tegwick
49de2f40ff
docs/tenant-engine-{resource-namespace,action-vocabulary}.md: four actions
(tenant.create, tenant.role.grant, tenant.role.revoke, tenant.plan.assign)
matching tenant_engine/src/tenant_engine/authz.py's _RESOURCE_TYPES mapping
exactly. No resource_manifest.yaml -- tenant-engine's resources are created
dynamically, unlike ops-warden's fixed SSH-certificate inventory; documented
as a deliberate deviation.
examples/tenant-engine/: protected_system_manifest.yaml, subject_manifest.yaml
(one registered caller: tenant-engine's own service identity),
policy_package.md (Rego rules + embedded tests), policy_fixtures.yaml (8
allow/deny pairs), assembled registry_snapshot.json, two standalone
check_request examples, README.
Design decision made explicit in the workplan: operator/service-identity
authorization (one known subject, four known actions), not aal2+assurance +
tenant-capability-role checking -- CheckRequest carries no assurance claim
yet (TEN-WP-0003 already flagged actor as a plain request-body field, not a
real auth context), and a tenant's capability roles are the tenant's own
state, not a property of who may call tenant-engine's admin API. Revisit
once KEY-WP-0005 gives callers a real assurance-bearing identity.
Verified for real: built ./cmd/flex-auth, ran test-policy (6 tests + 8
fixtures, all pass), load-registry, check against both example requests.
Then ran a live flex-auth serve with this exact registry+policy and pointed
tenant-engine's real, unmodified FlexAuthCheckClient/FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer
at it over real HTTP: unknown subject -> 403, tenant-engine -> 201. go test
./... still green across the whole repo.
T03 (live-lookup context adapter for other protected systems) stays open --
new Go adapter package, tracked separately.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
36 lines
1.8 KiB
Markdown
36 lines
1.8 KiB
Markdown
# tenant-engine Action Vocabulary
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This document defines the action vocabulary for `tenant-engine` as a
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flex-auth protected system (`FLEX-WP-0008-T01`). Action names here match
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`tenant-engine`'s own `authz.FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer` mapping exactly
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(`tenant_engine/src/tenant_engine/authz.py`) — coordinated between the two
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repos, not independently invented.
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| Action | tenant-engine write endpoint | Resource type | Decision effects |
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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
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| `tenant.create` | `POST /tenants` | `tenant` | `allow`, `deny` |
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| `tenant.role.grant` | `POST /tenants/{id}/roles/grant` | `role-grant` | `allow`, `deny` |
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| `tenant.role.revoke` | `POST /tenants/{id}/roles/revoke` | `role-grant` | `allow`, `deny` |
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| `tenant.plan.assign` | `POST /tenants/{id}/plan` | `plan-assignment` | `allow`, `deny` |
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These are the only four actions `tenant-engine` sends to `POST /v1/check` —
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its `FlexAuthCheckClient` (`TEN-WP-0003`) never sends anything else, and
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`tenant-engine`'s reads (`/roles`, `/roles/live`) are never gated through
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flex-auth at all; they're `tenant-engine`'s own cache-read and live-lookup
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endpoints, consumed *by* `key-cape` and `flex-auth` respectively.
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## Not in scope for this vocabulary
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`tenant-engine`'s capability roles (`PLTF`/`IAM`/`VEN`/`CUS`, ADR-0014) are
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**tenant** state — what a tenant is allowed to do on the platform. This
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vocabulary governs a different question: which **operator/service
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subjects** are allowed to call `tenant-engine`'s admin API at all. The two
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must not be conflated — a policy package that checked a *caller's* action
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against a *tenant's* capability roles would be checking the wrong thing.
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See `examples/tenant-engine/policy_package.md`'s Rules section for how the
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distinction is enforced.
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## Related
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- `docs/tenant-engine-resource-namespace.md`
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- `examples/tenant-engine/`
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