ebe3307e1c
Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 4040362@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 4fd0fd24-2ee8-4413-bd67-43bd79ca73f1
90 lines
4.6 KiB
Markdown
90 lines
4.6 KiB
Markdown
# Intake records
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## AUDIT-IN-0002 — Register tenant-engine as an attributive audit-core sender
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```yaml
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id: AUDIT-IN-0002
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kind: intake
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title: 'Register tenant-engine as an attributive audit-core sender'
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status: open
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origin: cross-repo
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origin_ref: TEN-WP-0011-T04
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priority: high
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owner: audit-core
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requested_by: tenant-engine
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description: >
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tenant-engine now emits mutation evidence through a local outbox
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(audit-core.event.v1alpha1, source=tenant-engine, POST /v1/events).
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The class is attributive and drain is non-blocking
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(tenant-engine/docs/evidence-emission.md). Production cannot land
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events until audit-core admits this sender: sender identity with
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source tenant-engine, a projected token (no secret in Git; warden
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route for custody), and NetworkPolicy if the current allow-list is
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still user-engine only.
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Envelope: schema_version audit-core.event.v1alpha1; tenant is the
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affected tenant_id; action is the domain event type; resource
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tenant:<id>. Duplicate event ids should 200. Credentials must not
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travel via State Hub messages.
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Requested: sender registration + token lane, or a correction if the
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envelope needs a field this engine is not sending.
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created: '2026-08-29'
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updated: '2026-08-29'
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state_hub_intake_id: "01a04d8f-b1c1-746a-8007-15221ebf0a48"
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```
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## AUDIT-IN-0001 — Proposed: audit-core takes the approval evidence half (security layer model v0.3 §9.4)
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```yaml
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id: AUDIT-IN-0001
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kind: intake
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title: 'Proposed: audit-core takes the approval evidence half (security layer model
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v0.3 §9.4)'
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status: closed
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origin: cross-repo
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origin_ref: net-kingdom security-layer-model_v0.3 §9.4
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priority: medium
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owner: audit-core
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requested_by: gate-house
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description: 'gate-house proposes that audit-core own the tamper-evident record of
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approvals: issuance, use, supersession, and revocation emitted as audit events.
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Rationale: principle 6 (signed or hash-chained manifests to prove a record set was
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not changed, omitted, or truncated) is exactly what authenticated approval entries
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need forensically, and audit-core independence is the property Canon core rule 13
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wants — audit evidence protected from the actor being audited. What is NOT proposed:
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the operative approval state. approval-engine owns the durable object, atomic supersession,
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single consumption, and revocation, because those need mutable in-path current-state
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semantics and audit-core operational custody is append-only Postgres by design;
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coupling decision-time approval reads to the audit fabric would also make an audit
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outage an authorization outage. Note audit-core INTENT lists policy decision making
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as out of scope — this proposal respects that: approval evidence is a record of
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what happened, never the authoritative answer to whether an approval is still valid.
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Requested: assent, revision, or rejection. If audit-core would rather not carry
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approval events as a distinct source, say so and gate-house will record the evidence
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half as unowned rather than assume it.'
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created: '2026-08-28T20:35:09.148892Z'
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updated: '2026-08-28T21:10:00Z'
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outcome: assent-with-conditions
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closed: '2026-08-28T21:10:00Z'
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resolution: 'Assent. The split is right: approval-engine owns the operative state,
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audit-core owns the tamper-evident record of issuance, use, supersession, and
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revocation as a distinct source. Two corrections to the rationale and one
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condition. (1) INTENT principle 6 overstates the delivered guarantee;
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docs/integrity.md is authoritative — an in-database chain does not withstand a
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database owner without the external chain-head attestation, and even then it is
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not WORM. Approval events get exactly the guarantee every other source gets,
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no more; anything stronger is an engine gap to declare under §5.3. (2) The chain
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proves alteration and truncation, not omission at source. A suppressed
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revocation leaves the chain intact and verify reports intact; completeness at
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the boundary is the emitter''s property, not the archive''s. CONDITION:
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approval-engine must guarantee emission atomicity (transactional outbox or
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equivalent) so an approval cannot change state without the event being durably
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queued in the same transaction — a requirement on approval-engine, not a task
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audit-core can discharge for it. Boundary stated: no approval-validity query
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will ever be exposed; a verdict surface would be deciding early under §6.1.
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Also raised: audit-core declared no layer, contrary to §11 — now declared Engine
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layer, explicitly not a decision point.'
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recorded_in: history/2026-08-28-approval-evidence-assent.md
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state_hub_intake_id: "01a04d8f-be67-75ed-a221-d50f99dbb78e"
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```
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