secrets-engine confirmed T03, and re-verifying against the regenerated destroy fixture found something neither repository can fix alone: a pdp_digest recorded at issue time can never equal the request_digest of a request that carries the claim in its context, because the claim is part of the context that is hashed. Embedding the claim changes the very digest the claim would need to name. Not fixture staleness. It holds for every dual-control request whose claim travels in context -- the shape GH-DEC-2026-008 had just ruled mandatory. Left unresolved that ruling was unimplementable for exactly the case it was written for, and destroy would have been permanently un-allowable in production, failing closed forever on a check that could never pass. flex-auth owns the canonical request digest, so the fix is ours. binding.approval_binding_digest is the same material with context.approval removed, emitted only when a claim was carried. An approval issued against a claim-free Check records that Check's request_digest; the claim-bearing request reproduces it here. DELIBERATELY ADDITIVE, and the reason matters. The tempting fix is to drop context.approval from request_digest entirely. That is wrong: request_digest is the replay identity, and two requests differing only in which approval was presented must not share one, because their decisions differ -- one allows, the other denies dual_control_required. Collapsing them would let an allow obtained with a valid claim be replayed against a request carrying none. So request_digest still covers the claim and still moves; approval_binding_digest deliberately does not, and is documented as not a replay identity. The tests assert the two functions DISAGREE on a claim-bearing request, which is approval-engine's formulation of how to defend a distinction that looks like duplication. The fixture now demonstrates the property rather than asserting it: its claim's pdp_digest equals the envelope's approval_binding_digest with pdp_path true, and changing the claim's contents moved request_digest while leaving approval_binding_digest untouched. Two files a consumer can diff. Also picked up approval-engine's new required binding.pdp_path via the cross-repo schema test added yesterday -- which is the test doing exactly what it was built for, one day later. T03 is done. secrets-engine's own digest-material defect, which our two real envelopes caught, is recorded in the workplan. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JTbVXpEiXA7mNJVpDnEPcB Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 412054@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 3968fae1-8d59-4209-9bd6-c22594b8ab19
5.6 KiB
Canonical request digest
Status: published Date: 2026-09-02 Standard: security-layer-model_v0.7 §6.4.2
The digest is the mechanical test for replaying a flex-auth verdict. A consumer may reuse an allow iff a new request produces the same digest and the decision's lifetime still holds. Negative caching of a deny uses the same test.
Constructor: api.NewDecisionBinding / api.RequestDigest.
Field: DecisionEnvelope.binding.request_digest.
Format: sha256: plus 64 lowercase hex characters.
What is hashed
Canonical JSON (Go encoding/json, which sorts map keys) of:
| Field | Source |
|---|---|
tenant |
CheckRequest.tenant |
subject |
normalized CheckRequest.subject |
action |
CheckRequest.action |
resource |
normalized CheckRequest.resource |
context |
CheckRequest.context |
Empty optional maps and omitempty strings are omitted. Attribute maps inside subject and resource are part of the material once the evaluator has enriched them from the registry.
Not hashed: id, policy_version, and caring_context. The request id is
correlation only. Policy version is recorded in provenance. CARING context is
hashed separately as provenance.input_claim_digests.caring_context.
Normalization
- Tenant on the request is copied onto subject and resource when those refs omit it.
- A registry hit copies type, tenant, and selected attributes onto the refs the digest sees.
- Context is a shallow copy. Key order is not significant.
A consumer that re-hashes the original unenriched request will not match a
decision that turned on registry attributes. Compare structured binding
fields to the proposed action, and treat request_digest as the evaluator's
statement of what it hashed. To recompute independently, hash the same
normalized tuple the binding carries (tenant, subject, action, resource,
context).
Stability
The digest is stable across process restarts for the same normalized tuple. It is not stable across:
- a change to any hashed field, including registry-enriched attributes
- a change to this contract (would require a new
contract_version)
It does not include the policy package, snapshot, or clock. Those live in
provenance and lifetime. Two allows over the same tuple but different
snapshots share a digest and differ in registry_snapshot_digest.
Worked example — permitted retry
Request (after enrichment):
{
"tenant": "tenant:alpha",
"subject": {"id": "user:alice", "type": "Human", "tenant": "tenant:alpha"},
"action": "read",
"resource": {
"id": "document:internal-note",
"type": "document",
"system": "markitect-tool",
"tenant": "tenant:alpha"
},
"context": {"purpose": "project-delivery"}
}
The evaluator stores binding.request_digest for that tuple and
lifetime.expires_at in the future. The same subject, action, resource, and
context presented again before expiry is a permitted retry of that allow.
Worked example — refused replay
Any of the following refuses replay:
actionchanges fromreadtodestroy(digest mismatch)resource.attributes.stagechanges frombuildtoproduction(digest mismatch)lifetime.expires_atis in the past (lifetime does not hold)- the stored effect is
denyand the consumer is attempting to treat a cached refusal as still binding after a policy change — negative cache is valid only for the same digest and while the recorded lifetime would have held; a newCheckis required once either fails
Local fixtures, State Hub /decisions/{uuid} records, and free-form
decided_by values are not this test.
The approval-binding digest
binding.approval_binding_digest is this same digest computed with an approval
claim removed from context. It appears only when the request carried one on
context.approval.
Why a second digest exists
An approval's pdp_digest is recorded at issue time. The request that later
carries that claim inside its hashed context has a different request_digest by
construction, because the claim is part of the context that is hashed. So:
A
pdp_digestrecorded at issue time can never equal therequest_digestof the request that carries the claim.
secrets-engine found this while verifying a replay fixture, and it is not a
fixture defect — it is circular by construction. Left unresolved it would make
GH-DEC-2026-008 unimplementable for exactly the case it was written for: a
dual-control action whose claim travels in context.
approval_binding_digest is stable across attaching the claim. An approval
issued against a claim-free Check records that Check's request_digest, and the
later claim-bearing request reproduces the same value here.
The comparison
claim.binding.pdp_digest == decision.binding.approval_binding_digest
Never against request_digest. Comparing to request_digest cannot succeed on a
claim-bearing request.
It is not a replay identity
request_digest remains the §6.4.2 replay test and still covers the approval
claim. approval_binding_digest deliberately does not: two requests differing
only in which approval was presented share it, and their decisions do not —
one allows, the other denies dual_control_required.
Collapsing the two would let an allow obtained with a valid claim be replayed
against a request carrying none. That is why this is an additional field rather
than a redefinition of the existing one, and why pkg/api/approval_binding_test.go
asserts the two functions disagree on a claim-bearing request. A test that a
distinction is real is how a distinction that looks like duplication is defended.