The role set — Principal, effective actor, Delegator, tool or agent, policy
ceiling, execution context, audit identity — now applies wherever a subject's
access is exercised through another party, rather than to non-human subjects
only.
The gap this closes is not about agents. A support operator impersonating a
customer involves no non-human subject anywhere in the path, yet without the
decomposition that operator's audit identity and policy ceiling collapse into
the customer's, which is the outcome CARING's exposure analysis exists to
prevent. CARING already names customer impersonation as an exposure mode and
ImpersonationBlocked as a control; the vocabulary for analysing it was gated to
subjects the case does not involve. Section 33 was already subject-agnostic, so
the canon applied the execution paths to any subject while restricting the roles
along those paths to non-human ones — an artifact of the section heading, not a
considered position.
Accepted narrowly. Section 32.1 stays agent-stated, with a note on reading the
capability ceiling for a human effective actor. No role is removed, renamed or
added, and section 33 is untouched. Option C, a twelfth dimension, is rejected as
duplicating sections 32 and 33 while touching a dimension set the Kubernetes RBAC
benchmark depends on.
Canon version moves to 0.4.0-RC2-itc2; source version stays 0.4.0-RC2, since
this revises the InfoTechCanon-aligned standard and claims nothing about
upstream CARING. The change is additive: an implementation that applied the set
only to non-human subjects stays conformant for those subjects.
Review record in history/; the SecurityCanon boundary file and placement record
are updated to show R-2 resolved.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 3588@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 24b80f66-e5a7-4e61-99fe-2d422e6d17da
interface-canon corrected its Interface and Endpoint pins at 20d7bfc2. Both were
pinned twice, to ITC-LAND and ITC-NET, because ITC-LAND section 13.2 lists them
in a seed-concept block while the Network Model defines them. Landscape section
13.2 now says in this repository that Interface, Endpoint and API are pointers
there and that the Network Model owns the first two, so the next reader does not
repeat it.
That is the fourth time in one day a list of concept names was read as a
definition, after CARING's Scope ladder, CARING's Environment values, and the
Landscape seeds that hid SoftwareSystem and SoftwareComponent. The closure
section names the pattern.
Both boundaries now resolve completely, security-canon 11 of 11 and
interface-canon 23 of 23, the registered copy is refreshed to the corrected
revision, and validation carries no drift warnings. The CLI test is rebuilt from
a deliberately broken copy so that a partner fixing its own pins can no longer
break this repository's suite.
make check passes with 59 tests, clean validation and no warnings.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 3588@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 24b80f66-e5a7-4e61-99fe-2d422e6d17da
import-review takes any partner manifest and returns, per concept, whether the
name resolves in the ownership index and to which artifact, and per entry
whether the pinned SHA-256 matches the blob at the declared source commit. Both
run in one pass so neither can be recorded without the other, which is the
failure this workplan exists to prevent. It exits non-zero on a finding, reads
JSON or YAML, needs no partner checkout, and carries its own limit: resolution
proves a name exists and names one owner, nothing more.
Accepted manifests are registered under infospace/interfaces/manifests/ as
provenance-preserving copies owned by the partner, with the partner revision and
retrieval date recorded. Editing a copy to make a check pass is forbidden in the
file itself. Validation re-resolves them and reports drift as
federation_import_drift, a warning naming the partner rather than an error,
because a stale partner pin is not this repository's file to fix.
The review kit gains an extension-boundary-review template requiring hash count,
resolution count and conflict count as three separate lines, and an operating
rule saying one is never evidence of another. Both boundary files carry the
standing-check result.
Verified live: security-canon resolves 11 of 11, interface-canon 23 of 25 with
the two known Interface and Endpoint pins. make check passes with 58 tests,
clean validation and those two warnings.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 3588@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 24b80f66-e5a7-4e61-99fe-2d422e6d17da
R-3 is resolved by disambiguation without a rename. CARING section 10.7 now says
its Authority exposure mode names a demanding party rather than a right, links to
ITC-ORG section 10.17, and notes that such an Authority holds no organizational
authority over the system it compels. ITC-ORG carries the reciprocal sentence and
records that SecurityCanon's AuthMode qualifies the exercise of the right rather
than redefining it.
