tegwick
c4016a70d5
informed-decision is the browser-facing approver surface; GH-DEC-2026-012 limit 3 makes its evidence copy the one that must reach audit-core independently of the emitter, because there the actor being audited and the evidence source are the same component. Registration accepted on every proposed field — exact source, ["tenant:platform"], write true, read false, load-bearing, secret_policy redact. Prepared and inert: the scope overlay applies only to a sender the Secret already carries, asserted by test rather than by reading. Ingress ANDs namespace and pod label in one peer, following approval-engine rather than user-engine's older breadth. Gate House asked whether the record shape can carry a source-held-content declaration with a retrieval expectation, and asked for a straight answer rather than a rule the storage cannot meet. Both halves, which must travel together: It CAN carry the declaration. data is stored verbatim into details.data and hash-chained, so content_exists and custody need no schema change and become as tamper-evident as the commitment they accompany. It CANNOT detect non-production. audit-core performs no retrieval and its egress permits Postgres and DNS only. Detection happens at retrieval, by the reviewer; the stored declaration is what turns a blank into a failure attributable to the named custodian. Residual stated rather than left to be found: a custodian that never held the content can emit a false content_exists. audit-core validates the declaration's shape, never its truth — the same class as omission at source, and not closed by the chain, by attestation, or by T04/T06. A test asserts no egress to the emitter exists, because that claim silently stops being true if one appears. Cadence: reconciliation plus heartbeat is right for a mixed-volume source, with both scoped per class rather than per source — a per-source heartbeat is satisfied by the high-volume presentation stream and says nothing about a quiet month of dispositions. Bound: a compromised emitter suppresses the event and its own count together. Also recorded: commitment-only satisfies non-alteration and never reconstructability, in this repo's documents as in theirs; and tenant provenance under GH-DEC-2026-013 lands in the registration record, not the envelope, since audit-core checks a value the credential may write rather than resolving an identity claim. No secret was created and no production manifest applied. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Nb7Q6ZmXppNDkTWytfYqfv Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 2069992@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 167dd7f8-2a25-4be1-aa46-3b6f1a5f94c6
99 lines
3.9 KiB
Python
99 lines
3.9 KiB
Python
from pathlib import Path
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ROOT = Path(__file__).parents[1]
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def test_whitehat_ingress_is_bound_to_namespace_and_target_labels():
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documents = (ROOT / "deploy" / "networkpolicies.yaml").read_text().split("\n---\n")
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policy = next(
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document
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for document in documents
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if "name: audit-core-whitehat-ingress" in document
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)
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# Both selectors must remain in the same `from` peer. Splitting them into
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# two list items changes AND to OR and would admit every pod in either set.
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expected_peer = """ - namespaceSelector:
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matchLabels:
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kubernetes.io/metadata.name: whitehat
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podSelector:
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matchLabels:
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whitehat.security/plane: \"true\"
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whitehat.security/target: audit-core"""
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assert expected_peer in policy
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assert policy.count(" - namespaceSelector:") == 1
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assert " - {protocol: TCP, port: 8080}" in policy
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def test_approval_engine_ingress_is_bound_to_namespace_and_pod_labels():
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"""AUDIT-WP-0009-T09. A load-bearing source gets a narrow rule, not a wide one."""
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documents = (ROOT / "deploy" / "networkpolicies.yaml").read_text().split("\n---\n")
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policy = next(
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document
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for document in documents
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if "name: audit-core-approval-engine-ingress" in document
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)
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# One `from` peer holding both selectors. Two list items would be OR, and
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# would admit every pod in the approval-engine namespace plus every pod
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# anywhere carrying the app label.
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expected_peer = """ - namespaceSelector:
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matchLabels:
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kubernetes.io/metadata.name: approval-engine
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podSelector:
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matchLabels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: approval-engine"""
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assert expected_peer in policy
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assert policy.count(" - namespaceSelector:") == 1
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assert " - {protocol: TCP, port: 8080}" in policy
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def test_user_engine_sender_ingress_is_unchanged_by_the_new_sender():
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"""glas-harness asked for user-engine's sender to stay as it is."""
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documents = (ROOT / "deploy" / "networkpolicies.yaml").read_text().split("\n---\n")
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policy = next(
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document
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for document in documents
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if "name: audit-core-sender-ingress" in document
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)
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assert "kubernetes.io/metadata.name: user-engine" in policy
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assert "approval-engine" not in policy
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def test_informed_decision_ingress_is_bound_to_namespace_and_pod_labels():
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"""AUDIT-WP-0009-T11. A second load-bearing source gets the narrow rule too."""
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documents = (ROOT / "deploy" / "networkpolicies.yaml").read_text().split("\n---\n")
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policy = next(
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document
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for document in documents
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if "name: audit-core-informed-decision-ingress" in document
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)
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expected_peer = """ - namespaceSelector:
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matchLabels:
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kubernetes.io/metadata.name: informed-decision
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podSelector:
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matchLabels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: informed-decision"""
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assert expected_peer in policy
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assert policy.count(" - namespaceSelector:") == 1
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assert " - {protocol: TCP, port: 8080}" in policy
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def test_no_egress_to_informed_decision_is_created():
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"""The custody declaration is carried, never dereferenced.
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GH-DEC-2026-014 limit 3 is met by storing an attributable declaration, not
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by audit-core retrieving content. If an egress rule to the emitter ever
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appears, the claim in docs/informed-decision-source-registration.md that
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audit-core performs no retrieval has silently stopped being true.
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"""
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documents = (ROOT / "deploy" / "networkpolicies.yaml").read_text().split("\n---\n")
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egress = next(
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document for document in documents if "name: audit-core-egress" in document
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)
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assert "informed-decision" not in egress
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assert "approval-engine" not in egress
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# Postgres and DNS only.
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assert egress.count(" - namespaceSelector:") == 2
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