audit-core/intakes/intakes.md

# Intake records

## AUDIT-IN-0003 — Register informed-decision as a load-bearing sender; commitment-only payload doctrine

```yaml
id: AUDIT-IN-0003
kind: intake
title: 'Register informed-decision as a load-bearing sender, and answer GH-DEC-2026-014
  limit 3'
status: closed
origin: cross-repo
origin_ref: INFD-WP-0001-T08 / GH-DEC-2026-012 / GH-DEC-2026-014
priority: high
owner: audit-core
requested_by: informed-decision
description: >
  informed-decision is the browser-facing approver surface approval-engine
  deliberately does not contain, ruled PEP-shaped by GH-DEC-2026-012. Limit 3
  of that ruling requires its evidence copy to reach audit-core independently
  of the emitter, because the actor being audited and the evidence source are
  the same component.

  Requested: (1) sender registration — source informed-decision exact, tenants
  [tenant:platform], write true, read false, evidence_kind load-bearing,
  secret_policy redact; (2) whether reconciliation per class as primary plus
  heartbeat for the low-volume classes is the right cadence form for a
  mixed-volume source; (3) whether commitment-only content is one event class
  or two, and whether it belongs in the same class as other evidence.

  GH-DEC-2026-014 attached a condition addressed to audit-core: non-production
  of committed content must be detectable as a FINDING rather than present as
  an absence, so the record must carry an assertion that committed content
  exists and where custody sits. Gate House asked audit-core to say plainly
  whether the record shape can express that, rather than have a rule written
  that the storage cannot meet.
created: '2026-09-09'
updated: '2026-09-10'
outcome: registered-with-a-stated-bound
closed: '2026-09-10'
resolution: 'Registration accepted on every proposed field; the proposal was
  correct and the substance is in the bounds. Prepared and inert pending token,
  protected-registry entry and operator apply —
  docs/informed-decision-source-registration.md, deploy/senders-scope.{json,yaml},
  audit-core-informed-decision-ingress. (1) GH-DEC-2026-014 limit 3: the fabric
  CAN carry the declaration — data is stored verbatim into details.data and
  hash-chained, so content_exists and custody need no schema change and become
  as tamper-evident as the commitment they accompany. It CANNOT detect
  non-production: audit-core performs no retrieval and its egress permits
  Postgres and DNS only. Detection happens at retrieval by the reviewer, and the
  stored declaration is what makes non-production attributable rather than a
  blank. Residual: a custodian that never held the content can emit a false
  content_exists; audit-core validates the declaration shape, never its truth —
  same class as omission at source, not closed by chain, attestation or T04/T06.
  (2) Cadence: reconciliation plus heartbeat is right, with both scoped PER
  CLASS rather than per source — a per-source heartbeat is satisfied by the
  high-volume presentation stream and says nothing about a quiet month of
  dispositions. Bound: a compromised emitter suppresses the event and its own
  count together, so neither control covers the limit-3 residual. Depends on
  T04/T06; declare now, do not describe as operating. (3) One source, distinct
  type values per class, following approval-engine four-class shape; a second
  sender would split one residual into two smaller-looking ones. (4) Tenant
  provenance is recorded in the registration document, not the envelope:
  audit-core does not resolve the tenant claim, it checks a value the credential
  is permitted to write, and restating an unobserved route in an event is the
  same error as claiming an event occurred. (5) Stated for all documents:
  commitment-only satisfies non-alteration and never reconstructability, and no
  audit-core document or conformance claim may describe it otherwise.'
recorded_in: docs/informed-decision-source-registration.md
work: AUDIT-WP-0009-T11
state_hub_intake_id: "01a08b76-05b9-7a53-8359-9cda50755f28"
```

