flex-auth/docs/tenant-engine-action-vocabulary.md
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Authorize tenant-engine guardrail read and set actions
FLEX-WP-0014. Package tenant-engine.write-api.mutate v1 now carries
nine actions: tenant.guardrail.read and tenant.guardrail.set on
resource type guardrail, verbatim from tenant-engine's mapping.

The read/write split is used now: flex-auth may read ceilings and is
denied action_not_granted on set; tenant-engine may do both. 17/17
Rego tests and 23/23 fixtures pass. Live e2e against a real
tenant-engine FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer matches.

In source only; production still serves the seven-action 9320df39 pin.
2026-08-16 02:46:25 +02:00

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3 KiB
Markdown

# tenant-engine Action Vocabulary
This document defines the action vocabulary for `tenant-engine` as a
flex-auth protected system (`FLEX-WP-0008-T01`). Action names here match
`tenant-engine`'s own `authz.FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer` mapping exactly
(`tenant_engine/src/tenant_engine/authz.py`) — coordinated between the two
repos, not independently invented.
| Action | tenant-engine write endpoint | Resource type | Decision effects |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `tenant.create` | `POST /tenants` | `tenant` | `allow`, `deny` |
| `tenant.role.grant` | `POST /tenants/{id}/roles/grant` | `role-grant` | `allow`, `deny` |
| `tenant.role.revoke` | `POST /tenants/{id}/roles/revoke` | `role-grant` | `allow`, `deny` |
| `tenant.plan.assign` | `POST /tenants/{id}/plan` | `plan-assignment` | `allow`, `deny` |
| `tenant.update` | `PATCH /tenants/{id}` | `tenant` | `allow`, `deny` |
| `tenant.retire` | `POST /tenants/{id}/retire` | `tenant` | `allow`, `deny` |
| `tenant.reactivate` | `POST /tenants/{id}/reactivate` | `tenant` | `allow`, `deny` |
| `tenant.guardrail.read` | `GET /tenants/{id}/guardrails` | `guardrail` | `allow`, `deny` |
| `tenant.guardrail.set` | `PUT` / `DELETE /tenants/{id}/guardrails/{limit_key}` | `guardrail` | `allow`, `deny` |
The lifecycle trio is from `FLEX-WP-0010` / `TEN-WP-0005`. The last two are
the TEN-WP-0006 guardrail actions (`FLEX-WP-0014`). They are two actions
rather than one `tenant.guardrail` so policy can grant a PDP the read
without granting the write. That split is used today: `flex-auth` may
`tenant.guardrail.read` and may not `tenant.guardrail.set`; `tenant-engine`
may do both. Reasoning is recorded in
`examples/tenant-engine/policy_package.md`.
These are the only nine actions `tenant-engine` sends to `POST /v1/check`
its `FlexAuthCheckClient` (`TEN-WP-0003`) never sends anything else.
`tenant-engine`'s role reads (`/roles`, `/roles/live`) are still not gated
through flex-auth; they remain `tenant-engine`'s own cache-read and
live-lookup endpoints. The guardrail GET is different: it is authorized,
because a ceiling is an input to a decision, not an unauthenticated lookup.
## Not in scope for this vocabulary
`tenant-engine`'s capability roles (`PLTF`/`IAM`/`VEN`/`CUS`, ADR-0014) are
**tenant** state — what a tenant is allowed to do on the platform. This
vocabulary governs a different question: which **operator/service
subjects** are allowed to call `tenant-engine`'s admin API at all. The
lifecycle actions do not change that boundary: `tenant.retire` asks whether
*this caller* may retire a tenant, not what a *retired tenant* may still do —
the latter is tenant state that tenant-engine enforces itself. The two
must not be conflated — a policy package that checked a *caller's* action
against a *tenant's* capability roles would be checking the wrong thing.
See `examples/tenant-engine/policy_package.md`'s Rules section for how the
distinction is enforced.
## Related
- `docs/tenant-engine-resource-namespace.md`
- `examples/tenant-engine/`