Exact normative text for all six amendments, section by section against accepted v0.7, at docs/amendments/v0.8-amendment-set.md. Each carries its defect statement, its replacement wording, and the decision or contract that already governs its implementers — the statute move does not decide any of them again. A1 §9.7.3 corrects the consume ordering: v0.7's stated order leaves the CAS able to prevent only the second record and never the second side effect, which makes single consumption theatre. A2 adds the §11 emission-guarantee check so GH-IN-0001 cannot recur unnoticed. A3 keeps the §13 tables and transcribes the four stance-map rows, ops-mason's gap included, since the register migration is conditioned on an export. A4 lands the recomputability boundary with the criteria-grounding clause. A5 generalizes validation-by-owning-layer into §6.4 and adds the validating-is-not-re-issuing demarcation to §8. A6 replaces §17's stale "neither has assented" paragraph. Deliberate omissions are recorded rather than left silent: §12's fourth step is a status not an amendment, §16's reconciliation is assembly work, and no §4 catalog row moves. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WtJBr77gMFLrN93iEevqQJ Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 425128@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: f5944d8b-dac4-4e1a-87eb-8b3d8f314a63
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Security layer model — v0.8 amendment set
Repository: gate-house (author)
Publisher: net-kingdom
Project family: NetKingdom security layer
Status: draft — normative text proposed, not yet cut
Version: 0.1
Date: 2026-09-06
Workplan: GH-WP-0003
Base: net-kingdom/canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.7.md (accepted)
What this document is
The exact normative text for the amendments GH-WP-0003 collects, section by
section, against accepted v0.7. It is the reviewable unit: each amendment can be
argued on its own wording here before any of them touch a cut document.
v0.7 is not patched in place. Nothing in this file is in force. Each amendment already governs its implementers through the decision record or contract named as its authority — this document moves them into the statute, it does not decide them again.
Assembly and circulation are GH-WP-0003-T06.
| # | Section | Authority | Task |
|---|---|---|---|
| A1 | §9.7.3 | GH-DEC-2026-003, docs/contracts/approval-consumption.md |
T01 |
| A2 | §11 | docs/contracts/approval-emission-detection.md |
T02 |
| A3 | §13, §13.1 | GH-DEC-2026-006 |
T03 |
| A4 | §9.5 | GH-DEC-2026-007 |
T04 |
| A5 | §6.4, §8 | GH-DEC-2026-005 |
T05 |
| A6 | §17 | GH-DEC-2026-004 |
T07 |
A1 — §9.7.3, consume ordering (T01)
Defect. v0.7 item 3 reads "the decision precedes the action and the action
precedes consumption". That clause is a protocol, and it is the wrong one. It was
written to support a forensic claim, not to specify an order, but implementers read
it as the order — APPROVAL-WP-0001-T05 and FLEX-WP-0017-T05 were both blocked on
it.
Why the stated order is unsafe. If the PEP acts and then consumes, two racing
PEPs can both observe valid_now, both receive ALLOW, and both act. The CAS then
prevents only the second record, not the second side effect. Single consumption
becomes theatre — the property the mutation exists to provide is exactly the one the
ordering destroys.
Replace item 3 with:
Consumption is a state change, never an inference. An approval is consumed by a mutation in
approval-engine(§9.4). It MUST NOT be inferred from the existence of a decision record: a decision record proves an intent to act, not an act.The PEP MUST obtain a successful consume before the protected side effect. Holding a claim with
valid_now: true, or an ALLOW rendered against that claim, is not authority to act; the consume is. In-flight duplicate ALLOWs are expected and the CAS serializes use — a laterCheckRequestseesvalid_now: falseand cannot mint a new ALLOW against the same object.v0.7 stated the opposite order. Acting first leaves the CAS able to prevent only the second record, never the second side effect, which makes single consumption theatre. This is a protocol correction and not a retraction of the forensic claim: consumption is still never inferred from a decision.
An approval authorizes one attempt, not one success. There is no unconsume and no reserve/release; a consumed approval spent on a failed action is spent. Reversibility would reopen replay, which is the failure the mutation exists to close. Settled in
GH-DEC-2026-003; the protocol isgate-house/docs/contracts/approval-consumption.md.
Item 4 stays as written. Its three failure modes now have owners rather than only names, in the same contract; the statute continues to name them and to point at it.
A2 — §11, the emission-guarantee declaration check (T02)
Why. GH-IN-0001 was found by argument, not by a check: audit-core noticed that
§9.4 rested on a completeness property no archive can deliver. Nothing in v0.7 stops
the next engine catalogued as an evidence source from reintroducing the same gap
silently, because the obligation §9.6 creates is not on the conformance list.