## AUDIT-IN-0002 — Register tenant-engine as an attributive audit-core sender

```yaml
id: AUDIT-IN-0002
kind: intake
title: 'Register tenant-engine as an attributive audit-core sender'
status: open
origin: cross-repo
origin_ref: TEN-WP-0011-T04
priority: high
owner: audit-core
requested_by: tenant-engine
description: >
  tenant-engine now emits mutation evidence through a local outbox
  (audit-core.event.v1alpha1, source=tenant-engine, POST /v1/events).
  The class is attributive and drain is non-blocking
  (tenant-engine/docs/evidence-emission.md). Production cannot land
  events until audit-core admits this sender: sender identity with
  source tenant-engine, a projected token (no secret in Git; warden
  route for custody), and NetworkPolicy if the current allow-list is
  still user-engine only.

  Envelope: schema_version audit-core.event.v1alpha1; tenant is the
  affected tenant_id; action is the domain event type; resource
  tenant:<id>. Duplicate event ids should 200. Credentials must not
  travel via State Hub messages.

  Requested: sender registration + token lane, or a correction if the
  envelope needs a field this engine is not sending.
created: '2026-08-29'
updated: '2026-08-29'
state_hub_intake_id: "01a04d8f-b1c1-746a-8007-15221ebf0a48"
```

## AUDIT-IN-0001 — Proposed: audit-core takes the approval evidence half (security layer model v0.3 §9.4)

```yaml
id: AUDIT-IN-0001
kind: intake
title: 'Proposed: audit-core takes the approval evidence half (security layer model
  v0.3 §9.4)'
status: closed
origin: cross-repo
origin_ref: net-kingdom security-layer-model_v0.3 §9.4
priority: medium
owner: audit-core
requested_by: gate-house
description: 'gate-house proposes that audit-core own the tamper-evident record of
  approvals: issuance, use, supersession, and revocation emitted as audit events.
  Rationale: principle 6 (signed or hash-chained manifests to prove a record set was
  not changed, omitted, or truncated) is exactly what authenticated approval entries
  need forensically, and audit-core independence is the property Canon core rule 13
  wants — audit evidence protected from the actor being audited. What is NOT proposed:
  the operative approval state. approval-engine owns the durable object, atomic supersession,
  single consumption, and revocation, because those need mutable in-path current-state
  semantics and audit-core operational custody is append-only Postgres by design;
  coupling decision-time approval reads to the audit fabric would also make an audit
  outage an authorization outage. Note audit-core INTENT lists policy decision making
  as out of scope — this proposal respects that: approval evidence is a record of
  what happened, never the authoritative answer to whether an approval is still valid.
  Requested: assent, revision, or rejection. If audit-core would rather not carry
  approval events as a distinct source, say so and gate-house will record the evidence
  half as unowned rather than assume it.'
created: '2026-08-28T20:35:09.148892Z'
updated: '2026-08-28T21:10:00Z'
outcome: assent-with-conditions
closed: '2026-08-28T21:10:00Z'
resolution: 'Assent. The split is right: approval-engine owns the operative state,
  audit-core owns the tamper-evident record of issuance, use, supersession, and
  revocation as a distinct source. Two corrections to the rationale and one
  condition. (1) INTENT principle 6 overstates the delivered guarantee;
  docs/integrity.md is authoritative — an in-database chain does not withstand a
  database owner without the external chain-head attestation, and even then it is
  not WORM. Approval events get exactly the guarantee every other source gets,
  no more; anything stronger is an engine gap to declare under §5.3. (2) The chain
  proves alteration and truncation, not omission at source. A suppressed
  revocation leaves the chain intact and verify reports intact; completeness at
  the boundary is the emitter''s property, not the archive''s. CONDITION:
  approval-engine must guarantee emission atomicity (transactional outbox or
  equivalent) so an approval cannot change state without the event being durably
  queued in the same transaction — a requirement on approval-engine, not a task
  audit-core can discharge for it. Boundary stated: no approval-validity query
  will ever be exposed; a verdict surface would be deciding early under §6.1.
  Also raised: audit-core declared no layer, contrary to §11 — now declared Engine
  layer, explicitly not a decision point.'
recorded_in: history/2026-08-28-approval-evidence-assent.md
state_hub_intake_id: "01a04d8f-be67-75ed-a221-d50f99dbb78e"
```