The standard is accepted at v0.7 and all three of audit-core's v0.6
findings landed in it (§9.6 threat decomposition, cadence MUST for
load-bearing sources with reconciliation/heartbeat for low-volume
classes, §3.3's Evidence row restated as an estate trade).
INTENT.md: layer/role declared in frontmatter as §11 and companion §2
require — layer.yaml alone did not discharge it. Layer section rewritten
for the Evidence role and its obligations. New Evidence Bound section
carrying the §9.6 sound/unsound forms and the three-row threat table,
including the residual nothing in the model prevents.
SCOPE.md: replaced the statehub register stub, which carried no boundary
at all. Statute-fixed prohibitions now live here, separated from the
merely-not-yet — §16 ruled the stronger-custody gap closed, so WORM and
data.archive are not ours rather than not yet.
Assessment found nine gaps. Headline: postgres_backend returns
tamper_evidence=True unconditionally while docs/integrity.md permits it
only against a live external attestation, and the one on record is
2026-08-16 with no job renewing it — audit-core overclaiming its own
bound, the §9.6 defect turned inward. Also: no cadence, heartbeat,
reconciliation, or load-bearing classification exists, so the obligation
audit-core argued up from SHOULD to MUST is not yet dischargeable
against audit-core.
AUDIT-WP-0009 raised, ten tasks.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WpeL68AWHqtqPQZEXY5kFe
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 4040362@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 4fd0fd24-2ee8-4413-bd67-43bd79ca73f1
gate-house proposed (security layer model v0.3 §9.4) that audit-core own
the tamper-evident record of approvals while approval-engine owns the
operative state. Assented, with two corrections and one condition.
Correction 1: INTENT principle 6 overstated the delivered guarantee.
docs/integrity.md is authoritative — an in-database chain does not
withstand a database owner without the external chain-head attestation,
and even then it is not WORM. Principle 6 now points at that bound.
Correction 2: the chain proves alteration and truncation, not omission
at source. A suppressed revocation leaves the chain intact.
Condition: approval-engine must guarantee emission atomicity, so an
approval cannot change state without the event being durably queued in
the same transaction. Not a task audit-core can discharge for it.
Boundary: no approval-validity query will be exposed — that would be
deciding early under §6.1.
Also declares audit-core's layer (Engine, not a decision point), which
§11 requires and INTENT.md was missing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WpeL68AWHqtqPQZEXY5kFe
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 4040362@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 4fd0fd24-2ee8-4413-bd67-43bd79ca73f1
