flex-auth/SCOPE.md

flex-auth Scope

One-liner

flex-auth is a policy-as-code authorization registry and decision engine for NetKingdom-aligned systems. Under the NetKingdom Security Layer Model (declared 2026-08-29) it is Engine / PDP — the estate's only policy decision point.

Core Idea

flex-auth turns verified identity claims, resource manifests, relationship facts, policy packages, and request context into inspectable authorization decisions. It is intentionally separate from identity providers and from the applications that enforce decisions.

The product should start as a useful standalone local authorization system, then grow into delegated mode where Topaz, OpenFGA, SpiceDB, OPA, Cedar, Keycloak Authorization Services, Entra, Graph, SCIM, LDAP, and similar systems can be coordinated behind a stable flex-auth API.

In Scope

• Protected-system registration.
• Resource namespaces, resource hierarchy, and action vocabularies.
• Subject, group, team, tenant, role, and service-account records needed for authorization.
• Relationship facts and inherited access.
• Versioned policy packages with metadata, fixtures, validation, tests, and activation state.
• Deterministic check, batch-check, list-allowed, explain, and decision-record capabilities.
• Local decision logs with policy version and provenance.
• CLI and service entry points for local development and integration tests.
• Markitect as the first concrete protected-system consumer.
• Delegated PDP and directory adapter boundaries after the standalone core is stable.
• The decision-record schema, published as flex-auth's own contract (Security Layer Model §17).
• The canonical request digest as the published replay test for consumers (§6.4.2) — binding.submitted_request_digest, over the request as sent. request_digest is over the enriched request and is flex-auth's own audit-replay identity, not a consumer check (FLEX-DEC-2026-012).
• Decision lifetimes on every allow, and revocation visibility deadlines stated per input class (§9.7).
• Registry-snapshot provenance, so a decision that turned on registry content is replayable from its own record (§6.1, §9.7.2).

Out of Scope

• Acting as an identity provider.
• Replacing key-cape, NetKingdom SSO, Keycloak, Entra, or other identity systems.
• Owning login, MFA, PKCE, token issuance, token lifecycle, or canonical identity profile behavior.
• Embedding protected-system enforcement logic inside flex-auth.
• Making Markitect-specific assumptions part of the generic authorization model.
• Forcing a single PDP backend or directory provider.
• Hiding policy behavior behind opaque administrative toggles.
• Expressing fail-open. When flex-auth is unreachable there is no evaluator in the path; the residue is the consumer's declared stance (§9.3).
• Owning enforcement. A PEP's obligations under §6.4 are the consumer's, including its published stance map.
• Owning the approval object, its storage, or its lifecycle — that is approval-engine's (§9.4). flex-auth validates approvals as input claims and never mutates them.
• Owning evidence of authentication or assurance. flex-auth consumes assurance claims and never redefines them; it owns evidence of the decision (FLEX-DEC-2026-002, recorded as declined in §13).
• Authoring security doctrine. gate-house owns invariants, authority ceilings, operating modes, and the authority context flex-auth consumes as claims.

Relevant When

• A protected system needs resource-specific authorization decisions.
• A team needs policy-as-code packages that can be reviewed, tested, versioned, and explained.
• Authorization must combine identity claims, groups, roles, tenants, relationships, context, and resource metadata.
• A local development workflow needs deterministic authorization behavior before enterprise PDP integrations exist.
• Markitect resources need central authorization decisions and durable audit records.
• A delegated backend needs to be introduced without changing the protected-system-facing API.

Not Relevant When

• The task is only about authentication, login, token issuance, or MFA.
• The desired outcome can be handled by coarse identity-provider roles alone.
• The protected system only needs local development labels and no central policy administration.
• A team is choosing identity-provider configuration rather than resource-specific authorization.

