flex-auth/docs/tenant-engine-resource-namespace.md
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Authorize tenant-engine guardrail read and set actions
FLEX-WP-0014. Package tenant-engine.write-api.mutate v1 now carries
nine actions: tenant.guardrail.read and tenant.guardrail.set on
resource type guardrail, verbatim from tenant-engine's mapping.

The read/write split is used now: flex-auth may read ceilings and is
denied action_not_granted on set; tenant-engine may do both. 17/17
Rego tests and 23/23 fixtures pass. Live e2e against a real
tenant-engine FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer matches.

In source only; production still serves the seven-action 9320df39 pin.
2026-08-16 02:46:25 +02:00

48 lines
2.1 KiB
Markdown

# tenant-engine Resource Namespace
This document defines the `tenant-engine` protected-system namespace
consumed by flex-auth (`FLEX-WP-0008-T01`).
Unlike Markitect's document hierarchy or ops-warden's fixed SSH-certificate
inventory, `tenant-engine`'s resources (tenants, their role grants, their
plan assignments, their guardrails) are created **dynamically** — there is
no fixed, pre-registrable resource list to publish a
`resource_manifest.yaml` for. Every `CheckRequest` carries the resource
identity inline (`resource.id == tenant_id`), and the policy evaluates
against `input` directly rather than looking up a registered resource by
id. This is a deliberate, documented deviation from the ops-warden
pattern, not an omission.
## Resource Types
```text
tenant -- a tenant record (existence, grouping)
role-grant -- a capability-role grant/revocation
plan-assignment -- a tenant's plan/subscription assignment
guardrail -- a tenant's resolved ceiling and its provenance
```
All four are `scope_level: Resource`, always accessed within
`system: tenant-engine`. A guardrail check still sends `resource.id` equal
to the tenant id — there is no separately addressable guardrail object on
the wire.
## Ownership Boundary
`tenant-engine`'s own boundary contract
(`net-kingdom/canon/standards/tenant-engine-boundary-contract_v0.1.md`)
already defines these as `tenant-engine`'s owned resource kinds. This
namespace only maps that ownership into flex-auth's protected-system
vocabulary — it does not redefine ownership.
## Related
- `docs/tenant-engine-action-vocabulary.md` — the actions gated on these
resource types
- `examples/tenant-engine/` — protected-system manifest, subject manifest,
policy package, and fixtures
- `net-kingdom/docs/adr/ADR-0014-tenant-capability-roles-and-tenant-engine-ownership.md`
— the capability-role model (`PLTF`/`IAM`/`VEN`/`CUS`) these resources
carry as *tenant* state, distinct from the *operator* authorization this
namespace governs (who may call `tenant-engine`'s write API, not what a
tenant is allowed to do)