flex-auth/examples/secrets-engine/README.md
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fix: the address we published was a misdirection, and the channel is unauthenticated
secrets-engine probed the Service DNS name handed over in FLEX-WP-0021-T05
and found it resolves, from the workstation, to an unrelated public host.
Reproduced here: search ad.binect.de answers wildcard, so
flex-auth-secrets-engine.flex-auth.svc.cluster.local and
this-service-does-not-exist.flex-auth.svc.cluster.local both resolve to
80.158.43.29, while the trailing-dot FQDN correctly fails. A bare Service
name in a handover is not merely unreachable from there, it is a live
misdirection, and the handover was ours.

Had a deployment pointed at it, the CheckRequest body would have gone to
that host: subject, tenant, lane and resource ids, stage, field names,
purpose, plus the caller's bearer token.

Trailing-dot FQDN and "in-cluster only" now replace the bare name in the
example README, SCOPE.md, and the T05 note.

Their real question was how the response channel is authenticated, and
they declined to answer it locally because choosing a transport control
for our service is not a consumer's call. Right boundary, so the answer
is recorded here as FLEX-DEC-2026-010: it is not authenticated. Pins
serve plain HTTP, the envelope carries no signature, and a responder that
knows the package id and version can return a well-formed allow that
passes every check a consumer performs.

The part worth stating in the contract is that the digests do not help
and look like they do. Every input to request_digest,
policy_package_digest and registry_snapshot_digest is either sent by the
caller or published in this repo, so a forger reproduces all three
exactly. They establish integrity of the binding, never authenticity of
the source — and publishing more digests makes a forged envelope look
more authenticated, not less.

For secrets-engine specifically: fail-closed protects against a PDP that
is absent, not against one that lies. An unreachable PDP denies; a lying
PDP allows.

Third instance of one seam in three decisions. 008: a tenant carried
into the digest and never compared — visible, not enforced. 009: a caller
authenticated and never recorded — enforced, not visible. 010: a record
verifiable and unauthentic — checkable, but not evidence.

One nuance that changes the operator recommendation: kubectl port-forward
does authenticate the responder, transitively — no DNS name, one named
pod, API-server TLS. That is the exact reverse of the caller direction,
where it bypasses the NetworkPolicy. Independent properties pointing
opposite ways, so neither can be summarised as "the network protects it".

FLEX-WP-0024 carries signing; key custody routes through warden/OpenBao
rather than minting a key here.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014aQMM1dPXaPiXVn6DwwtLd

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 715613@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: fabd95c1-4c9e-4080-8849-8707ae025f80
2026-09-06 22:44:45 +02:00

64 lines
3 KiB
Markdown

# secrets-engine example
Policy package, manifests, and fixtures for `secrets-engine`'s gated
catalog-lane operations. Opened by `FLEX-DEC-2026-005`, carried by
`FLEX-WP-0021`.
| File | What it is |
| --- | --- |
| `policy_package.md` | `secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle` v2, `allow_ttl: 15m` |
| `protected_system_manifest.yaml` | the `secret-catalog-lane` resource type and twelve actions |
| `subject_manifest.yaml` | the single `secrets-engine` service identity |
| `registry_snapshot.json` | loadable snapshot combining both manifests |
| `policy_fixtures.yaml` | 32 fixtures — 11 allows, dual control both ways, and every denial branch |
| `check_request_*.json` | standalone requests for `POST /v1/check` |
The action vocabulary is **secrets-engine's**, delivered under
`FLEX-WP-0021-T01` and recorded in
[`../../docs/secrets-engine-action-vocabulary.md`](../../docs/secrets-engine-action-vocabulary.md).
Read that before changing any action string here.
## Verify
```bash
go run ./cmd/flex-auth validate -kind policy -file examples/secrets-engine/policy_package.md
go run ./cmd/flex-auth load-registry -file examples/secrets-engine/registry_snapshot.json
```
28 Rego tests and 32 fixtures.
## Deployed, and the version to pin
`FLEX-WP-0021-T04` deployed the `flex-auth-secrets-engine` pin on 2026-09-06:
```text
Service: http://flex-auth-secrets-engine.flex-auth.svc.cluster.local.:8080
^ trailing dot, required
Package: secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle
Version: v2
callerAuth.mode: warn (not enforced caller authentication)
```
**The trailing dot is not cosmetic, and this address is in-cluster only.**
`secrets-engine` reported and flex-auth reproduced that on the workstation a
bare `*.svc.cluster.local` name resolves through `search ad.binect.de` to one
unrelated public host — a name for a service that does not exist resolves to the
same address, which proves it is suffix expansion rather than a record. The
trailing-dot form correctly fails to resolve instead. A bare Service name in a
handover is therefore not merely unreachable from a workstation, it is a live
misdirection. See `../../docs/operator-caller-access-path.md`.
Ingress admits namespace `secrets-engine` with pod label
`app.kubernetes.io/name=secrets-engine` and default-denies everything else. A
workstation CLI process is not that, and Service DNS is not workstation
connectivity — an operator-run consumer needs a decided access path before it
can call this pin at all (`FLEX-WP-0021-T04`'s three shapes).
**Pin `_VERSION` to `v2`, never `v1`.** `v1` is deployed and superseded: it had
no tenant rule and allowed a foreign tenant. See the correction section in
`policy_package.md`. The pin still serves `v1` until the redeploy lands, which
is why the version is stated here rather than left to be read off the running
service.
`SECRETS_ENGINE_AUTHORIZATION_POLICY_PACKAGE` / `_VERSION` remain fallback-free
and fail-closed by design; nothing here changes that.