flex-auth/docs/canonical-request-digest.md
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fix(decision): registry facts win over caller-supplied attributes
secrets-engine's first live request rejected our allow: binding.
request_digest is computed over material they never sent, because we
enrich subject and resource from the registry before hashing. Answering
that meant reading the enrichment path, which had a worse defect in it.

Enrichment was additive-if-absent — addAttribute wrote a registry value
only where the request had no value for that key. So where a caller
supplied a key, the caller's value won and the registry's never applied.
Every registry ceiling and allowlist was advisory. Verified against the
shipped ops-warden package, each one added key on an otherwise-denied
request:

  max_ttl_hours: 99      registry says 8    -> allowed a 12h certificate
  allowed_principals     registry allowlist -> disallowed_principal bypassed
  allowed_subjects       registry allowlist -> unknown_subject bypassed

The third is the one to read twice: a subject the registry does not know
authorized itself by naming itself in the allowlist it was being checked
against.

Not remotely reachable today — the PEP builds the CheckRequest,
ops-warden sends no resource.attributes, and enforce admits one identity.
It is a defence-in-depth failure: any path that lets attacker-influenced
data into a CheckRequest field became a full policy bypass rather than a
bounded input problem. Callers sending resource.attributes is not
hypothetical; secrets-engine does it on every request.

Registry facts now win, and diagnostics.registry_overrode names every
displaced key, because a registry that silently discards a contradicting
claim hides that a caller asserted authority it did not have.

subject.type is carved out, and the reason is a finding of its own.
Making the registry win there denied every secrets-engine allow: the
registry's type is CARING vocabulary (Human, Agent, Automation, Service)
and the request's is the protected system's actor vocabulary (service,
adm, agt, atm). Two fields sharing a name; substituting one for the other
is translation rather than identity, which GH-DEC-2026-008 ruled against.
Note what surfaced it — the registry's type had been dead data since the
field existed, because the caller's value always won.

Also publishes binding.submitted_request_digest, over the request exactly
as sent. request_digest was published as the consumer replay test and
cannot be one. Nothing is lost hashing the pre-enrichment form:
enrichment is a function of the request and the snapshot, and
registry_snapshot_digest already pins the snapshot.

Existing pins do not move. All three replay fixtures' request_digest and
approval_binding_digest values are byte-identical — those requests
contradict no registry fact. A field to add, not a value to correct.

Regression tests verified failing against the old behaviour before being
kept. FLEX-DEC-2026-012; FLEX-WP-0025 carries the residual, that a policy
still cannot tell a fact from an assertion.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014aQMM1dPXaPiXVn6DwwtLd

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 715613@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: fabd95c1-4c9e-4080-8849-8707ae025f80
2026-09-07 13:43:33 +02:00

6.4 KiB

Canonical request digest

Status: published Date: 2026-09-02 Standard: security-layer-model_v0.7 §6.4.2

The digest is the mechanical test for replaying a flex-auth verdict. A consumer may reuse an allow iff a new request produces the same digest and the decision's lifetime still holds. Negative caching of a deny uses the same test.

Constructor: api.NewDecisionBinding / api.RequestDigest. Field: DecisionEnvelope.binding.request_digest. Format: sha256: plus 64 lowercase hex characters.

What is hashed

Canonical JSON (Go encoding/json, which sorts map keys) of:

Field Source
tenant CheckRequest.tenant
subject normalized CheckRequest.subject
action CheckRequest.action
resource normalized CheckRequest.resource
context CheckRequest.context

Empty optional maps and omitempty strings are omitted. Attribute maps inside subject and resource are part of the material once the evaluator has enriched them from the registry.

Not hashed: id, policy_version, and caring_context. The request id is correlation only. Policy version is recorded in provenance. CARING context is hashed separately as provenance.input_claim_digests.caring_context.

Normalization

  1. Tenant on the request is copied onto subject and resource when those refs omit it.
  2. A registry hit copies type, tenant, and selected attributes onto the refs the digest sees.
  3. Context is a shallow copy. Key order is not significant.

