flex-auth/docs/canonical-request-digest.md

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# Canonical request digest
Status: published
Date: 2026-09-02
Standard: security-layer-model_v0.7 §6.4.2
The digest is the mechanical test for replaying a flex-auth verdict. A consumer
may reuse an allow **iff** a new request produces the same digest **and** the
decision's lifetime still holds. Negative caching of a deny uses the same test.
Constructor: `api.NewDecisionBinding` / `api.RequestDigest`.
Field: `DecisionEnvelope.binding.request_digest`.
Format: `sha256:` plus 64 lowercase hex characters.
## What is hashed
Canonical JSON (Go `encoding/json`, which sorts map keys) of:
| Field | Source |
| --- | --- |
| `tenant` | `CheckRequest.tenant` |
| `subject` | normalized `CheckRequest.subject` |
| `action` | `CheckRequest.action` |
| `resource` | normalized `CheckRequest.resource` |
| `context` | `CheckRequest.context` |
Empty optional maps and omitempty strings are omitted. Attribute maps inside
subject and resource are part of the material once the evaluator has enriched
them from the registry.
**Not hashed:** `id`, `policy_version`, and `caring_context`. The request id is
correlation only. Policy version is recorded in provenance. CARING context is
hashed separately as `provenance.input_claim_digests.caring_context`.
## Normalization
1. Tenant on the request is copied onto subject and resource when those refs
omit it.
2. A registry hit copies type, tenant, and selected attributes onto the refs
the digest sees.
3. Context is a shallow copy. Key order is not significant.
A consumer that re-hashes the **original** unenriched request will not match a
decision that turned on registry attributes. Compare structured `binding`
fields to the proposed action, and treat `request_digest` as the evaluator's
statement of what it hashed. To recompute independently, hash the same
normalized tuple the binding carries (tenant, subject, action, resource,
context).
## Stability
The digest is stable across process restarts for the same normalized tuple.
It is **not** stable across:
- a change to any hashed field, including registry-enriched attributes
- a change to this contract (would require a new `contract_version`)
It does not include the policy package, snapshot, or clock. Those live in
provenance and `lifetime`. Two allows over the same tuple but different
snapshots share a digest and differ in `registry_snapshot_digest`.
## Worked example — permitted retry
Request (after enrichment):
```json
{
"tenant": "tenant:alpha",
"subject": {"id": "user:alice", "type": "Human", "tenant": "tenant:alpha"},
"action": "read",
"resource": {
"id": "document:internal-note",
"type": "document",
"system": "markitect-tool",
"tenant": "tenant:alpha"
},
"context": {"purpose": "project-delivery"}
}
```
The evaluator stores `binding.request_digest` for that tuple and
`lifetime.expires_at` in the future. The same subject, action, resource, and
context presented again before expiry is a permitted retry of that allow.
## Worked example — refused replay
Any of the following refuses replay:
- `action` changes from `read` to `destroy` (digest mismatch)
- `resource.attributes.stage` changes from `build` to `production` (digest mismatch)
- `lifetime.expires_at` is in the past (lifetime does not hold)
- the stored effect is `deny` and the consumer is attempting to treat a cached
refusal as still binding after a policy change — negative cache is valid only
for the same digest **and** while the recorded lifetime would have held; a
new `Check` is required once either fails
Local fixtures, State Hub `/decisions/{uuid}` records, and free-form
`decided_by` values are not this test.
Publish approval_binding_digest: a claim cannot name the request carrying it secrets-engine confirmed T03, and re-verifying against the regenerated destroy fixture found something neither repository can fix alone: a pdp_digest recorded at issue time can never equal the request_digest of a request that carries the claim in its context, because the claim is part of the context that is hashed. Embedding the claim changes the very digest the claim would need to name. Not fixture staleness. It holds for every dual-control request whose claim travels in context -- the shape GH-DEC-2026-008 had just ruled mandatory. Left unresolved that ruling was unimplementable for exactly the case it was written for, and destroy would have been permanently un-allowable in production, failing closed forever on a check that could never pass. flex-auth owns the canonical request digest, so the fix is ours. binding.approval_binding_digest is the same material with context.approval removed, emitted only when a claim was carried. An approval issued against a claim-free Check records that Check's request_digest; the claim-bearing request reproduces it here. DELIBERATELY ADDITIVE, and the reason matters. The tempting fix is to drop context.approval from request_digest entirely. That is wrong: request_digest is the replay identity, and two requests differing only in which approval was presented must not share one, because their decisions differ -- one allows, the other denies dual_control_required. Collapsing them would let an allow obtained with a valid claim be replayed against a request carrying none. So request_digest still covers the claim and still moves; approval_binding_digest deliberately does not, and is documented as not a replay identity. The tests assert the two functions DISAGREE on a claim-bearing request, which is approval-engine's formulation of how to defend a distinction that looks like duplication. The fixture now demonstrates the property rather than asserting it: its claim's pdp_digest equals the envelope's approval_binding_digest with pdp_path true, and changing the claim's contents moved request_digest while leaving approval_binding_digest untouched. Two files a consumer can diff. Also picked up approval-engine's new required binding.pdp_path via the cross-repo schema test added yesterday -- which is the test doing exactly what it was built for, one day later. T03 is done. secrets-engine's own digest-material defect, which our two real envelopes caught, is recorded in the workplan. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JTbVXpEiXA7mNJVpDnEPcB Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 412054@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 3968fae1-8d59-4209-9bd6-c22594b8ab19
2026-09-06 14:52:33 +02:00
## The approval-binding digest
`binding.approval_binding_digest` is this same digest computed with an approval
claim removed from `context`. It appears only when the request carried one on
`context.approval`.
