tegwick
58a106aa4d
T08 fixes two defects in our own declaration. provider.R.available quoted a 30-day horizon audit-core does not solely control: at P1 the erasure horizon is the instance maximum across co-residents, so a co-resident declaring longer extends what a sender's records remain recoverable for, silently. Decision 4.5.4 names this for tiers; it applies to a provider quoting a number too, and the provider block now says so. And user-engine, the only consumer, was notified under Decision 6.1 -- what we declared, that E4 and R4 are unreachable here, and that the retention number is a floor rather than a ceiling. T03 writes docs/erasure-and-audit.md: the fact/payload split, why shreddability is not retrofittable onto a chain committing to cleartext, and why the retained hash is a confirmation oracle over low-entropy audit records. The framework half was already resolved as Decision 4.5.3, so what remains is our own position. The legal basis for retaining audit facts is routed to risk-nexus, open and visible. T06 closes the review loop with net-kingdom: five findings adopted, declaration validates clean, and the E line will go stale on an upgrade that Decision 6.1 deliberately does not require anyone to announce. T07 enumerates the seven dependencies on the accept path and specifies five recovery scenarios with integrity as a pass condition. It settled one thing: V2 is not reachable from P1 as built, since platform-pg runs instances 1 and Decision 4.6.1 makes V the minimum across synchronous providers. V1 is the ceiling here, not the next step. The exercise needs a live window. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
92 lines
5.3 KiB
Markdown
92 lines
5.3 KiB
Markdown
# Availability and recovery
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**Status:** V1 not yet evidenced. Dependency enumeration complete; exercise
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pending a live window on railiance01.
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**Framework:** NetKingdom Tenancy Posture v0.1 (draft-8) §4.6, §13 V-row.
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**Declared:** `tenancy.yaml` — `current.V: 0`, `target.V: 1`.
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## Why V0 today
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`V0` is "no availability or recovery position; recovery is untested or depends
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on improvisation". That is accurate. Nothing in this repo exercises recovery of
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the complete audit path and records a measured recovery time.
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What exists is an *observation*, not an exercise: after the railiance01 node
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reboot on 2026-08-16, `/readyz` failed for roughly 40 seconds before the pod
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went Ready, recorded in `docs/operator-runbook.md`. That is useful and it is not
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V1 evidence — it enumerated nothing, measured nothing deliberately, and happened
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to us rather than being performed.
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Decision 4.6.1 is explicit that a replica count or a status page is not
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evidence of a level. audit-core runs one replica; that fact argues for neither
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V0 nor V1. Only the exercise settles it.
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## Critical dependency enumeration (Decision 4.6.1)
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V is **end-to-end**: the minimum across the components and synchronous providers
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required to serve the operation. An application that restarts in five seconds
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over a database that takes ninety is not V1 at five seconds.
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The operation being declared is **accept an audit event** (`POST /v1/events`).
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Read surfaces are operator-facing and are not the availability claim.
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| # | Dependency | Role in the accept path | Failure shows as |
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| 1 | `audit-core` Deployment (1 replica, namespace `audit-core`) | Serves the receiver | Connection refused; Service has no endpoint |
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| 2 | `platform-pg` (CNPG, `instances: 1`) | Custody. Synchronous — an accept is not accepted until committed | `/readyz` 503, request 503 `unavailable` |
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| 3 | Secret `audit-core-database` at `/etc/audit-core/db` | Runtime lease, re-read per connection | 503 `unavailable` on lease expiry or revocation |
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| 4 | ESO + OpenBao (`database/creds/audit-core-runtime`) | Refreshes 3 every 15 min | Delayed: works until the current lease expires |
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| 5 | Secret `audit-core-senders` + scope ConfigMap | Sender authentication; read at process start | 401 for every sender after a restart with a bad Secret |
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| 6 | CoreDNS | Resolves `platform-pg` | 503 `unavailable`, indistinguishable from 2 without logs |
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| 7 | NetworkPolicy (default-deny + sender ingress) | Admits `user-engine` | Sender timeouts; receiver sees nothing at all |
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**The binding constraint is 2.** `platform-pg` runs `instances: 1` — no HA, single
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node. §17 of the framework already records that no P1 tenant has HA. audit-core
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cannot exceed `platform-pg`'s availability level regardless of what it does to
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its own Deployment, so **V2 is not reachable from P1 as built** and is not a
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target. V1 is.
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Dependency 4 is worth separating: OpenBao being down does not stop accepts. It
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stops *renewal*, so the failure is deferred to lease expiry. An exercise that
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takes OpenBao down and declares success after two minutes has proved nothing —
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this is the invisible-failure shape §12 warns about.
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## The V1 exercise
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§13's V1 row asks for three things, all mechanical: dependencies enumerated
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(above), restart/recreate recovery exercised, interruption and measured recovery
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time recorded.
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**Rules for the run.** Measure from the last successful accept to the next
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successful accept, not from pod restart to Ready — Ready is our own opinion of
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ourselves. Drive a real `POST /v1/events` on a fixed interval throughout and
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count what the sender sees, because the sender's experience is the availability
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being claimed. Record wall-clock times, not durations someone computed later.
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| # | Scenario | Action | Record |
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| E1 | Receiver restart | `kubectl -n audit-core rollout restart deploy/audit-core` | Accepts lost; time to first successful accept |
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| E2 | Receiver recreate | Delete the pod | As E1, plus whether any accepted event is missing after recovery |
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| E3 | Custody restart | Restart the `platform-pg` primary | Time to first successful accept; 503 count; chain intact after |
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| E4 | Lease expiry under load | Revoke the runtime lease, wait for ESO refresh | Time to recovery **without** a pod restart — the property `credentials.py` exists to provide |
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| E5 | Node reboot | Reboot railiance01 | End-to-end recovery; compare against the 2026-08-16 observation of ~40s |
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**Integrity is part of the pass condition, not a separate check.** After every
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scenario, `python -m audit_core verify-chain` must report intact, and every
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event the driver believes was accepted must be present. A recovery that loses an
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accepted event, or forks the chain, is a custody defect and fails the exercise
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regardless of how fast it was.
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**RPO.** An accept is committed before the sender is told, so the expected RPO
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for accepted events is zero. The exercise tests that claim rather than assuming
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it; E2 and E3 are where it would break.
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## Results
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*Not yet run.* Needs a live window on railiance01 and coordination with
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`user-engine`, since E4 and E5 are visible to the sender.
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On completion, record the measured recovery time per scenario here with dates,
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raise `tenancy.yaml` `current.V` to 1, note the exercise as the evidence, and
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set a review date — a recovery exercise from a year ago describes a system that
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no longer exists.
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