The seventeen concepts no artifact declared are now declared: eleven to the
Organization Model, four to CARING and two to the Capability Model. Capacity in
the Organization Model and Capacity behaviour in the Capability Model are two
concepts, not one, and neither moves. Two of CARING's four turned out not to be
new concepts at all but the prose spellings of CaringCapabilityProfile and
CaringDerivedCapability; both spellings are declared to the same owner so the
name a reader meets resolves. Effective Access and Declared Access were
genuinely undeclared.
Three boundary reviews are added for organization, caring and capability,
bringing the count to fourteen. The concept_defined_without_owner warning is at
zero, and the test that asserted it fires now proves it on a modified corpus
instead of on the live one.
make check passes with 54 tests, clean validation, no warnings, no stale assets.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 3588@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 24b80f66-e5a7-4e61-99fe-2d422e6d17da
Neither boundary has an ownership conflict now that declarations cover the
corpus, so the central claim of both acceptances holds. Name resolution is a
different matter, and it had never been checked: both original reviews verified
their import manifests by file hash, every hash matched, and that was recorded
as evidence. A hash proves the reviewed file is the pinned file; it says nothing
about whether the concept named in the manifest exists in it.
SecurityCanon: five of twelve imports named concepts their pinned artifact does
not define, corrected on that side to eleven imports. InterfaceCanon: twenty-one
of twenty-five resolve exactly, and two of the four failures were this
repository's omission — SoftwareSystem and SoftwareComponent are Landscape seed
concepts that extraction cannot read and are now declared, making those pins
correct. Interface and Endpoint resolve to the Network Model, which the accepted
clarifications already treat as contextual rather than exact aliases; those pins
are InterfaceCanon's to correct.
Both boundary files carry the re-verification and its method limit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 3588@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 24b80f66-e5a7-4e61-99fe-2d422e6d17da
Twelve of the thirteen artifacts that declared nothing now declare what they
define, together with the map-assigned concepts the Organization Model was
missing and the Landscape seed concepts the extractor cannot see because they
are listed rather than defined in prose. The ownership index grows from 164
entries to 750, undeclared prose definitions fall from 637 to 57, and there are
no ownership conflicts. The 57 that remain are overlaps this round assigned to
another owner: imports, each recorded in a boundary review.
The kernel map declares nothing, deliberately, because it assigns concepts to
owners rather than defining them. It is now the only silent artifact and the
suite asserts that, so an artifact added without declarations fails.
itc-org:Authority is declared, with Actor, Ownership, Membership, Role,
Responsibility and Accountability, which SecurityCanon and the identity model
already treat as organization-owned. The regression test that previously
asserted the blind spot now asserts that the kernel map's assignment and the
declaration agree.
Profile is deliberately left undeclared. The kernel map assigns it to Core, the
identity model owns it under accepted CUST-ADR-006, and Observability defines a
runtime performance profile. Three senses need a decision, not a declaration, so
it is recorded as open rather than forced.
Eleven boundary reviews are added beside the artifacts they describe, in the
shape the identity model has used since INFO-WP-0021. The largest finding is
that Core and the Information Space model restate eight provenance concepts in
nearly identical words; Core owns them and Information Space imports. Label,
Drift, Summary and Attribute are resolved by disambiguation rather than
transfer.
make check passes with 50 tests, clean validation, no stale generated assets.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 3588@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 24b80f66-e5a7-4e61-99fe-2d422e6d17da
The SecurityCanon boundary review recorded a residual: CARING and ITC-ACCESS
hold two definitions of Scope, with ITC-ACCESS named owner. Reading the corpus
corrects both halves. ITC-IDENT section 2.10 owns Scope as the general boundary
within which identifiers, meanings, relationships, accounts, policies or
lifecycle states are valid, and ITC-ACCESS section 11.8 ResourceScope already
declares itself a refinement of that general identity Scope rather than a
competing definition.
The second use the residual was reaching for is CARING section 21, which
presented a dimension named Scope with a ladder from Ecosystem to Field without
saying what the dimension ranges over. It now states that it ranges over
ITC-IDENT Scope instances, that the ladder is the canonical value set rather
than a second definition, and that ResourceScope refines the same concept for
resource boundaries.
No concept is renamed, moved or removed and no ladder value changes, so the
corpus is unchanged in shape; make check passes with 46 tests, clean validation
and a passing small-saas profile. The correction is carried back to the
SecurityCanon placement record and imports.json, where Scope now imports from
the identity model.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 3588@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 24b80f66-e5a7-4e61-99fe-2d422e6d17da
SecurityCanon publishes an architecture-layer vocabulary for authority
relationships, the Mode of Authority, and references shared InfoTechCanon
concepts. This records the InfoTechCanon-side acceptance of that boundary and
adds reciprocal navigation from the federation interface README.