### Why a second digest exists
An approval's `pdp_digest` is recorded **at issue time**. The request that later
carries that claim inside its hashed context has a different `request_digest` by
construction, because the claim is part of the context that is hashed. So:
> A `pdp_digest` recorded at issue time can never equal the `request_digest` of
> the request that carries the claim.
`secrets-engine` found this while verifying a replay fixture, and it is not a
fixture defect — it is circular by construction. Left unresolved it would make
`GH-DEC-2026-008` unimplementable for exactly the case it was written for: a
dual-control action whose claim travels in context.
`approval_binding_digest` is stable across attaching the claim. An approval
issued against a claim-free Check records that Check's `request_digest`, and the
later claim-bearing request reproduces the same value here.
### The comparison
```text
claim.binding.pdp_digest == decision.binding.approval_binding_digest
```
Never against `request_digest`. Comparing to `request_digest` cannot succeed on a
claim-bearing request.
### It is not a replay identity
`request_digest` remains the §6.4.2 replay test and still covers the approval
claim. `approval_binding_digest` deliberately does not: two requests differing
only in which approval was presented share it, **and their decisions do not**
one allows, the other denies `dual_control_required`.
Collapsing the two would let an allow obtained with a valid claim be replayed
against a request carrying none. That is why this is an additional field rather
than a redefinition of the existing one, and why `pkg/api/approval_binding_test.go`
asserts the two functions **disagree** on a claim-bearing request. A test that a
distinction is real is how a distinction that looks like duplication is defended.
fix(decision): registry facts win over caller-supplied attributes secrets-engine's first live request rejected our allow: binding. request_digest is computed over material they never sent, because we enrich subject and resource from the registry before hashing. Answering that meant reading the enrichment path, which had a worse defect in it. Enrichment was additive-if-absent — addAttribute wrote a registry value only where the request had no value for that key. So where a caller supplied a key, the caller's value won and the registry's never applied. Every registry ceiling and allowlist was advisory. Verified against the shipped ops-warden package, each one added key on an otherwise-denied request: max_ttl_hours: 99 registry says 8 -> allowed a 12h certificate allowed_principals registry allowlist -> disallowed_principal bypassed allowed_subjects registry allowlist -> unknown_subject bypassed The third is the one to read twice: a subject the registry does not know authorized itself by naming itself in the allowlist it was being checked against. Not remotely reachable today — the PEP builds the CheckRequest, ops-warden sends no resource.attributes, and enforce admits one identity. It is a defence-in-depth failure: any path that lets attacker-influenced data into a CheckRequest field became a full policy bypass rather than a bounded input problem. Callers sending resource.attributes is not hypothetical; secrets-engine does it on every request. Registry facts now win, and diagnostics.registry_overrode names every displaced key, because a registry that silently discards a contradicting claim hides that a caller asserted authority it did not have. subject.type is carved out, and the reason is a finding of its own. Making the registry win there denied every secrets-engine allow: the registry's type is CARING vocabulary (Human, Agent, Automation, Service) and the request's is the protected system's actor vocabulary (service, adm, agt, atm). Two fields sharing a name; substituting one for the other is translation rather than identity, which GH-DEC-2026-008 ruled against. Note what surfaced it — the registry's type had been dead data since the field existed, because the caller's value always won. Also publishes binding.submitted_request_digest, over the request exactly as sent. request_digest was published as the consumer replay test and cannot be one. Nothing is lost hashing the pre-enrichment form: enrichment is a function of the request and the snapshot, and registry_snapshot_digest already pins the snapshot. Existing pins do not move. All three replay fixtures' request_digest and approval_binding_digest values are byte-identical — those requests contradict no registry fact. A field to add, not a value to correct. Regression tests verified failing against the old behaviour before being kept. FLEX-DEC-2026-012; FLEX-WP-0025 carries the residual, that a policy still cannot tell a fact from an assertion. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014aQMM1dPXaPiXVn6DwwtLd Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 715613@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: fabd95c1-4c9e-4080-8849-8707ae025f80
2026-09-07 13:43:33 +02:00
## Correction, 2026-09-07: which digest a consumer computes
This document describes the canonical form. It does **not** follow that
`binding.request_digest` is the value a consumer reproduces.
`request_digest` is computed over the **enriched** request — after the evaluator
overlays registry facts onto subject and resource — so a consumer recomputing it
over what it sent gets a different value on every request whose subject or
resource the registry knows. `secrets-engine` found this on its first live
request.
**The consumer's §6.4.2 replay test is `binding.submitted_request_digest`**: this
same canonical form applied to the request exactly as received. Everything below
about canonicalisation is unchanged and applies to both; what changed is which
*material* a consumer hashes. See
[`request-enrichment.md`](request-enrichment.md) and `FLEX-DEC-2026-012`.