FLEX-WP-0010-T04: the deployed flex-auth-tenant-engine Deployment bakes
the policy package into its image, so production still serves the
four-action policy -- probed live, tenant.retire returns deny
unknown_action there while tenant.create allows. TEN-WP-0005-T05 is
unblocked in source but needs an image build from 8e127e5 and a rollout,
which this workplan does not scope. Stated in the workplan and in
examples/tenant-engine/README.md rather than left implied.
FLEX-WP-0009-T04: replayed all six user-engine fixtures against the
deployed flex-auth-user-engine service; all six matched expected effect
and reason, confirming the deployed failure matrix is still fail-closed.
T04 stays in progress -- the criterion also requires user-engine to
retire its local bridge, which is not flex-auth's to close.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Extend the tenant-engine write-API policy package with tenant.update,
tenant.retire, and tenant.reactivate, the three actions TEN-WP-0005
introduced. Until now every lifecycle mutation resolved to deny
unknown_action, blocking TEN-WP-0005-T05 production rollout.
- policy_package.md: three actions in valid_actions and frontmatter;
CARING capabilities extended with EditAny/Archive/Restore
- protected_system_manifest.yaml, subject_manifest.yaml, and the rebuilt
registry_snapshot.json carry all seven actions
- docs/tenant-engine-action-vocabulary.md documents the HTTP surfaces
- 8 new fixture pairs and 5 new Rego tests, including action-drift
guards (tenant.retired, tenant_update -> unknown_action)
T02 decision, recorded in policy_package.md: tenant.retire does NOT get
stricter authorization yet. With one service subject and no assurance
claim in the CheckRequest there is nothing stricter to check, and a
condition the sole caller always satisfies would falsely read as
separate control. Retirement is reversible and non-destructive. Revisit
on KEY-WP-0005 assurance claims or a second operator subject.
Verified: 11/11 Rego tests, 16/16 fixtures, go test ./... green, gofmt
and go vet clean. End-to-end against a live serve with a real
tenant-engine through the unmodified FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer: update
6176c39c2f4d7b15, retire 8a801b8ee8455080, reactivate c64cf3713cecd970
all allow; unregistered actor denied unknown_subject
(59d3e99c6416be89, 403 write_denied).
Handoff revision for TEN-WP-0005-T05: package
tenant-engine.write-api.mutate v1 (ready, caring-0.4.0-rc2).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
TEN-WP-0005 added tenant.update / tenant.retire / tenant.reactivate to
tenant-engine's write API. FLEX-WP-0008's policy package predates them, so
every lifecycle mutation resolves to deny unknown_action -- correct
fail-closed, but it blocks TEN-WP-0005-T05 rollout and USER-WP-0021.
Requested by tenant-engine; action strings taken verbatim from the live
_RESOURCE_TYPES mapping.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Maintainer decision, 2026-07-29: adopts TRSL V1C1 as this repo's
preliminary governing license, per target-revenue's
workplans/TREV-WP-0008-governance-and-pilot-rollout.md T05. Full
specialist legal review is deferred until out of beta (target-revenue
SCOPE.md §1). No Phase is yet declared for this repo.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
QONTO-WP-0004-T04. Modeled directly on examples/tenant-engine/: one
resource type (finance-snapshot), one action (finance.qonto.read),
two registered subjects (an agent-harness session identity and the
founder's human identity), and a Rego policy gating on
resource.system + action + subject.type + tenant match. Tenant
capability-role/plan liveness (VEN/CUS) is deliberately NOT encoded
here -- that's qonto-assistant's separate tenant-engine live-lookup
check, per this package's own scope note.
Verified: flex-auth test-policy (6 rego tests + 6 fixtures, all pass),
load-registry, and CLI check for both an allow and a deny case. Also
verified end-to-end over real HTTP: a live flex-auth serve loaded with
this exact registry+policy, hit by qonto-assistant's actual
FlexAuthCheckClient (not a mock) -- allow for tenant:friendly:binky,
deny (wrong_tenant) for a mismatched tenant.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
internal/adapters/tenantengine: HTTPClient.LiveRoles() calls tenant-engine's
GET /tenants/{id}/roles/live. LiveRolesResult.Available is the load-bearing
field -- false on any transport error, non-200, or malformed body, never
inferred as zero roles. AttachToContext() writes both tenant_roles and
tenant_roles_available into a CheckRequest.Context map; a consuming Rego
policy must check tenant_roles_available before trusting tenant_roles.
Architectural finding recorded in the workplan: engine.go's Check() has no
context-adapter hook, and none of the existing topaz/relationship/rule
adapters are wired into cmd/flex-auth either -- they're standalone packages
for downstream composition. This adapter is a request-preparation helper a
protected system's own request-building code calls before POST /v1/check,
not an engine-internal hook, matching that precedent exactly.
9 Go tests; gofmt/vet/build clean; go test ./... green repo-wide.
Verified as a real three-service chain: live flex-auth serve + live
tenant-engine, created a tenant and granted it a CUS role through the real
flex-auth-gated write path, then read it back through this adapter (via a
throwaway harness, not committed) -- known tenant: roles=[CUS]
available=true; unknown tenant: roles=[] available=false err="status 404".