Add to §11's "Mechanically checkable" list:
- every repository catalogued in §4 as a source of evidence declares its emission guarantee in its machine-readable layer declaration: for a load-bearing source, a local transactional outbox (§9.4) plus a detection surface — heartbeat or reconciliation, per §9.6 — and its declared cadence; for an attributive source, the trade it makes and an explicit statement that completeness is not claimed.
Add after the list:
A source that declares nothing is not conforming, and neither is one that declares load-bearing emission with rate monitoring alone where its event class is rare (§9.6). The declaration is what makes §9.6 checkable rather than reviewable; without it the section states an obligation whose satisfaction cannot be observed, which is the §9.1 defect this standard has now corrected four times.
Drafted in
gate-house/docs/contracts/approval-emission-detection.md, whichapproval-engine'scadence.yamlimplements as the reference instance. Raised byaudit-coreas the general form ofGH-IN-0001, so that the finding that producedGH-WP-0002cannot recur unnoticed.
A3 — §13 and §13.1, register disposition (T03)
Settled by GH-DEC-2026-006. The tables stay in v0.8 and the four outstanding
stance maps are transcribed into §13.1. The migration to maturity-engine is
conditioned on a published export and is therefore a v0.9-or-later change, not this
one.
Add to §13.1, after the table:
This register moves to
maturity-enginewhen — and not before — that engine publishes a committed, versioned export of §13 and §13.1 that is readable without a live query, generated rather than hand-edited, and regenerable so drift between the export and the engine's computed state is detectable. A standard of record must stay legible in git, at a version, to a reader with no cluster access, including one auditing the estate precisely because they do not trust its running systems. A pointer to a live engine is an instruction to run software, not a register.
maturity-enginealready holds both registers as queryable data (MAT-WP-0001); what remains is publication, which is the migration's precondition rather than its follow-up. Settled inGH-DEC-2026-006.
§13.1 rows to transcribe at the cut — carried here so the cut is mechanical:
| Consumer | Stance map | Shape |
|---|---|---|
ops-warden |
ops-warden/pep-stance.yaml |
total per zone; fail_open for z0–z2 and unknown, sanctioned by §9.3 and recorded per §6.4 obligation 1 limb two; test asserts published map equals shipped default |
user-engine |
user-engine/pep-stance.yaml |
total per zone; fail_closed for z0–z3, unknown, and not-applicable; test asserts published map equals user_engine.pep_stance |
tenant-engine |
tenant-engine/pep-stance.yaml |
total; fail_closed for unset, unreachable, non-allow, unknown; test asserts file equals shipped behaviour |
ops-mason |
— | unpublished; PEP-shaped under §6.4 (opening a route). Recorded as a gap, not a stance |
Three of four are total and fail-closed. The ops-mason row is the finding §6.4's
closing paragraph anticipated, and it is more useful in the register than absent from
it.
A4 — §9.5, the posture/maturity boundary (T04)
Settled by GH-DEC-2026-007, adopting kings-guard's KG-DEC-2026-002 with one
added clause.
Append to §9.5, before the approvals/maturity closing paragraph:
The boundary with posture is recomputability, not volatility. Given the same criteria and the same evidence, recompute. If you MUST get the same answer, it is maturity and it belongs in an engine. If you CANNOT promise the same answer, it is posture and it belongs in Staff.
This is not a new rule — it is the determinism clause above, pointed at the one boundary where it had not been pointed. This section already states the maturity half: a criterion that cannot be evaluated by rule is not yet a criterion. The posture half is its mirror and completes the pair: a judgment that CAN be evaluated by rule is not posture — it is a criterion sitting in the wrong repository. Together they partition rather than describe, which a "fast-moving versus slow-moving" line cannot: volatility is an observation about how a value has behaved, and every case it does not obviously cover becomes an argument at exactly the boundary §6 exists to keep out of argument.
A criterion MUST bottom out in evidence about the subject, not in another party's conclusion about the subject. A recorded judgment may be evidence that the judgment was made — a fact with an issuer and a timestamp. It MUST NOT be evidence that the thing judged is so. Without this, the test is satisfiable by the inference it exists to exclude: "level 2 iff the reviewer marked the control adequate" recomputes identically every time and has placed an opinion inside an engine wearing a rule's clothes. For human-attested controls, grade on the attestation event's existence, freshness, and issuer — never on its verdict.
