email-connect/workplans/EMAIL-WP-0004-transactional-mail-delivery-service.md
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Complete EMAIL-WP-0004 transactional invitation mail delivery.
Ship the railiance01 deploy package (OpenBao/ESO custody, NetworkPolicy,
probes), provider failure classification and suppression, T04 unit and live
proof, and non-secret NK-WP-0024 hand-back evidence. Workplan finished.
2026-08-12 13:32:11 +02:00

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id type title domain repo status owner topic_slug created updated depends_on state_hub_workstream_id
EMAIL-WP-0004 workplan Provide transactional invitation mail delivery infotech email-connect finished codex netkingdom 2026-08-08 2026-08-12
NK-WP-0024
a37e5e4d-090a-4a75-88d2-aacd0c0fd235

EMAIL-WP-0004 - transactional invitation mail delivery

Extend email-connect beyond mailbox evidence scanning with a narrow, provider-neutral transactional-send service for user-engine invitations and verification messages. Email evidence remains non-authoritative.

Deferred (not in this workplan): daily send-quota privilege tiers (10 / 100 / 1e3 / 1e4 / 1e5 / 1e6 / unlimited) as anti-spam abuse control — see DECISIONS.md “Defer daily send-quota privilege tiers”.

T01 - Define the send and evidence contract

id: EMAIL-WP-0004-T01
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "ef07126a-3c1b-4a8b-9ec1-252c8844ec49"

Define an authenticated HTTP send request derived from the user-engine outbox envelope, approved templates, recipient/address validation, tenant/template allow-lists, Idempotency-Key, correlation, redaction, and response/error semantics. Provider acceptance must not be described as inbox delivery, awareness, identity, or authorization.

Done when the contract supports invitation-created and invitation-resent events without accepting arbitrary sender, template, or message content.

Done 2026-08-09: authenticated /v1/send accepts only the two invitation event types, validates recipient/event/idempotency fields, and renders a fixed portal invitation template. Provider acceptance remains explicitly distinct from delivery or identity evidence.

T02 - Implement provider-neutral transactional sending

id: EMAIL-WP-0004-T02
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "6a6ae927-4393-480f-a83e-93c9dabe18fe"

Implement the HTTP receiver, template rendering, idempotency store, suppression checks, bounded provider calls, and provider adapter. Start with the approved IONOS SMTP/STARTTLS lane while keeping provider credentials outside requests, logs, Git, and database evidence.

Done when repeated event IDs send at most one message and failures return stable retryable/permanent classifications without leaking SMTP details.

Done 2026-08-09: SQLite idempotency, provider-neutral injection, bounded STARTTLS SMTP calls, duplicate suppression, and redacted provider-unavailable responses are implemented. The same narrow service now issues public- registration mailbox challenges: plaintext handles exist only in the message, SQLite retains a SHA-256 digest, evidence is purpose/binding scoped, expiry is enforced, and consumption is atomic and single-use. All 23 repository tests pass.

2026-08-10 cancellation increment: verification messages now include a fixed portal cancellation link using the same opaque handle. The SQLite store keeps only its digest and atomically records either consumption or cancellation, so verification and cancellation invalidate one another and replay fails closed. Purpose-bound cancellation evidence lets user-engine abandon the matching registration without accepting browser identity claims. All 24 tests pass.

T03 - Establish custody and deploy the service

id: EMAIL-WP-0004-T03
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "13428364-29b1-4e0d-aaf5-c0b254c829b9"

Route SMTP and caller credentials through the credential catalog before requesting them, store provider material in OpenBao, and deliver only scoped runtime secrets. Deploy an immutable image on railiance01 with probes, resource/security controls, default-deny NetworkPolicy, restricted user-engine ingress, SMTP-only egress, and rollback.

Done when user-engine can call the cluster-local receiver without possessing SMTP credentials and unrelated workloads cannot send through it.

Done 2026-08-12 after CCR-2026-0010 approval:

  • OpenBao path platform/workloads/email-connect/transactional provisioned (ingest token new; SMTP username/password seeded from live forgejo IONOS lane — sender ConfigMap uses forgejo@coulomb.social).
  • Policies applied; ESO child token Secret external-secrets/openbao-email-connect-eso-token; ClusterSecretStore openbao-email-connect Ready; ExternalSecret SecretSynced (3 keys).
  • Package applied on railiance01: Deployment Ready 1/1, PVC Bound, probes green, image digest sha256:bc7a01b4….
  • Network: email-connect default-deny + user-engine ingress + SMTP-587 egress; user-engine-runtime egress allow to email-connect:8080 (net-kingdom sso-mfa/k8s/user-engine/runtime.yaml).
  • Smoke: user-engine /healthz//readyz 200; unauth /v1/send 401; bearer template_not_allowed / invalid_recipient 400; default-ns probe Connection refused. user-engine secret has no SMTP keys.
  • Catalog email-connect-transactional promoted active/resolvable.
  • Follow-up (not T03): mount same ingest token into user-engine for NK outbox (NK-WP-0024); optional dedicated noreply@ mailbox; T04 failure proof.

T04 - Prove invitation delivery failure behavior

id: EMAIL-WP-0004-T04
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "34127b3e-f7c6-4ebe-a86c-743ba1b27640"

Test template allow-list denial, invalid recipient, provider timeout, temporary deferral, permanent rejection, duplicate request, suppression, resend, and redacted diagnostics. Verify mailbox ownership and provider acceptance never alter user-engine authorization. Hand non-secret message/event references and failure evidence back to NK-WP-0024.

Done when deployed invitation and verification flows are observable, idempotent, retry-safe, and conservative about delivery evidence.

Done 2026-08-12:

  • ProviderError classification: timeout/temporary/unavailable → 503 retryable=true; permanent_rejection → 422 retryable=false; no SMTP text in responses. SQLite suppressions → recipient_suppressed. Accept body carries evidence_ceiling=provider_accepted; verification consume/cancel set authorization=false.
  • Unit matrix: 9 tests pass (tests/test_transactional.py).
  • Live matrix on railiance01 (image sha256:a9de1994…): unauth 401, template/invalid/idempotency 400, accept 202 + duplicate 200, resend 202, bad domain 422 permanent_rejection, suppression 400; redaction checked. Evidence note for NK-WP-0024: docs/EMAIL-WP-0004-T04-failure-evidence.md.
  • Workplan finished when T01T04 all done (this completes EMAIL-WP-0004).