Current State

The standalone core is implemented and all seven baseline workplans (FLEX-WP-0001 through FLEX-WP-0007) are complete. The repository carries the intent baseline, authorization landscape research, ADR set, and a working Go service (cmd/flex-auth) with validate, load-registry, serve, and POST /v1/check plus registry, policy, decision, audit, Markitect, and delegated-adapter internals. The standalone policy-as-code core (FLEX-WP-0002), Markitect consumer integration (FLEX-WP-0003, manifest ingest, decisions, and fixtures), and the delegated PDP/directory adapter shapes (FLEX-WP-0004, Topaz/OpenFGA/OPA/Cedar/Keycloak/Entra tradeoffs documented with at least one controlled adapter shape) all landed in May 2026.

Standalone decisions include a structured binding containing the normalized subject, action, resource, context, and a full request digest. This makes the execute-time decision contract inspectable without parsing reason or diagnostic prose. Durable human approval lifecycle, supersession, and authenticated multi-approver evidence are approval-engine responsibilities; the proposed cross-system object is documented in schemas/action_authorization.schema.json and is not yet a deployed approval-engine endpoint.

secrets-engine is a shipped consumer as of 2026-09-06 (FLEX-WP-0021): secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle v2 over resource.type: secret-catalog-lane, twelve actions delivered by secrets-engine rather than inferred, destroy gated on a dual-control approval claim, and a dedicated flex-auth-secrets-engine pin at http://flex-auth-secrets-engine.flex-auth.svc.cluster.local.:8080 — trailing dot required, in-cluster only — with callerAuth.mode: warn. Adoption is not complete: secrets-engine is a CLI rather than a workload, and the pin's default-deny ingress admits a pod, so an operator-run access path is still undecided.

v1 of that package had no tenant rule and allowed a foreign tenant; v2 supersedes rather than amends it, because a fail-open correction must be visible to a consumer as a version change (FLEX-DEC-2026-008). The sweep that finding prompted shows tenant-engine unscoped on tenant as well, carried by FLEX-WP-0022.

The first shipped protected-system consumer is ops-warden: its opt-in pre-sign gate calls POST /v1/check for resource.type: ssh-certificate, action: sign decisions (examples/ops-warden/, policy package, allow/deny fixtures, and tests). FLEX-WP-0006 published that gate and FLEX-WP-0007 deployed flex-auth as a reachable production runtime for it. The joint OpenBao-backed smoke is verified (2026-06-29: vault-backed allow recorded decision:032b096c433ad80c; TTL-over-max denied ttl_out_of_bounds by flex-auth before OpenBao). FLEX-WP-0016 then shipped an independently rollable in-cluster ops-warden pin and moved it to callerAuth.mode: enforce once ops-warden adopted a calling identity (WARDEN-WP-0031): anonymous /v1/check is 401, a token bound to another protected system is 403.

Production policy.enabled is deliberately off, and is not coming back as a boolean. ops-warden's ADR-0009 (2026-08-22, superseding ADR-0006) settles it: policy.enabled is one repo-wide flag, and with fail_closed: true it makes flex-auth a hard dependency of every warden sign — including the SSH certificates the ops-bridge tunnels depend on, one of which carries the policy call itself. ADR-0009 retires policy.enabled and the global policy.fail_closed outright and replaces them with a total per-zone stance map in the consumer PEP (ops-warden/pep-stance.yaml): open for z0-z2 and unknown, closed for z3-critical. That map is the reference shape for the Security Layer Model's §6.4 obligation 3. It is no longer the only published one: secrets-engine published pep-stance.yaml (total over catalog stage plus unknown, runtime-read and test-pinned), so §13.1's register grew past the single row the standard recorded as itself the finding. It now carries five — ops-warden, user-engine, tenant-engine, secrets-engine, and ops-mason with no map at all — two of them marked non-conformant. flex-auth reviewed the pair in docs/stance-register-review.md — the first exercise of the aggregate-divergence capability it claimed on 2026-08-29 — and found that the two maps take opposite stances on unknown (fail_open vs fail_closed) and scope on different axes (security-zone vs catalog-stage), which makes the rows conformant but not comparable.

flex-auth reviewed the zone model as the PDP on 2026-08-19 and holds one boundary: zone membership compiles into the registry snapshot flex-auth already consumes (no schema change needed), while per-zone stance belongs in the versioned policy package, because registry content is absent from decision provenance. Fail-open is not expressible by a PDP at all and stays a consumer-side setting. The enforcing pins stay enforcing regardless — an enforcing pin with no enforcing consumer still turns the anonymous path into a 401 rather than a decision.

