approval-engine flagged the class one message earlier -- a contract whose examples contradict its prose gets implemented as its examples -- and yesterday's package was a fresh instance of it, committed while flagging it. The published rule required context.approval.status == "approved" and counted context.approval.approvals[].subject_id. Neither field exists. approval-engine's approval_claim.schema.json has `state` (whose operative value is `valid`, not `approved`) and carries no approver list at all. The rule was unsatisfiable: every live destroy would have denied dual_control_required no matter how good the approval was. It failed closed, so it was never a hole, but it was policy written against a shape of our own devising rather than a published one. The rule now consumes valid_now from the real claim, guarded on kind and issuer. valid_now is the summary predicate that already folds in the distinct-approver threshold, with reason_code insufficient_approvers for a claim that failed it -- so this is also the correct layering, not just the correct shape. Counting approvers here is exactly the duplication GH-DEC-2026-005 removes; the compensating property is reconstructability at the issuer under 9.6, which is approval-engine's. Recorded as a correction section in the package and the vocabulary doc rather than quietly rewritten. 25 Rego tests and 29 fixtures pass, covering insufficient_approvers, consumed, revoked, approved-but-not-yet- valid, foreign issuer, and wrong kind. Two things the package deliberately does not do, both now written down: it does not compare binding.pdp_digest, because the request digest is computed after policy evaluation and a Rego rule cannot see it; and it makes no cross-check that the claim was approved for this action and target, because the claim's binding uses approval-engine's vocabulary and no mapping between the two is published. Inventing one would silently accept a claim approved for something else. Both belong to the PEP until a mapping exists, and that is worth closing before SECRETS-WP-0007-T04 makes destroy reachable. Also swept the other published fixtures on approval-engine's reasoning. One more instance: the inner decision in examples/caring/action_authorization.json declared contract_version flex-auth.decision-record.v1 while its provenance omitted policy_package_digest, registry_snapshot_digest, and input_claim_digests -- all published contract fields since 2026-09-02. Completed. The remaining example context vocabularies are consumer-owned and match their integrations. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JTbVXpEiXA7mNJVpDnEPcB Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 412054@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 3968fae1-8d59-4209-9bd6-c22594b8ab19
5.6 KiB
secrets-engine action vocabulary
Status: published
Date: 2026-09-06
Workplan: FLEX-WP-0021-T01
Source: secrets-engine docs/gated-actions.md, read out of their cli.py
Package: secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle v1
(examples/secrets-engine/policy_package.md)
FLEX-WP-0021-T01 required secrets-engine to name this list rather than
letting flex-auth derive it, and made an inferred action a blocker rather than
a default. That was not ceremony: four of the twelve would have been inferred
wrongly, and one action that looks obvious does not exist at all.
The example vocabulary secrets-engine.lifecycle/v1 this replaces is not
this list and was never published (FLEX-DEC-2026-005).
Request shape
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
resource.type |
secret-catalog-lane |
resource.system |
secrets-engine |
resource.id |
the catalog id |
resource.attributes.stage |
deployment stage |
resource.attributes.fields |
sorted; populated for provision, rotate, verify, exec; empty list otherwise |
resource.attributes.policy_targets / auth_targets |
sorted |
context.approval |
approval claim; required for destroy only |
Empty lists are sent rather than omitted or guessed.
The twelve actions
| Action | Reaches OpenBao | Notes |
|---|---|---|
apply |
yes | apply --dry-run does not reach the gate |
provision |
yes | carries fields |
rotate |
yes | carries fields |
verify |
yes | carries fields |
handoff |
yes | |
wrap |
yes | |
exec |
yes | carries fields |
deactivate |
yes | also the gate for the CLI verb revoke |
suspend |
yes | |
destroy |
yes | dual control; not reachable live yet |
compromise |
no | local delivery overlay only |
reactivate |
no | local delivery overlay only |
Four things an inferred list gets wrong
1. revoke is not an action. The CLI verb revoke gates as deactivate,
which is also reached from lifecycle deactivate. There is no revoke value
and one must not be added. The package asserts this
(test_revoke_is_not_an_action → unknown_action).
2. destroy is defined but not reachable live. Its handler raises before
the gate, so only --dry-run renders. It stays in the vocabulary as the
dual-control case; no live destroy Check arrives until
SECRETS-WP-0007-T04 lands. Keeping it in the package now means the rule is
reviewed and fixtured before the path opens rather than in the same change
that opens it.
3. compromise and reactivate touch no OpenBao object. They mutate local
delivery-overlay state only. They are gated because they change delivery
posture, not because they write to the backend — a distinction worth recording,
because a reviewer looking for backend writes would otherwise read their
presence as a mistake.
4. Seven CLI surfaces never reach the gate and must not appear in the
package: plan, apply --dry-run, route, audit, catalog,
decision inspect, and evidence.
apply --dry-run is the one flex-auth cannot enforce. apply is an action and
apply --dry-run is not, but both would arrive as apply — the distinction is
invisible to the PDP. What keeps them apart is that the PEP does not call the
gate for a dry run. flex-auth records the limit rather than implying a control
it does not have.
Dual control on destroy
destroy requires an approval-claim on context.approval, issued by
approval-engine, whose valid_now is true. That is the whole check.
The shape is approval-engine/schemas/approval_claim.schema.json.
valid_now is a summary predicate — true only when the object is approved,
inside its validity window, and not consumed, superseded, revoked, or expired —
and the distinct-approver threshold is folded into it. A claim that failed
the threshold returns reason_code: insufficient_approvers.
flex-auth consumes the claim as an input claim and never mutates it
(security-layer-model_v0.7 §9.4). Per FLEX-DEC-2026-006 the approval fact is
approval-engine's step-1 artifact and the decision is step 2; the PEP
validates across both.
The package does not count approvers, re-derive validity/freshness/
signature/supersession, or compare binding.pdp_digest. Counting approvers is
the duplication the split removes (GH-DEC-2026-005); the compensating property
is reconstructability at the issuer under §9.6, which is approval-engine's.
The digest comparison is real and preferred but the request digest is computed
after policy evaluation, so a Rego rule cannot see it — it belongs in the PEP.
Correction, 2026-09-06
The first published rule required context.approval.status == "approved" and
counted context.approval.approvals[].subject_id. Neither field exists: the
claim's field is state (and valid, not approved, is the operative value),
and it carries no approver list. The rule was unsatisfiable — every live
destroy would have denied dual_control_required regardless of the approval.
It failed closed, so it was never a hole, but it was a policy written against an
invented shape. Corrected the same day.
Open item: no published binding mapping
The claim's binding.action and binding.target use approval-engine's
vocabulary (secrets.kv.destroy, {"id": ..., "stage": ...}), not this one
(destroy, lane:...). No mapping between them is published, so the package
makes no cross-check that the claim was approved for this action and target,
and must not invent one — a wrong mapping would silently accept a claim approved
for something else. Until a mapping exists that correspondence is the PEP's, via
binding.pdp_digest. Worth closing before SECRETS-WP-0007-T04 makes destroy
reachable.