190 lines
8 KiB
Markdown
190 lines
8 KiB
Markdown
---
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id: FLEX-WP-0015
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type: workplan
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title: "Tenancy posture declaration and inbound caller authentication"
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domain: infotech
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repo: flex-auth
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status: active
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owner: claude
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topic_slug: netkingdom
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planning_priority: P1
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planning_order: 150
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depends_on_workplans: []
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related_workplans:
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- FLEX-WP-0004
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- FLEX-WP-0011
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created: "2026-08-17"
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updated: "2026-08-18"
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state_hub_workstream_id: "31846b19-c2a3-428e-950b-5985bc9146eb"
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---
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# FLEX-WP-0015 - Tenancy posture declaration and inbound caller authentication
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Answer `rapp-postgres`'s review request on **NetKingdom Tenancy Posture v0.1**
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(message `82ec43ce`), publish flex-auth's posture vector, and close the one
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real defect the review surfaced.
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**Review output:** `docs/tenancy-posture-review.md`
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**Declaration:** `tenancy.yaml` (repo root, per framework §5.1)
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## Why this workplan exists
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The original five axes described flex-auth unevenly; draft-8's sixth
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availability axis and canonical provider declaration now cover the remaining
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shape. Assessing
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against them turned up two things we did not know we were carrying:
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1. **`/v1/check` authenticates no caller.** Any workload with network reach to
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the ClusterIP Service can assert any subject and any tenant and receive an
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authoritative allow. flex-auth is the estate's authorization oracle and
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trusts its callers completely. Framework level `A0`.
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2. **The tenant-engine live-roles adapter is built and unwired.** No non-test
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caller exists. The IAM Profile live re-query reads as a capability we have
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and is not one.
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The framework itself needs six amendments, two of them corrections of
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statements it makes about flex-auth. Those are in the review document and go
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back to `rapp-postgres` as review output, not as work here.
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**Scope discipline:** this workplan closes flex-auth's own gaps and answers
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the review. It does not build fleet-level conformance tooling, does not adopt
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AuthZEN, and does not touch production enforcement (`policy.enabled` stays off
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per FLEX-WP-0007).
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## Tasks
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```task
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id: FLEX-WP-0015-T01
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status: done
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priority: high
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state_hub_task_id: "0a32500d-511a-4bd7-972e-de4cd3e62dd9"
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```
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**Publish posture and answer the review.** Write `tenancy.yaml` and
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`docs/tenancy-posture-review.md`; reply to `rapp-postgres` with the posture
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vector, the A4 ruling, the internal-hop ruling, and the two factual
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corrections. Done 2026-08-17.
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```task
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id: FLEX-WP-0015-T02
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status: wait
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priority: high
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state_hub_task_id: "b2e87a81-b63d-4be4-ad44-01426b7e6f74"
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```
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**Close the A0 — authenticate callers of `/v1/check`.** Decide first, build
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second: this is a production-facing security boundary on a service two
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consumers already depend on, and the wrong instrument is worse than the delay.
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**Waiting on `ops-warden`** (asked 2026-08-17): it owns how workloads prove
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identity in this estate, and it is a flex-auth PEP, so it implements the
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calling side of whatever we choose. `warden route find` was run first per the
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credential-routing rules — the catalog holds credential lanes and has no entry
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for service-to-service caller authentication as a pattern, which is part of
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what was asked. Our stated instinct is ServiceAccount TokenReview; the
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question is open pending their answer. Nothing is built until it lands.
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Record an ADR covering at minimum:
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- What identifies a caller — Kubernetes ServiceAccount token review, mTLS via
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the cluster's own CA, or a shared secret header. Note that the Deployment
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currently sets `automountServiceAccountToken: false`, so option one changes
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the pod spec.
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- Whether caller identity only authenticates, or also constrains: may
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`user-engine` ask questions about resources owned by `tenant-engine`? A
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caller allowlist per `system` is the natural shape and flex-auth's registry
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already keys on `system`.
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- Fail-closed vs fail-open during rollout. Given `policy.enabled` is off in
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production and both consumers are ours, a warn-only phase that logs
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unauthenticated callers before rejecting them is available and probably
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right.