Three consequences follow. The migration direction is permanent: anything called posture that proves recomputable becomes a criterion in
maturity-engine; anything inmaturity-enginethat needs judgment is not yet a criterion and returns to Staff. Two authorities cannot grade the same subject property, because a property is either recomputable or it is not, and that does not depend on which repository claims it. Capability readiness MUST NOT be an input to posture — readiness is deterministic and posture is not, so feeding one into the other would make posture partly recomputable and blur the boundary from the Staff side.A limit, stated rather than implied. "The same evidence" is not yet well defined in this estate. Until §17's request-claim and gap-record schemas exist, two parties can disagree about whether they hold the same evidence, and recomputability is a thought experiment rather than a check. This makes §17 load-bearing for this rule. A boundary that is correct but not yet mechanically checkable is better than one that is checkable and wrong; a reader is entitled to know which they are holding.
Raised by
kings-guardagainst the volatility line this repository had proposed, and against its own convenience — the readiness constraint is one it volunteered. Settled inGH-DEC-2026-007.
A5 — §6.4 and §8, validation by owning layer (T05)
Why it belongs in the statute. GH-DEC-2026-005 settled it on the approval path,
but the property is general: it is a fact about the layer model, not about approvals,
and it currently lives only in a decision record and a contract. The next consumer to
join two artifacts will re-derive it or get it wrong.
Add as §6.4 obligation 5:
Validation by owning layer. Where a PEP's decision to act rests on more than one artifact, each artifact MUST be validated against the layer that owns its data, and a PIP MUST NOT republish the PDP's decision. A PEP MUST NOT accept the approval fact from the decision artifact, nor the decision from the approval artifact.
A composed object bundling both is not forbidden as an artifact, but it is post-decision by construction: it cannot be served from a pre-decision call, and it needs a named issuer and lifecycle owner before anyone may rely on it.
The live instance is the
GH-DEC-2026-003consumption path: the approval-claim carries the approval fact (binding digest, validity window, consumption state, freshness, issuer) and theDecisionEnvelopecarries the decision (exactCheckRequestmatch, policy package and version pin). Two digests may cover the same proposed action without being compared to each other; they answer different questions at different layers, and collapsing them is a layer violation in the shape of a refactor.A consumer of a summary predicate trusts the issuer's evaluation of everything folded into it. Where the split reduces what a PEP verifies independently — as
valid_nowdoes for an approver threshold the claim deliberately does not expose — the compensating property is reconstructability at the issuer under §9.6, not a second check at the consumer. That is detection, not prevention, and it belongs in the same register as §9.6's other residual.Raised by
approval-engine, and byaccess-engineagainst its own proposed artifact. Settled inGH-DEC-2026-005.
Add to §8's demarcations:
Validating a fact is not re-issuing it. A repository that checks an artifact against its issuer is consuming; a repository that serves another layer's conclusion as its own output is deciding early (§6.1), whatever the field is named.
A6 — §17, ownership is now assigned (T07)
Defect. §17 closes with "Ownership is proposed, not assigned… Neither has assented." That was true at the v0.7 cut and is now false. A reader of the accepted statute is told the estate has not decided something it has.
Replace that closing paragraph with:
Ownership of the emission-cadence declaration is assigned.
info-tech-canonowns the versioned, ecosystem-wideEmissionCadenceDeclarationsemantic contract — generic forms, fields, vocabulary, validation semantics, compatibility, and evolution.net-kingdomimports it and owns the NetKingdom security profile: which evidence classes MUST or SHOULD declare cadence, the prohibition on rate monitoring for rare load-bearing classes, and the heartbeat-plus-reconciliation obligations that satisfy §9.6. Each source repository owns its declaration instance and its emission behaviour;kings-guardowns stream evaluation and silence findings, not the schema.The split was made by artifact so that each has one owner: joint ownership would leave version authority ambiguous, and giving the whole artifact to either repository would conflate a reusable evidence contract with the security obligations of one estate. Settled in
GH-DEC-2026-004; both repositories accepted in their own voice (ITC-WP-0018, publishingITC-EMISSION-CADENCE 0.1in canon0.7.0;NK-WP-0035, publishingemission-cadence-security-profile_v0.1.md). Thekings-guarddraft is frozen as assimilation provenance.Ownership of the remaining three artifacts is still proposed. The request-claim and gap-record schemas sit between
info-tech-canonandnet-kingdomon the same unsettled line; the decision-record schema isaccess-engine's, per above. §2 keeps ownership in the owning repository'sINTENT.md.
Not in this set
Recorded so the omissions are deliberate rather than forgotten.
- §12's fourth step remains unstaffed. Observation in production is still not
live;
kings-guard'sqonto-assistantpilot is fixture-only. That is a status, not an amendment, and §12 already says so. - §16's open questions are not re-cut here. Several have been answered by decision
records since v0.7. Reconciling §16 against the decision log is
T06work at assembly, not a separate normative amendment. - No §4 catalog change. None of these amendments moves a capability between repositories.