tegwick
5fd04e2095
Accept now extends a single-schema chain. Verify walks it; a rewritten payload_hash is a break. Tamper evidence is that detector plus an external chain-head attestation, not WORM.
73 lines
3 KiB
Markdown
73 lines
3 KiB
Markdown
# Integrity contract (AUDIT-WP-0007)
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Operational custody already stores `payload_hash` and rejects UPDATE/DELETE
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for the runtime role. That is not tamper evidence: a database owner can
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drop the trigger and rewrite rows. This contract says what the hash chain
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proves, and what it does not.
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## Chain
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Each accepted event stores:
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- `payload_hash` — SHA-256 of the canonical event record (already stored)
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- `chain_prev` — the previous event's `chain_hash`, or genesis
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- `chain_hash` — `SHA-256(chain_prev | payload_hash | event_id)`
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Genesis is 64 ASCII zeros (`audit_core.integrity.GENESIS`). The delimiter
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is `|`. The chain is **one stream per schema**, not per tenant. A
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per-tenant chain would hide a cross-tenant rewrite.
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The first accept of an empty store uses genesis as `chain_prev`. A
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duplicate accept must not mint a second link. A conflict must not
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advance the head. Concurrent first-accepts of different events take an
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advisory lock (`CHAIN_LOCK_KEY`) so they cannot fork.
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Verify walks `ORDER BY accepted_at, event_id`, recomputes every link,
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and reports the first event id whose stored hashes do not match. A
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break is a **custody defect**, not a sender error. Retrying the event
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will not repair it.
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## Proof bound
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A chain *inside* the same database detects a rewritten `payload_hash`
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**if the attacker does not also recompute the suffix**. A database
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owner can. Tamper evidence against that class of attacker requires a
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**chain-head attestation** stored outside `platform-pg`.
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`tamper_evidence=True` is allowed only when:
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1. `verify` exists and fails on a rewritten row
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2. an external head attestation exists and verify-against-attestation
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reports a missing cited head as a break
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It still does not mean WORM, object lock, or ITC-CAP `data.archive`.
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It does not raise provision maturity to D5.
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Do not write the attestation into the Barman prefix
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(`platform-pg/` on `resource:platform:audit-storage`). That copy is
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restored with the table. A second copy may follow the logical-offsite
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path already used by RESOURCE-WP-0002-T06 (`rapp-postgres` /
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Nextcloud + age); cite it, do not invent a new bucket.
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## Tests this contract names
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| Test | What it asserts |
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| --- | --- |
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| `test_first_accept_sets_genesis` | First `chain_prev` is genesis |
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| `test_second_accept_links` | Second `chain_prev` is the first `chain_hash` |
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| `test_duplicate_does_not_fork` | Replay does not add a link |
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| `test_verify_clean_on_fresh_store` | Empty and two-event stores verify |
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| `test_rewritten_payload_fails_verify` | Superuser rewrite of `payload_hash` is a break |
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| `test_attestation_mismatch` | Cited head absent from the live chain is a break |
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## Operator surface
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```bash
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python -m audit_core verify-chain
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python -m audit_core verify-chain --against docs/evidence/chain-head-<ts>.json
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python -m audit_core attest-chain --output docs/evidence/chain-head-<ts>.json
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```
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`GET /v1/integrity` (`may_read`) returns
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`{intact, events, head, head_event_id, first_break, attestation_match}`
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and never event payloads.
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