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- Whether NetworkPolicy is a sufficient interim control to declare `A1`
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honestly before the real fix lands.
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Target level `A2` — a single inbound choke point binding caller identity —
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with the §13 evidence artifact: a test that an unbound request is refused.
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Ship through the FLEX-WP-0011 staged-promotion path, not by direct apply.
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2026-08-18 source outcome: ADR 0004 selects audience-scoped Kubernetes
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ServiceAccount TokenReview with a separately projected reviewer identity and
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exact `resource.system` → ServiceAccount bindings. Both check endpoints share
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the choke point; missing/mismatched identity fails 401/403 and reviewer outage
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fails 503. Unit and handler tests include the required unbound request. Desired
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manifests select enforce mode and carry narrow TokenReview RBAC. The running
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digest is unchanged, so `tenancy.current.A` honestly remains 0 while
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`tenancy.implemented.A` is 2. Remaining: build/pin/promote through
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FLEX-WP-0011, migrate both callers and capture the live negative probe.
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```task
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id: FLEX-WP-0015-T03
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status: done
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priority: medium
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state_hub_task_id: "64eb7652-3b67-4bfb-879b-8588deeec8b5"
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```
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**Wire or delete `internal/adapters/tenantengine`.** The adapter is complete
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and has no non-test caller; `decision.Engine` has no field for it. Both
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outcomes are conformant, silence is not.
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Deciding factor is whether any live policy needs `tenant_roles` for a
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privileged, destructive, credential-vending or `aal2`-class decision — the
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IAM Profile's own trigger list. If yes, wire it into the decision path with a
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timeout and an explicit unavailable-path decision (`AttachToContext` already
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carries `tenant_roles_available: false` for exactly this), and note the new
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synchronous dependency on tenant-engine's availability. If no, delete it and
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say so in the review record rather than leaving it as latent capability.
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Update `tenancy.yaml` `I` either way.
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Completed 2026-08-18 by deletion. Repository-wide search found no non-test
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caller and no policy consuming `tenant_roles`; wiring it would add a
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synchronous dependency without a decision that uses the result. The adapter
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and its isolated tests were removed, and the review records that any future
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live-role policy must introduce the dependency explicitly.
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```task
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id: FLEX-WP-0015-T04
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status: wait
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priority: low
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state_hub_task_id: "06432560-c28c-4de2-a672-87e74be54a6a"
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```
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**AuthZEN evaluation endpoint (framework `A4`).** Deliberately deferred, not
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backlogged. `POST /access/v1/evaluation` translating onto the existing engine
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beside `/v1/check`, non-breaking.
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**Trigger to start:** either a PEP arrives that flex-auth's operator does not
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control, or a delegated backend under FLEX-WP-0004 needs uniform addressing.
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Until one of those, A4 buys swappability nobody can use.
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Note when starting: AuthZEN standardises the envelope, not the action
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vocabulary — it does not end action-string copying between repos. The cheaper
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fix for that is serving `registry.Actions` read-only, which is independent of
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this task and may be worth doing first.
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```task
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id: FLEX-WP-0015-T05
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status: done
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priority: medium
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state_hub_task_id: "9195ba20-ab0f-4d75-b293-86978073beb1"
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```
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**Guard the declaration.** Framework §12 requires verifying the declared
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posture still holds — against our own declaration, not a universal maximum.
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Small mechanical check, `make verify-posture`, in the shape tenant-engine used
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for `verify-pin` (bash, no dependency tree). Assert what code can actually
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prove: that the `/v1/check` handler has caller authentication iff
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`tenancy.yaml` claims `A >= 2`; that `tenantengine` has a non-test caller iff
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`I >= 3`; that the production Deployment carries no `--log` and no volume iff
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`R` is `n/a`. Exit 1 on drift.
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Designed for invisible failure per §12: posture regression returns
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correct-looking responses, exactly like the two silent pin rollbacks the
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estate has already been bitten by.
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Completed 2026-08-18. `make verify-posture` checks the current/implemented
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distinction, both authenticated handlers, enforce-mode desired manifests,
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TokenReview RBAC, absence of a latent tenant-engine caller, and the stateless
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deployment assumptions behind `R: n/a`.
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