tegwick
6eaa33699d
The standard is accepted at v0.7 and all three of audit-core's v0.6 findings landed in it (§9.6 threat decomposition, cadence MUST for load-bearing sources with reconciliation/heartbeat for low-volume classes, §3.3's Evidence row restated as an estate trade). INTENT.md: layer/role declared in frontmatter as §11 and companion §2 require — layer.yaml alone did not discharge it. Layer section rewritten for the Evidence role and its obligations. New Evidence Bound section carrying the §9.6 sound/unsound forms and the three-row threat table, including the residual nothing in the model prevents. SCOPE.md: replaced the statehub register stub, which carried no boundary at all. Statute-fixed prohibitions now live here, separated from the merely-not-yet — §16 ruled the stronger-custody gap closed, so WORM and data.archive are not ours rather than not yet. Assessment found nine gaps. Headline: postgres_backend returns tamper_evidence=True unconditionally while docs/integrity.md permits it only against a live external attestation, and the one on record is 2026-08-16 with no job renewing it — audit-core overclaiming its own bound, the §9.6 defect turned inward. Also: no cadence, heartbeat, reconciliation, or load-bearing classification exists, so the obligation audit-core argued up from SHOULD to MUST is not yet dischargeable against audit-core. AUDIT-WP-0009 raised, ten tasks. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WpeL68AWHqtqPQZEXY5kFe Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 4040362@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 4fd0fd24-2ee8-4413-bd67-43bd79ca73f1
115 lines
5 KiB
Markdown
115 lines
5 KiB
Markdown
# SCOPE
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Boundary contract for `audit-core`, aligned to NetKingdom Security Layer Model
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v0.7 (accepted) and its working companion. `INTENT.md` says what Audit Core is
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for; this file says what it does and does not do, and is the file to check
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before adding a surface.
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## One-liner
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The estate's Evidence engine: durable, tenant-aware custody of audit events,
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with an honest and bounded integrity claim.
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## Layer and role
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**Engine / Evidence** (statute §3.3, §4). Deterministic API over one modeled
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concept — the audit event. Declared in `INTENT.md` frontmatter and `layer.yaml`.
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Audit Core is **not** a PDP, not a PIP, and not PEP-shaped. It renders no
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decision, supplies no claim a decision consumes, and causes no protected side
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effect of its own.
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## In Scope
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**Custody and integrity**
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- Event ingestion, validation, normalization to the Audit Core envelope,
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redaction, and append-only operational custody.
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- Sender registration and binding; tenant and scope attribution.
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- Hash-chain integrity: link, verify, chain-head attestation, and the
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`GET /v1/integrity` operator surface.
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- The honest custody claim — `custody_class`, `immutable`, `tamper_evidence`,
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`recoverable_days` — stated at no more than `docs/integrity.md` delivers.
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- Retention profiles, search and export entitlements, dead-letter and
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secret-finding surfaces.
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**Evidence-role obligations under v0.7 §9.6** *(largely not yet built — see
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`workplans/AUDIT-WP-0009-evidence-role-conformance.md`)*
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- Recording, per source, whether its evidence is **load-bearing** or
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**attributive**, because the obligations differ.
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- Accepting and storing a source's declared **emission cadence**, and raising a
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finding when the stream falls below it — the stream observed, not only its
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contents.
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- **Heartbeat** ingestion and missing-heartbeat findings for low-volume
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load-bearing classes, where rate monitoring cannot work.
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- A **reconciliation** surface: per-source, per-class event counts a source can
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compare against its own state transitions.
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- Registering `approval-engine` as a distinct source carrying issuance, use,
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supersession, and revocation (§9.4, `AUDIT-IN-0001`).
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**Conformance**
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- Machine-readable layer declaration (`layer.yaml`) and a conformance test.
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- A total list of infrastructure contacts, catalogued or not, so the §5 check
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is total rather than vacuous.
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## Out of Scope
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**Boundaries fixed by the statute — these are permanent, not "not yet"**
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- **Any authorization decision.** `access-engine` is the only decision point
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(§6). Audit Core renders and caches none.
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- **An approval-validity query.** Records, yes; a verdict on whether an approval
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is still valid, never (§9.4). A consumer branching on such an answer would
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route an authorization decision through the audit fabric.
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- **Operative approval state** — the durable object, atomic supersession, single
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consumption, revocation. That is `approval-engine`'s (§9.4).
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- **Emission atomicity at the source.** Completeness at the boundary is the
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emitter's obligation; an archive cannot retrofit it (§9.6).
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- **Any claim that the archive proves an event occurred, or that absence proves
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it did not** (§9.6).
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- **Policy decision making**, per `INTENT.md`.
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**Not owned here**
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- Procuring or operating S3 / Barman / WAL; the `platform:audit-storage` booked
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cost or a second usage stream.
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- WORM, object lock, or ITC-CAP `data.archive`. Ruled a different store with a
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different owner (statute §16); the stronger-custody gap is withdrawn, not
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pending.
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- A `rapp.yaml` in this repo (schema requires `rapp-*`).
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- Public ingest.
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- Unrelated adjacent systems; irreversible operational decisions without human
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approval.
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## Current State
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- Status: production. Receiver on railiance01 (`namespace audit-core`), Postgres
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operational custody on `platform-pg`, sender `user-engine`.
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- Recovery is the platform `data.backup` window (30 days). `/readyz` reports
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`custody_class=operational`, `recoverable_days=30`.
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- Hash chain verified on 30 live events
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(`docs/evidence/chain-head-20260816.json`).
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- ITC-CAP case: `data/capability/audit-core-operational.json` at D4.
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- Tenancy posture: `tenancy.yaml` — declared `I1 A2 E1 P1 R1`, target `E3`/`R2`.
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**Known conformance gaps** (assessed 2026-08-29,
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`history/2026-08-29-v0.7-alignment-and-scope-assessment.md`):
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- `tamper_evidence=True` is returned unconditionally by the Postgres backend
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while `docs/integrity.md` permits it only when a live external attestation
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exists. The one attestation on record is 2026-08-16 and no job renews it.
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This is Audit Core overclaiming its own bound — the §9.6 defect turned inward.
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- No cadence, heartbeat, reconciliation, or load-bearing classification exists.
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The §9.6 obligations Audit Core argued for are not yet supportable by Audit
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Core.
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- `approval-engine` is not yet registered as a source.
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- No negative test asserts the absence of an approval-validity surface.
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## Getting Oriented
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- Start with: `INTENT.md`, then `net-kingdom/SECURITY-COMPANION.md`
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- Bound on what may be claimed: `docs/integrity.md`
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- Agent instructions: `AGENTS.md`
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- Workplans: `workplans/`
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