T02. deploy/attest-cronjob.yaml: daily at 03:17 UTC against the 168h window,
its own ServiceAccount, and a Role reaching exactly one named ConfigMap —
get/update/patch, no create, no list. audit_core/attest_publish.py does the
publish in stdlib; the image carries no kubectl, and adding one to an audit
receiver's image to write a single file is the worse trade.
Three refusals, all deliberate:
The producer is not the receiver. A receiver that could rewrite its own
attestation could forge it. audit-core-egress is now scoped to
component: receiver and a separate audit-core-attest-egress carries the 6443
rule, so the receiver never gains API-server reach. Asserted by test.
It refuses to publish over a broken chain. A fresh head written over a break
replaces an honest chain_break with a fresh-looking attestation. Stale
degrades the claim visibly; false does not.
Mounted as a directory, not subPath. Found while writing the manifest: a
subPath ConfigMap mount is resolved once at pod start and never updates, so
the daily attestation would land in the ConfigMap and never reach the running
receiver — tamper_evidence would age out to false while the job reported
success every night, silent in both directions.
The offsite copy stays an operator step. audit-core holds no Nextcloud
credential and should not acquire one to publish a hash, so docs/integrity.md
states the bound plainly: until that copy exists the delivered control defends
against a database owner, not a cluster owner, and no stronger claim may be
made from it.
T10. layer.yaml lists four infrastructure contacts — platform-pg, state-hub,
kube-apiserver, the container registry — each with its role and whether another
layer reads it. tooling_contacts stays [], which is true under §5 as written;
the companion's totality request is met by the uncatalogued list rather than by
inventing a Tooling row. tests/test_layer_conformance.py derives the egress
destinations from the manifests and the registry from the pinned digests, so a
new contact appearing in deploy/ without a row fails the test rather than
waiting for a reviewer to notice.
Applying the manifests remains an operator action; nothing here was applied.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The Postgres backend returned tamper_evidence=True as a constant while
docs/integrity.md permits the claim only when a live external chain-head
attestation exists. The one attestation on record is 2026-08-16 and no job
renews it, so audit-core was telling every sender it had a property whose
precondition was unverified — the §9.6 defect it twice corrected in
gate-house's doctrine, turned inward.
evaluate_tamper_evidence() derives the flag from the chain report and the
mounted attestation, distinguishing seven states. Absence, staleness,
mismatch, an undated or unreadable attestation, a chain break, and an
unwalkable chain all degrade the claim rather than leave it standing.
Unreadable is treated as absent on purpose: a malformed file must not hold
up a claim a missing file would drop.
The freshness window is 168h against an intended daily cadence — seven
cadences, so a handful of missed runs degrade the claim rather than a single
one flapping it. Window and cadence are one contract in docs/integrity.md.
Production /readyz will now report tamper_evidence: false until
AUDIT-WP-0009-T02 schedules attestation. The claim was already false; it now
says so.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0185wifnLzCxjEY2MT1XbK7L
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Accept now extends a single-schema chain. Verify walks it; a rewritten
payload_hash is a break. Tamper evidence is that detector plus an
external chain-head attestation, not WORM.
