tegwick
49de2f40ff
docs/tenant-engine-{resource-namespace,action-vocabulary}.md: four actions
(tenant.create, tenant.role.grant, tenant.role.revoke, tenant.plan.assign)
matching tenant_engine/src/tenant_engine/authz.py's _RESOURCE_TYPES mapping
exactly. No resource_manifest.yaml -- tenant-engine's resources are created
dynamically, unlike ops-warden's fixed SSH-certificate inventory; documented
as a deliberate deviation.
examples/tenant-engine/: protected_system_manifest.yaml, subject_manifest.yaml
(one registered caller: tenant-engine's own service identity),
policy_package.md (Rego rules + embedded tests), policy_fixtures.yaml (8
allow/deny pairs), assembled registry_snapshot.json, two standalone
check_request examples, README.
Design decision made explicit in the workplan: operator/service-identity
authorization (one known subject, four known actions), not aal2+assurance +
tenant-capability-role checking -- CheckRequest carries no assurance claim
yet (TEN-WP-0003 already flagged actor as a plain request-body field, not a
real auth context), and a tenant's capability roles are the tenant's own
state, not a property of who may call tenant-engine's admin API. Revisit
once KEY-WP-0005 gives callers a real assurance-bearing identity.
Verified for real: built ./cmd/flex-auth, ran test-policy (6 tests + 8
fixtures, all pass), load-registry, check against both example requests.
Then ran a live flex-auth serve with this exact registry+policy and pointed
tenant-engine's real, unmodified FlexAuthCheckClient/FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer
at it over real HTTP: unknown subject -> 403, tenant-engine -> 201. go test
./... still green across the whole repo.
T03 (live-lookup context adapter for other protected systems) stays open --
new Go adapter package, tracked separately.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
45 lines
1.8 KiB
Markdown
45 lines
1.8 KiB
Markdown
# tenant-engine Resource Namespace
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This document defines the `tenant-engine` protected-system namespace
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consumed by flex-auth (`FLEX-WP-0008-T01`).
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Unlike Markitect's document hierarchy or ops-warden's fixed SSH-certificate
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inventory, `tenant-engine`'s resources (tenants, their role grants, their
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plan assignments) are created **dynamically** — there is no fixed,
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pre-registrable resource list to publish a `resource_manifest.yaml` for.
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Every `CheckRequest` carries the resource identity inline
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(`resource.id == tenant_id`), and the policy evaluates against `input`
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directly rather than looking up a registered resource by id. This is a
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deliberate, documented deviation from the ops-warden pattern, not an
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omission.
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## Resource Types
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```text
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tenant -- a tenant record (existence, grouping)
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role-grant -- a capability-role grant/revocation
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plan-assignment -- a tenant's plan/subscription assignment
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```
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All three are `scope_level: Resource`, always accessed within
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`system: tenant-engine`.
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## Ownership Boundary
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`tenant-engine`'s own boundary contract
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(`net-kingdom/canon/standards/tenant-engine-boundary-contract_v0.1.md`)
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already defines these as `tenant-engine`'s owned resource kinds. This
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namespace only maps that ownership into flex-auth's protected-system
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vocabulary — it does not redefine ownership.
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## Related
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- `docs/tenant-engine-action-vocabulary.md` — the actions gated on these
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resource types
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- `examples/tenant-engine/` — protected-system manifest, subject manifest,
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policy package, and fixtures
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- `net-kingdom/docs/adr/ADR-0014-tenant-capability-roles-and-tenant-engine-ownership.md`
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— the capability-role model (`PLTF`/`IAM`/`VEN`/`CUS`) these resources
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carry as *tenant* state, distinct from the *operator* authorization this
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namespace governs (who may call `tenant-engine`'s write API, not what a
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tenant is allowed to do)
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