Layer position (declared 2026-08-29). flex-auth is Engine / PDP under the NetKingdom Security Layer Model, declared machine-readably in INTENT.md frontmatter per §11. That declaration deliberately carries no standard version: a layer is a boundary and does not change when the text is amended, which is the distinction the standard itself draws when it says assent is "to a BOUNDARY, given at the version named. It is not assent to the current text." The absence is enforced by test in internal/layer, and raised to gate-house as FLEX-WP-0030 B4 in case §11 should say so generally.

Version-scoped state therefore lives in docs/conformance/security-layer-conformance.md — a derived artifact that names what it derives from and the version it was derived at, as §11 requires. It carries the assent history (v0.4 FLEX-DEC-2026-002, v0.6 FLEX-DEC-2026-003, v0.8 FLEX-DEC-2026-011) and the gap table below.

Findings of flex-auth's adopted into the standard: §9.3's two-owner split for degraded mode, §6.4.2 scoped to the decision's own binding with the canonical request digest as its mechanical test and negative caching ruled explicitly, §9.7.2 split by role, §17 moving the decision-record schema to flex-auth, and four more in the v0.8 round (FLEX-DEC-2026-011), of which F1 — that a decision must be attributable to flex-auth and that a digest comparison does not discharge it — was the finding of the round.

Conformance state is not conforming on §11, held as three declared gaps, each with an owner and a route rather than a sentence. G2 is the non-conformance (GH-DEC-2026-018):

#	Gap	Owner	Route
G1	Registry-snapshot digest absent from decision provenance (§9.7.2 conformance prerequisite)	flex-auth	FLEX-WP-0019
G2	Emission guarantee declared per event class (cadence.yaml) but not delivered — no outbox, heartbeat, or audit-core sender registration. Review 2026-10-19	flex-auth	FLEX-WP-0031
G3	Published stance-register review stale — written at two register rows, §13.1 now carries five	flex-auth	FLEX-WP-0029

G2 was held open as a question — is flex-auth a §4 source of evidence, or only the producer of an artifact audit-core sources? — and gate-house ruled it against flex-auth on 2026-09-21: a custodian is never the source of what it holds. audit-core reached the same answer on its own authority. The classification is flex-auth's and is published; the delivery is the gap, and it fails closed (a missed detection, never a manufactured permission).

Boundaries review (2026-09-21). FLEX-WP-0030 reviews flex-auth's boundary against every security-relevant counterpart and raises five items: inconsistent layer: casing across the estate against §11's mechanical-checkability claim (B1); four security-relevant repositories with no layer declaration at all — gate-house, key-cape, ops-mason, net-kingdom — of which key-cape is the identity source whose claims flex-auth consumes as normative input, making that boundary asserted from one side only (B2); G2 above (B3); B4; and canon naming access-engine while the repository still answers to flex-auth (B5).

State Hub integration is present through:

• .custodian-brief.md
• state_hub_workstream_id fields in workplans
• state_hub_task_id fields in task blocks
• active State Hub dispatch for the flex-auth repo

How It Fits

flex-auth sits between identity and protected systems:

key-cape / NetKingdom SSO
  -> verified identity claims
  -> flex-auth authorization registry and policy decisions
  -> protected systems such as Markitect

Identity systems establish who the caller is and provide coarse claims. flex-auth decides what that caller can do to a specific resource under a specific context. Protected systems enforce the decision and keep their own local diagnostics.

