The file carried an identifier minted by the retired local hub while central held a different record for the same file — ADR-010's same-filename, different-UUID duplicate-registration class. Central is authoritative (ADR-010 decision 1) and decision 6 says to mitigate by changing the repository file rather than editing central, so the file adopts central's id. The cache-side id dies with the cache. Refs CUST-WP-0068 Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 2583210@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: f2bff2d5-e9b2-4338-92ca-10282a927006
152 lines
5.6 KiB
Markdown
152 lines
5.6 KiB
Markdown
---
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id: DISCTL-WP-0002
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type: workplan
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title: "Resilience foundation: registers, policy, first tested restore"
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domain: infotech
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repo: disaster-control
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status: finished
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owner: grok
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topic_slug: custodian
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created: "2026-07-04"
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updated: "2026-07-07"
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state_hub_workstream_id: "73d2ecb3-e594-4a7c-920d-8753198eb6ec"
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---
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# Resilience foundation: registers, policy, first tested restore
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Stand up the minimum viable Resilience Control Plane for Coulomb Social /
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Helix Forge: know what exists (registers), what must survive (policy, RTO/RPO),
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how it comes back (runbook, panic sheet), and prove it once (drill + evidence).
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Driven by `history/2026-07-04-initial-risk-analysis.md` — priority order R2
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(untested restores), R9 (silent backup failure), R3 (backup-deleting breach),
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R4/R5 (identity & secret recovery), R10 (control plane single-homed), R1
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(full server loss). Design source: `specs/ResilienceControlSetup.md`.
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The same-day Forgejo/Railiance assessment
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(`history/2026-07-04-forgejo-backup-strategy-assessment.md`) proved the Forgejo
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restore path (RAIL-HO-WP-0005-T09) and handed this repo a pickup queue: its
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items 7–8 are T03/T04/T06 below; its cross-repo items are tracked by T08.
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## Mirror disaster-control off the primary Gitea (R10)
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```task
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id: DISCTL-WP-0002-T01
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status: done
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priority: high
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state_hub_task_id: "0d7e27f6-1290-45da-b76a-407b7b039e95"
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```
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This repo must survive the disasters it describes. Add at least one mirror on
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infrastructure independent of CoulombCore/Gitea (e.g. GitHub private mirror or
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secondary machine), document the mirror location in README, and note how the
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mirror is refreshed.
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## Asset and data registers with Tier-0 recovery paths (R4, R7, R8, R12)
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```task
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id: DISCTL-WP-0002-T02
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status: done
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priority: high
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state_hub_task_id: "59f04771-25cf-4bde-adf0-8a1cd418dc1f"
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```
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Write `AssetRegister.yaml` and `DataRegister.yaml` seeded with the current
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stack: domains/DNS/registrar, email, Stripe, Bubble.io, OpenRouter, Gitea,
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CoulombCore content, k3s, databases, backup storage, secrets/OpenBao. Every T0
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entry must record its recovery path (backup admin, MFA recovery, break-glass).
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Every T1 entry must name its source of truth and backup mechanism (or mark it
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`backup: none` honestly). Use the tier model from the spec (§2).
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## ResiliencePolicy and RTO/RPO matrix (R1, R6)
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```task
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id: DISCTL-WP-0002-T03
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status: done
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priority: high
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state_hub_task_id: "8c119835-0c97-4556-ab98-42267688e432"
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```
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Write `ResiliencePolicy.md` (operating principle, tier definitions, drill
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cadence, evidence requirement) and `RTO-RPO-Matrix.md` with explicit per-system
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targets, starting from the spec's suggested values (§3): RPO ≤ 24h everywhere,
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RTO ≤ 1 day full recovery, RTO ≤ 4–8h for code/content/control plane.
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## BackupPolicy with credential separation and monitoring (R3, R9)
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```task
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id: DISCTL-WP-0002-T04
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status: done
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priority: high
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state_hub_task_id: "d6b9b621-c901-48c0-be4c-7bc98245de99"
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```
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Write `BackupPolicy.md`: 3-2-1 + immutable/offline model, per-stream mechanisms
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(gitea dump + mirrors, restic, k3s etcd snapshots, Bubble/Stripe exports,
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SOPS/age secret vault), and two hard rules with verification steps —
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(a) backup-storage credentials never live on the production host with delete
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permission; (b) backup job success and repository integrity are checked on a
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defined schedule with a named alerting path.
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## Full-server-loss restore runbook and panic sheet (R1, R11)
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```task
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id: DISCTL-WP-0002-T05
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status: done
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priority: medium
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state_hub_task_id: "c413734b-7a17-4164-bf72-0de18fd509c4"
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```
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Write `RestoreRunbooks/01-full-server-loss.md` (new machine → Ansible → secret
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recovery → data restore → k3s redeploy → validate → DNS cutover → evidence
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report) and the one-page panic sheet: where backups are, who has access, how to
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rebuild, how to rotate secrets, how to switch DNS — written so a competent
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stranger could execute it.
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## First restore drill with evidence file (R2)
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```task
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id: DISCTL-WP-0002-T06
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status: done
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priority: high
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state_hub_task_id: "c816efa0-bbc2-4612-9a8f-a03bd83ca7c0"
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```
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The 2026-07-04 Forgejo drill (evidence in `railiance-infra`) proved that path;
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this task covers the next untested system: restore one Gitea repo/dump or
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decrypt the secret vault from cold, onto a clean target. Write
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`TestEvidence/restore-drill-2026-MM-DD.md` with measured RTO/RPO, result,
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issues found, and follow-up actions; also copy or link the Forgejo drill
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evidence so this repo holds the complete evidence trail. Define the recurring
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drill cadence (pickup item 7). This task is the exit criterion for the
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workplan: no drill evidence here, not finished.
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## Incident playbooks (R3, R4, R5, R6, R7)
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```task
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id: DISCTL-WP-0002-T07
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status: done
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priority: medium
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state_hub_task_id: "ee7254a8-5adf-4913-bb47-bf94e59c88ec"
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```
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Write the five playbooks under `IncidentPlaybooks/`: ransomware/hostile access,
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credential leak, accidental delete / data corruption, provider outage
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(Bubble/Stripe/OpenRouter/DNS/email), loss of admin identity. Keep each to one
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page of numbered steps per the spec (§6).
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## Track cross-repo backup pickup queue (R2, R9)
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```task
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id: DISCTL-WP-0002-T08
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status: done
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priority: medium
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state_hub_task_id: "af9ae2ca-5af8-45af-9301-8c28e78ea32a"
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```
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Drive closure of the cross-repo items from the Forgejo assessment's pickup
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queue (items 1–6: backup destination decision #7, CNPG ScheduledBackup,
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scheduled `forgejo dump`, `railiance-backup` tool, Gitea pre-cutover snapshot,
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`apps-pg` coverage). Implementation lives in `railiance-platform` /
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`railiance-apps` / `railiance-infra`; this repo tracks status and records the
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outcome in the registers and BackupPolicy as each item lands.
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