tegwick
afd9be5aa9
secrets-engine probed the Service DNS name handed over in FLEX-WP-0021-T05 and found it resolves, from the workstation, to an unrelated public host. Reproduced here: search ad.binect.de answers wildcard, so flex-auth-secrets-engine.flex-auth.svc.cluster.local and this-service-does-not-exist.flex-auth.svc.cluster.local both resolve to 80.158.43.29, while the trailing-dot FQDN correctly fails. A bare Service name in a handover is not merely unreachable from there, it is a live misdirection, and the handover was ours. Had a deployment pointed at it, the CheckRequest body would have gone to that host: subject, tenant, lane and resource ids, stage, field names, purpose, plus the caller's bearer token. Trailing-dot FQDN and "in-cluster only" now replace the bare name in the example README, SCOPE.md, and the T05 note. Their real question was how the response channel is authenticated, and they declined to answer it locally because choosing a transport control for our service is not a consumer's call. Right boundary, so the answer is recorded here as FLEX-DEC-2026-010: it is not authenticated. Pins serve plain HTTP, the envelope carries no signature, and a responder that knows the package id and version can return a well-formed allow that passes every check a consumer performs. The part worth stating in the contract is that the digests do not help and look like they do. Every input to request_digest, policy_package_digest and registry_snapshot_digest is either sent by the caller or published in this repo, so a forger reproduces all three exactly. They establish integrity of the binding, never authenticity of the source — and publishing more digests makes a forged envelope look more authenticated, not less. For secrets-engine specifically: fail-closed protects against a PDP that is absent, not against one that lies. An unreachable PDP denies; a lying PDP allows. Third instance of one seam in three decisions. 008: a tenant carried into the digest and never compared — visible, not enforced. 009: a caller authenticated and never recorded — enforced, not visible. 010: a record verifiable and unauthentic — checkable, but not evidence. One nuance that changes the operator recommendation: kubectl port-forward does authenticate the responder, transitively — no DNS name, one named pod, API-server TLS. That is the exact reverse of the caller direction, where it bypasses the NetworkPolicy. Independent properties pointing opposite ways, so neither can be summarised as "the network protects it". FLEX-WP-0024 carries signing; key custody routes through warden/OpenBao rather than minting a key here. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014aQMM1dPXaPiXVn6DwwtLd Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 715613@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: fabd95c1-4c9e-4080-8849-8707ae025f80
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Decision-record contract
Status: published
Contract: flex-auth.decision-record.v1
Schema: ../schemas/decision_envelope.schema.json
Date: 2026-09-02
This is flex-auth's output artifact under the NetKingdom Security Layer Model v0.7 §17. Taxonomy holds only the shared field vocabulary. Consumers may rely on this schema.
A decision record is a DecisionEnvelope returned by POST /v1/check and the
CLI check / batch-check / list-allowed commands. Standalone evaluation
and every delegated adapter (Topaz, relationship, rule, Keycloak) emit the
same shape.
Required fields
| Field | Meaning |
|---|---|
id |
Deterministic decision identifier |
effect |
allow, deny, redact, audit_only, or not_applicable |
subject / resource |
Normalized refs the evaluator used |
provenance |
Who evaluated, over which policy and facts |
Contract fields consumers may rely on
| Field | Meaning |
|---|---|
contract_version |
flex-auth.decision-record.v1 |
binding |
Structured subject, action, resource, context, and request_digest |
binding.approval_binding_digest |
Present only when the request carried context.approval. The digest an approval's pdp_digest must equal — see canonical-request-digest.md. Not a replay identity |
lifetime |
Required on every allow. A TTL with not_before and expires_at |
provenance.policy_package / policy_version |
Named package pin |
provenance.policy_package_digest |
SHA-256 of package metadata plus compiled Rego |
provenance.registry_snapshot_digest |
SHA-256 of the canonical registry snapshot |
provenance.directory_etag |
Directory consistency token when a delegated directory was joined |
provenance.input_claim_digests |
SHA-256 per request-time claim class (context, caring_context) |
provenance.decision_time |
UTC timestamp used to compute lifetime |
reason, diagnostics, and CARING prose are not an authorization contract.
Allow lifetime
Every allow carries lifetime.kind = ttl. The duration comes from the policy
package allow_ttl field, or from the engine default of 15m when the package
omits it. A package that declares allow_ttl: none (or 0s) produces a deny
with reason allow_lifetime_unstated instead of a standing grant.
Replay is permitted only while lifetime.expires_at is still in the future.
See canonical-request-digest.md and
decision-input-freshness.md.
Versioning
This is contract version 1. Additive optional fields may appear. Removing or
redefining a required field requires a new contract_version value and a new
schema id.
What this record does not prove: who answered
A consumer must not read digest recomputation as verification of the
responder. Recomputing binding.request_digest,
provenance.policy_package_digest, and provenance.registry_snapshot_digest
and finding all three correct says nothing about who produced the envelope.
Every input to those digests is either sent by the caller or published: the request material is what the caller just transmitted, and both the package and registry digests are computable from files in this repo. A responder that knows the package id and version can reproduce all three exactly. The digests establish integrity of the binding, never authenticity of the source.
flex-auth.decision-record.v1 carries no signature today, and pins serve plain
HTTP. So the response channel is unauthenticated, stated as a stance rather than
left as an assumption (FLEX-DEC-2026-010). For a fail-closed consumer the
distinction that matters is this: fail-closed protects against a PDP that is
absent, not against one that lies. An unreachable PDP denies; a lying PDP
allows.
A detached signature over the canonical envelope is the intended fix
(FLEX-WP-0024). Until it lands, responder authenticity comes from the channel
alone — and of the available channels only kubectl port-forward supplies it,
by targeting one named pod over the API server's TLS with no DNS name resolved.