tegwick 686d2d3dbf email lane live: first read-only mailbox scan (93 messages)

Scan c3c7e784 via warden/OpenBao lane, evidence CSV in mailmeta/reports/
(metadata only; sqlite state gitignored). Checklist item 8 done. New
AWQ-009: Stripe webhook delivery failure noticed 2026-07-05 — first
real-world event caught by the lane. Two suspicious external mails
logged, not acted on.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-07-17 00:47:50 +02:00

4.8 KiB

Raw Blame History

Company Email → Net Kingdom / OpenBao Integration Plan

Status: lane active — provision done — 2026-07-17 (WARDEN-WP-0028).
Goal: bernd.worsch@binky-hedgehog.com becomes an agent-readable event source so StB replies, bank and authority notices reach the control plane. Credential handover is a single Red-lane founder step — no agent solicits or stores the password before provision.

Architecture (sanctioned path)

Layer	Role
OpenBao mount `tenants/`	Custody for client/tenant commercial secrets
railiance-platform CCR-2026-0007	Policy + OIDC role (applied); value provision separate
ops-warden catalog `binky-company-email-imap`	Front door (`warden access`); no custody
email-connect	Read-only IMAP scan; credentials only via env names
binky-control	Queues + `mailmeta/` metadata evidence (no message bodies in git)

founder (Red lane, once)
   └─ bao kv put tenants/binky/company-email/imap IMAP_USERNAME=@file IMAP_PASSWORD=@file
        └─ OpenBao: tenants/binky/company-email/imap
             └─ warden access binky-company-email-imap --out / --exec
                  └─ email-connect scan-mailbox → mailmeta / queues

Provider facts (IONOS — non-secret)

Source: IONOS Mail connection tables (founder 2026-07-17).

Inbound (we use IMAP)

Setting	IMAP	POP3 (unused)
Server	`imap.ionos.de`	`pop.ionos.de`
Port	`993`	`995`
Encryption	SSL/TLS	SSL/TLS

Outbound SMTP (out of scope for this lane)

Setting	SMTP
Server	`smtp.ionos.de`
Port	`465`
Encryption	SSL/TLS

Field	Value
Username	Full mailbox address (e.g. `bernd.worsch@binky-hedgehog.com`)
Password	Mailbox password for that address

Username is not a high-secrecy secret but still lives in OpenBao with the password so consumers get one fetch surface. Password never in git/chat.

OpenBao lane

Item	Value
Mount	`tenants`
Path	`tenants/binky/company-email/imap`
Fields	`IMAP_USERNAME`, `IMAP_PASSWORD`
Policy	`workload-kv-read-binky-company-email-imap`
OIDC role	`binky-company-email-imap-workload-kv-read`
Catalog	`binky-company-email-imap` (active, resolvable)
Risk	high

email-connect consumer config (non-secret)

Repo copy: integrations/mailbox-binky-company.yml (host/port/env names only).

mailbox:
  id: binky-company-primary
  protocol: imap
  host: imap.ionos.de
  port: 993
  tls: true
  folder: INBOX
  username_env: IMAP_USERNAME
  password_env: IMAP_PASSWORD

Scan output under mailmeta/ — metadata only (no message bodies in git).

Execution checklist

Path convention decided (tenants/<tenant>/…) — WARDEN-WP-0028
Mount tenants/ enabled on bao.coulomb.social
CCR-2026-0007 + policy + OIDC role applied (metadata only)
ops-warden draft catalog + playbooks
Confirm IMAP host/provider facts (IONOS: imap.ionos.de:993 SSL/TLS)
Red lane — founder: provision username/password via @file only
Capabilities-safe verify + promote catalog to active/resolvable
First read-only scan 2026-07-17: 93 messages, evidence CSV in mailmeta/reports/ (scan c3c7e784…). Notable: Stripe webhook failure notice, Qonto Beleg reminders, HUB31 correspondence, 2 suspicious external mails (ignored, never acted on)
Recurring scan via activity-core (BINKY-WP-0003 follow-ons)

Founder provision (step 6) — interactive human shell

bao login -method=oidc -path=netkingdom role=binky-company-email-imap-workload-kv-read

# write mailbox address and password to mode-0600 files (never paste into chat)
umask 077
printf '%s' 'bernd.worsch@binky-hedgehog.com' > /tmp/imap.user
# password into /tmp/imap.pass via editor or paste in a private terminal only

bao kv put tenants/binky/company-email/imap \
  IMAP_USERNAME=@/tmp/imap.user \
  IMAP_PASSWORD=@/tmp/imap.pass
shred -u /tmp/imap.user /tmp/imap.pass

Then tell the agent/session so catalog can promote and the first scan can run.

Boundary rules (binding)

Secret values never appear in git, State Hub, chat, prompts, logs, or workplans.
email-connect stays read-only (BODY.PEEK); no mailbox write-back.
Agents with WARDEN_AGENT_ID set must not stream raw high-risk values.
SMTP / sending from the company address is a separate future lane (smtp.ionos.de:465); not this CCR.

4.8 KiB Raw Blame History