docs/tenant-engine-{resource-namespace,action-vocabulary}.md: four actions
(tenant.create, tenant.role.grant, tenant.role.revoke, tenant.plan.assign)
matching tenant_engine/src/tenant_engine/authz.py's _RESOURCE_TYPES mapping
exactly. No resource_manifest.yaml -- tenant-engine's resources are created
dynamically, unlike ops-warden's fixed SSH-certificate inventory; documented
as a deliberate deviation.
examples/tenant-engine/: protected_system_manifest.yaml, subject_manifest.yaml
(one registered caller: tenant-engine's own service identity),
policy_package.md (Rego rules + embedded tests), policy_fixtures.yaml (8
allow/deny pairs), assembled registry_snapshot.json, two standalone
check_request examples, README.
Design decision made explicit in the workplan: operator/service-identity
authorization (one known subject, four known actions), not aal2+assurance +
tenant-capability-role checking -- CheckRequest carries no assurance claim
yet (TEN-WP-0003 already flagged actor as a plain request-body field, not a
real auth context), and a tenant's capability roles are the tenant's own
state, not a property of who may call tenant-engine's admin API. Revisit
once KEY-WP-0005 gives callers a real assurance-bearing identity.
Verified for real: built ./cmd/flex-auth, ran test-policy (6 tests + 8
fixtures, all pass), load-registry, check against both example requests.
Then ran a live flex-auth serve with this exact registry+policy and pointed
tenant-engine's real, unmodified FlexAuthCheckClient/FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer
at it over real HTTP: unknown subject -> 403, tenant-engine -> 201. go test
./... still green across the whole repo.
T03 (live-lookup context adapter for other protected systems) stays open --
new Go adapter package, tracked separately.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
165 lines
4.3 KiB
Markdown
165 lines
4.3 KiB
Markdown
---
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id: tenant-engine.write-api.mutate
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name: tenant-engine Write API authorization
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namespace: tenant-engine:tenant
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version: v1
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status: ready
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package: flexauth.tenant_engine.write_api
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actions:
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- tenant.create
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- tenant.role.grant
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- tenant.role.revoke
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- tenant.plan.assign
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owner: team:platform-security
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fixtures:
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- policy_fixtures.yaml
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caring:
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profile: caring-0.4.0-rc2
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enforce: false
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canonical_roles:
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- Operator
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organization_relations:
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- ServiceProvider
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scopes:
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- level: Platform
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id: platform:tenant-engine
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tenant: tenant:platform
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planes:
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- Identity
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- Policy
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- Audit
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capabilities:
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- Create
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- Grant
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- Revoke
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- Bind
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- Audit
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exposure_modes:
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- Metadata
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conditions:
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- Logged
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restrictions:
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- PrivilegeEscalationBlocked
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activation:
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mode: local
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metadata:
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source: examples/tenant-engine/policy_package.md
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flex_auth_contract: protected-system-v0
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---
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# tenant-engine Write API authorization
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This package authorizes `tenant-engine`'s write API
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(`TEN-WP-0003`'s `authz.FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer`). `tenant-engine` keeps
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custody of tenant records, role-grant audit trails, and plan assignments;
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flex-auth decides whether a specific write is allowed now.
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**Scope note:** this policy governs *who may call tenant-engine's admin
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API* (an operator/service-identity question) — it does not evaluate a
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*tenant's* capability roles (`PLTF`/`IAM`/`VEN`/`CUS`, ADR-0014). Those are
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tenant state a *different* protected system's policy might consult via
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`tenant-engine`'s live-lookup endpoint (`FLEX-WP-0008-T03`); conflating the
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two would authorize the wrong thing.
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## Rules
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```rego
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import future.keywords.contains
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import future.keywords.if
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import future.keywords.in
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valid_actions := {
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"tenant.create",
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"tenant.role.grant",
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"tenant.role.revoke",
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"tenant.plan.assign",
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}
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known_operators := {"tenant-engine"}
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decision := {"effect": "allow", "reason": "write_api_policy_matched"} if {
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allowed
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} else := {"effect": "deny", "reason": first_denial} if {
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true
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}
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allowed if {
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input.resource.system == "tenant-engine"
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input.action in valid_actions
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input.subject.type == "service"
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input.subject.id in known_operators
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}
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default first_denial := "no_matching_rule"
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first_denial := "wrong_system" if {
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input.resource.system != "tenant-engine"
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} else := "unknown_action" if {
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not input.action in valid_actions
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} else := "wrong_subject_type" if {
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input.subject.type != "service"
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} else := "unknown_subject" if {
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not input.subject.id in known_operators
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}
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```
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## Tests
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```rego test
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package flexauth.tenant_engine.write_api_test
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import future.keywords.if
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import data.flexauth.tenant_engine.write_api
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base_request := {
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"id": "check:tenant-engine-create",
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"tenant": "tenant:friendly:binky",
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"subject": {"id": "tenant-engine", "type": "service"},
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"action": "tenant.create",
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"resource": {"id": "t-1", "type": "tenant", "system": "tenant-engine"}
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}
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test_known_operator_create_allowed if {
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write_api.decision.effect == "allow" with input as base_request
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}
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test_role_grant_allowed if {
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write_api.decision.effect == "allow" with input as {
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"subject": {"id": "tenant-engine", "type": "service"},
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"action": "tenant.role.grant",
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"resource": {"id": "t-1", "type": "role-grant", "system": "tenant-engine"}
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}
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}
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test_unknown_subject_denied if {
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write_api.decision.reason == "unknown_subject" with input as {
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"subject": {"id": "some-other-service", "type": "service"},
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"action": "tenant.create",
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"resource": {"id": "t-1", "type": "tenant", "system": "tenant-engine"}
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}
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}
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test_wrong_system_denied if {
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write_api.decision.reason == "wrong_system" with input as {
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"subject": {"id": "tenant-engine", "type": "service"},
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"action": "tenant.create",
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"resource": {"id": "t-1", "type": "tenant", "system": "some-other-system"}
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}
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}
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test_unknown_action_denied if {
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write_api.decision.reason == "unknown_action" with input as {
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"subject": {"id": "tenant-engine", "type": "service"},
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"action": "tenant.delete",
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"resource": {"id": "t-1", "type": "tenant", "system": "tenant-engine"}
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}
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}
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test_wrong_subject_type_denied if {
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write_api.decision.reason == "wrong_subject_type" with input as {
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"subject": {"id": "tenant-engine", "type": "human"},
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"action": "tenant.create",
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"resource": {"id": "t-1", "type": "tenant", "system": "tenant-engine"}
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}
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}
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```
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