Terminology

• Subject: Human, service account, group, team, tenant, role, or emergency principal.
• Resource: Protected object registered by a system.
• Namespace: Resource type and ownership boundary.
• Action: Operation requested against a resource.
• Context: Request, environment, assurance, workflow, or runtime attributes.
• Policy package: Versioned policy-as-code bundle with metadata and tests.
• Relationship fact: Subject-resource or resource-resource relation.
• Decision: Allow, deny, redact, audit-only, or not-applicable outcome with reason and provenance.
• PDP: Policy decision point, either flex-auth standalone logic or a delegated backend.
• PEP: Policy enforcement point in the protected system.

Related / Overlapping

• key-cape / NetKingdom SSO: identity source and coarse claims provider; flex-auth consumes the NetKingdom IAM Profile (~/net-kingdom/canon/standards/iam-profile_v0.2.md).
• ops-warden: first shipped protected-system consumer. Its opt-in pre-sign gate calls flex-auth for ssh-certificate / sign decisions before issuing a short-lived SSH certificate (FLEX-WP-0006, FLEX-WP-0007). ops-warden owns the SSH CA, OpenBao signing, and actor inventory; flex-auth owns the policy decision. ops-warden's routing charter names flex-auth as the owner of every "may I perform action X?" question.
• Markitect: first knowledge-pipeline consumer. Integration is complete on the flex-auth side (FLEX-WP-0003 — resource-manifest ingest, Markitect- compatible decisions, and fixtures); a live Markitect runtime calling the gate in production is the next consumer milestone after ops-warden.
• Topaz: aligned evaluator. Per ADR-003 the standalone core is shaped to match Topaz's Rego + directory model from day one; the Topaz adapter in FLEX-WP-0004 is therefore a small step rather than a conversion.
• OpenFGA and SpiceDB: candidate relationship authorization backends.
• OPA and Cedar: candidate rule and typed-policy engines.
• Keycloak Authorization Services: adapter path for Keycloak-centric deployments. Default architecture is "Keycloak as SSO only, flex-auth owns authorization"; Keycloak AuthZ is one optional delegated PDP.
• Entra, Graph, SCIM, LDAP, and Keycloak APIs: directory and group resolver sources.

Disjoint From

• ops-warden is a flex-auth consumer, not an overlap (see Related / Overlapping). The two remain disjoint on identity surface: ops-warden issues SSH certificates for ops actors (adm/agt/atm) and is not a resource-policy engine; flex-auth decides whether a given sign request is allowed and never issues certificates. The once-hypothetical flow of surfacing an agt actor as a flex-auth subject is now realized through the signing policy gate.
• ops-bridge owns SSH reverse-tunnel connectivity and explicitly disclaims being a credential authority or policy engine. No overlap.

Provided Capabilities

type: orientation
title: Agent orientation
status: current
description: Repo intent, boundaries, research, workplan map, and State Hub agent brief are available for new coding agents.

type: workplan
title: Standalone policy core plan
status: current
description: Workplan for schemas, local registry, policy packages, check APIs, list/explain, decision log, CLI/service skeleton, tests, and examples.

type: workplan
title: Markitect consumer integration plan
status: current
description: Workplan for Markitect resource namespace, manifest import, action vocabulary, check fixtures, contract tests, and integration flow.

type: workplan
title: Delegated adapter plan
status: current
description: Workplan for Topaz evaluation, relationship PDP adapters, rule PDP adapters, Keycloak AuthZ path, directory resolvers, and operations docs.

type: contract
title: Decision-record contract
status: current
description: Published decision-record schema, the submitted-request digest as the replay test for consumers, request-enrichment precedence, and decision provenance — flex-auth's own contract under the Security Layer Model section 17.

type: orientation
title: Layer declaration
status: current
description: Machine-readable Engine/PDP boundary declaration in INTENT.md frontmatter, carrying no standard version by design, with version-stamped conformance state and three declared gaps (G2 a ruled §11 non-conformance) and a per-event-class emission declaration in cadence.yaml, per docs/conformance/security-layer-conformance.md, per Security Layer Model section 11.