FLEX-WP-0008 closed: T01-T04 all done. tenant-engine's write path is now
real end-to-end; any other protected system can pull live tenant capability
role context, fail-closed. Remaining open item unchanged from TEN-WP-0003:
KEY-WP-0005 (key-cape's IAM Profile core-claims gap).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
docs/tenant-engine-{resource-namespace,action-vocabulary}.md: four actions
(tenant.create, tenant.role.grant, tenant.role.revoke, tenant.plan.assign)
matching tenant_engine/src/tenant_engine/authz.py's _RESOURCE_TYPES mapping
exactly. No resource_manifest.yaml -- tenant-engine's resources are created
dynamically, unlike ops-warden's fixed SSH-certificate inventory; documented
as a deliberate deviation.
examples/tenant-engine/: protected_system_manifest.yaml, subject_manifest.yaml
(one registered caller: tenant-engine's own service identity),
policy_package.md (Rego rules + embedded tests), policy_fixtures.yaml (8
allow/deny pairs), assembled registry_snapshot.json, two standalone
check_request examples, README.
Design decision made explicit in the workplan: operator/service-identity
authorization (one known subject, four known actions), not aal2+assurance +
tenant-capability-role checking -- CheckRequest carries no assurance claim
yet (TEN-WP-0003 already flagged actor as a plain request-body field, not a
real auth context), and a tenant's capability roles are the tenant's own
state, not a property of who may call tenant-engine's admin API. Revisit
once KEY-WP-0005 gives callers a real assurance-bearing identity.
Verified for real: built ./cmd/flex-auth, ran test-policy (6 tests + 8
fixtures, all pass), load-registry, check against both example requests.
Then ran a live flex-auth serve with this exact registry+policy and pointed
tenant-engine's real, unmodified FlexAuthCheckClient/FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer
at it over real HTTP: unknown subject -> 403, tenant-engine -> 201. go test
./... still green across the whole repo.
T03 (live-lookup context adapter for other protected systems) stays open --
new Go adapter package, tracked separately.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Registers tenant-engine as a flex-auth protected-system consumer in both
directions its boundary contract requires: tenant-engine's writes need
authorization (FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer in TEN-WP-0003 currently gets
deny/not_applicable for everything until a policy package exists), and
flex-auth's own decisions for other protected systems need tenant
capability roles as context input via a live-lookup adapter.
Scoped closer to FLEX-WP-0006/0007 (ops-warden's small security-lane
integration) than FLEX-WP-0003 (Markitect's CARING-benchmark integration)
-- tenant-engine's resource/action vocabulary is small.
Registered, not implemented.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Sync AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md, and .claude/rules from updated project_rules
templates: workplan-first session protocol, legacy terminology footnote,
and GET /workplans/ examples.
Correct a stale Current State paragraph: FLEX-WP-0002 (standalone core),
0003 (Markitect integration), and 0004 (delegated PDP/directory adapters)
were completed in May 2026, not "planned". Record FLEX-WP-0007 closure:
ops-warden ran the joint OpenBao smoke (2026-06-29, decision
032b096c433ad80c allow; ttl_out_of_bounds deny), with production
policy.enabled deliberately left off while the ecosystem is build-stage.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
ops-warden's SSH signing policy gate (FLEX-WP-0006 finished, FLEX-WP-0007
deploying) makes it flex-auth's first shipped protected-system consumer.
Update the intent baseline to match the implemented reality:
- SCOPE Current State: standalone Go core + /v1/check is implemented;
FLEX-WP-0001/0005/0006 complete, 0007 blocked only on T4 VAULT_TOKEN.
- SCOPE Related/Overlapping + Disjoint From: ops-warden is now a consumer,
not merely disjoint; the once-hypothetical "agt as flex-auth subject"
flow is realized through the signing gate. Disjointness narrowed to the
identity surface (warden issues certs, flex-auth never does).
- INTENT Consumer Patterns: lead with the shipped action-gate shape
(ops-warden), keep Markitect as the planned knowledge-pipeline consumer.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add production_registry_snapshot.json from ops-warden inventory with CI
coverage for real actors, IAM subject binding, ttl_out_of_bounds, and
unknown_actor_resource. Extend serve contract tests with /healthz and
publish the registry sync contract for operator deployment.
- Align agent files with on-disk workplan prefixes (infer from workplan ids)
- Set workplan domain to registered domain_slug; add topic_slug where applicable
- Repair frontmatter delimiter formatting; migrate legacy task status literals
- Regenerate AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md, and .claude/rules from State Hub templates
Remove external reference points so the intent stands on its own at the
abstract, stable level: drop named identity/SSO systems, named PDP/policy
products, named directory/enterprise systems, the named first-consumer
project, and the external IAM-profile path. Keep all of flex-auth's own
substance — purpose, responsibility boundary (stated as abstract roles:
identity layer / authorization / enforcement points), design principles,
concepts, API shape, standalone vs delegated mode, non-goals, early work.
Relationships to other systems belong in interface contracts and the
orchestration responsibility map, not in intent.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
