window. Join ITC-CAP operations.audit at D4, publish the
interface card, and overlay user-engine tenants [*] from Git so an
ExternalSecret refresh cannot shrink it.
Logical dump of live audit_core restored locally in 4.1s; counts and
sample triples match the rapp-postgres drill. Retention is platform
backup, not an audit-core deletion window. Workplan finished.
SET ROLE during migrate so tables are not owned by a disposable lease.
Current image sha256:aec5575. T02/T03 recorded done after live rotation
and rollout undo. T05 remote run is partial (port-forward dropped).
Secret volume rotation swaps ..data. Sequential reads of username then
password can tear across two leases. Resolve the snapshot once.
Also document why ESO AppRole login cannot parent database/creds leases:
the token discard DROP ROLEs the role ESO just stored.
Database leases come from ClusterSecretStore openbao-audit-core-database
(one extract, one lease). Senders are minted in-cluster. Secret mounts
use fsGroup 10001. Schema 0001-0004 applied after dropping the isolation
stub events table. /readyz reports custody_class=archive.
VaultDynamicSecret pulls database/creds/* so a rotating lease is not frozen
into KV. Runtime sets AUDIT_CORE_AUTO_MIGRATE=0; schema is a Job with the
migration lease. Image base is digest-pinned. Namespace and NetworkPolicies
are on the cluster; Deployment waits for the attended OpenBao ESO token.
AUDIT-WP-0005-T02 (progress). rapp-postgres has landed platform-pg with the
audit_core database, roles, and dynamic credential provisioning, so
audit-core's side is now built against it.
In-cluster delivery is a mounted directory rather than environment variables.
A dynamic lease rotates while the pod runs and an env var is fixed at process
start, so env delivery would force a restart on every rotation - and every
restart is a delivery gap, which is what this task forbids.
CredentialDirectory is re-read on every connection attempt via psycopg_pool's
callable kwargs, so a rotated lease takes effect with no restart. Rotation is
logged by password fingerprint, never by value.
deploy/externalsecrets.yaml follows the ClusterSecretStore -> ExternalSecret ->
Secret pattern already used by activity-core and rapp-qonto, at a 15m refresh
rather than the default 1h since the interval bounds how long a revoked lease
can stay mounted. All manifests validated --dry-run=server --validate=strict.
The rotation test was initially vacuous: it passed against a deliberately naive
implementation that read credentials once at startup, because pooled sessions
stay authenticated after a password change and nothing forced a reconnect. It
now terminates the role's sessions first, and is verified to fail against the
naive implementation and pass against the real one. Tests 82 -> 84.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
AUDIT-WP-0005-T03 (progress). Manifests validated --dry-run=server
--validate=strict against railiance01; not applied, since deployment is gated
on RAPP-POSTGRES-WP-0002 and T02 credentials. Nothing here mutates the cluster.
Conventions read off the deployed user-engine workload rather than invented:
digest-pinned image from forgejo.coulomb.social, runAsNonRoot with
RuntimeDefault seccomp, no privilege escalation, all capabilities dropped,
readOnlyRootFilesystem, probes on a named http port, same resource envelope.
The namespace carries railiance.io/postgres-client: platform-pg, which is what
platform-pg-consumer-ingress in rapp-postgres admits; without that label the
pod cannot reach the database at all.
NetworkPolicies default-deny both directions, then permit ingress from the
user-engine namespace only, a separately labelled operator read path, and
egress to PostgreSQL in databases plus DNS.
Three decisions worth naming. Liveness is /healthz while readiness is /readyz,
so a database outage drops the pod from the Service rather than restarting it
in a loop. readOnlyRootFilesystem enforces the empty-filesystem property rather
than trusting it, so the SQLite fallback physically cannot accumulate audit
records on ephemeral storage. AUDIT_CORE_REQUIRE_CUSTODY_CLASS=archive makes a
missing database URL a startup failure instead of a silent downgrade to the
development store.
Counters deferred from WP-0004-T06 are exposed as JSON at /v1/stats behind the
read privilege, not as Prometheus exposition format: the cluster runs no
Prometheus, no ServiceMonitor CRD and no other scrape target, so an exposition
endpoint would target a scrape path that does not exist. Usable with curl now
and a small step from /metrics later.
Tests 77 -> 80.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