A consumer that re-hashes the original unenriched request will not match a decision that turned on registry attributes. Compare structured binding fields to the proposed action, and treat request_digest as the evaluator's statement of what it hashed. To recompute independently, hash the same normalized tuple the binding carries (tenant, subject, action, resource, context).

Stability

The digest is stable across process restarts for the same normalized tuple. It is not stable across:

  • a change to any hashed field, including registry-enriched attributes
  • a change to this contract (would require a new contract_version)

It does not include the policy package, snapshot, or clock. Those live in provenance and lifetime. Two allows over the same tuple but different snapshots share a digest and differ in registry_snapshot_digest.

Worked example — permitted retry

Request (after enrichment):

{
  "tenant": "tenant:alpha",
  "subject": {"id": "user:alice", "type": "Human", "tenant": "tenant:alpha"},
  "action": "read",
  "resource": {
    "id": "document:internal-note",
    "type": "document",
    "system": "markitect-tool",
    "tenant": "tenant:alpha"
  },
  "context": {"purpose": "project-delivery"}
}

The evaluator stores binding.request_digest for that tuple and lifetime.expires_at in the future. The same subject, action, resource, and context presented again before expiry is a permitted retry of that allow.

Worked example — refused replay

Any of the following refuses replay:

  • action changes from read to destroy (digest mismatch)
  • resource.attributes.stage changes from build to production (digest mismatch)
  • lifetime.expires_at is in the past (lifetime does not hold)
  • the stored effect is deny and the consumer is attempting to treat a cached refusal as still binding after a policy change — negative cache is valid only for the same digest and while the recorded lifetime would have held; a new Check is required once either fails

Local fixtures, State Hub /decisions/{uuid} records, and free-form decided_by values are not this test.

The approval-binding digest

binding.approval_binding_digest is this same digest computed with an approval claim removed from context. It appears only when the request carried one on context.approval.

Why a second digest exists

An approval's pdp_digest is recorded at issue time. The request that later carries that claim inside its hashed context has a different request_digest by construction, because the claim is part of the context that is hashed. So:

A pdp_digest recorded at issue time can never equal the request_digest of the request that carries the claim.

secrets-engine found this while verifying a replay fixture, and it is not a fixture defect — it is circular by construction. Left unresolved it would make GH-DEC-2026-008 unimplementable for exactly the case it was written for: a dual-control action whose claim travels in context.

approval_binding_digest is stable across attaching the claim. An approval issued against a claim-free Check records that Check's request_digest, and the later claim-bearing request reproduces the same value here.

The comparison

claim.binding.pdp_digest == decision.binding.approval_binding_digest

Never against request_digest. Comparing to request_digest cannot succeed on a claim-bearing request.

It is not a replay identity

request_digest remains the §6.4.2 replay test and still covers the approval claim. approval_binding_digest deliberately does not: two requests differing only in which approval was presented share it, and their decisions do not — one allows, the other denies dual_control_required.

Collapsing the two would let an allow obtained with a valid claim be replayed against a request carrying none. That is why this is an additional field rather than a redefinition of the existing one, and why pkg/api/approval_binding_test.go asserts the two functions disagree on a claim-bearing request. A test that a distinction is real is how a distinction that looks like duplication is defended.

Correction, 2026-09-07: which digest a consumer computes

This document describes the canonical form. It does not follow that binding.request_digest is the value a consumer reproduces.

request_digest is computed over the enriched request — after the evaluator overlays registry facts onto subject and resource — so a consumer recomputing it over what it sent gets a different value on every request whose subject or resource the registry knows. secrets-engine found this on its first live request.

The consumer's §6.4.2 replay test is binding.submitted_request_digest: this same canonical form applied to the request exactly as received. Everything below about canonicalisation is unchanged and applies to both; what changed is which material a consumer hashes. See request-enrichment.md and FLEX-DEC-2026-012.