The accepted dispositions keep the layers apart. Mode of Authority describes the
relationship in which authority is exercised; CARING analyses how an
access-control implementation is composed. Auth Mode is orthogonal to access
operation and to CARING's Canonical Role and Plane, so the Operator role and the
OPERATE mode stay distinct concepts and neither is renamed. SecurityCanon does
not reuse Actor or Subject, which ITC-ACCESS owns and binds as "Subject is the
access-control view of an actor"; it renamed its on-behalf-of dimension to
AuthorityContext instead, so no change is required here.
Verified at security-canon b1fa25eb: all five pinned manifest hashes match Git
blobs at this commit and the sources are unchanged in the review checkout, and
none of the seven concepts SecurityCanon declares appears in any InfoTechCanon
owned_concepts declaration, so the boundary introduces no ownership conflict.
No concept is transferred and nothing is removed, so the corpus is unchanged.
Generated indexes and the repository tree are refreshed for the added file;
make check passes with 46 tests, clean validation and a passing small-saas
profile. This is an agent review, not human sign-off, and it records no consumer
adoption or conformance claim.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUkN13CAqtXWPXuEiEtmJj
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 36656@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 66d6eece-d245-43ca-85e8-68a1b5970a67
Finish ITC-WP-0013 (AttributeValueType under ITC-DATA) and ITC-WP-0014
T02/T03/T05/T06/T07. Capability contract schemas, live-catalog review
CLI, landscape/kernel-map pointers. Sit on this version.
A provision can name which other provision satisfies a catalog
dependency. Relation vocabulary is depends_on / may_use only.
Quoted sits below the invoiced/measured peer pair for propagation.
§10.3 now accepts a consumer record that validates against the live
catalog; resource-control's backup restatement is that proof. ITC-GOV
gains EvidenceBasis in tiers (invoiced and measured are peers) and
ITC-CAP requires it on every consumption row (CAP-R10).
A third front door next to incoming/ and demand/: longitudinal PurposeFit
evidence, not a change request and not a canon artifact. Seeded with the
resource-control backup-cycle mapping.
Accept resource-control demand: move resource classes onto provisions,
let requirements carry targets and constraints, add human-effort class H
with native-unit consumption. Model stays proposed.
Security & Governance splits into `security` (secrets, keys, policy,
vulnerability) and `governance` (evidence, lifecycle). Every capability id
is unchanged — domains are navigation_only, so this is a table-of-contents
change, not a concept change.
- capabilities.yaml: 41 capabilities across 9 domains
- ITC-CAP §8 catalog table and promotion gate updated
- OQ-2 closed; decision record added to ASSIMILATION.md
- canon 0.2.0 -> 0.2.1 (patch) + CHANGELOG entry
- ITC-WP-0014 T01 done, workplan active
make validate: ok. make test: 22 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Define the intake and assimilation practice (incoming/ drop zone -> frozen
source snapshot -> Minimal Assimilation Profile -> disposition gate -> canon
transformation -> versioned change notes) and run it on the first inputs.
- infospace/assimilation/intake-and-assimilation-practice.md, incoming/README.md
- assimilation/it-capability-canon: frozen source, comparison matrix, 26
mappings, 8 proposed changes, 7 open questions, decision record (adapt)
- new model ITC-CAP with 41-capability machine-readable catalog, anchored to
owning canon models; CILM rejected, Profile renamed, Provision made explicit
- registered in canon.yaml / artifacts index / infospace.yaml; regenerated
briefs, indexes, views; canon version 0.1.0-scaffold -> 0.2.0 + CHANGELOG
- ITC-WP-0014 for promotion work; ITC-WP-0013 added to the workplan registry
make validate: ok (65 artifacts, 0 errors/warnings). make test: 22 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Register the InfoTechCanon Repository Layout Standard as a domain standard
(itc-repo-layout), processed from demand through the canon's Purpose/Demand
intake without collapsing existing model concepts.
- Register standard in artifacts/index.yaml, canon.yaml, infospace.yaml;
regenerate indexes, views, briefs, tree, and validation (validate green).
- T04: add reconciliation.yaml (partial/as-is dogfooding, declared core
conformance, recorded tensions); resolve the demand by moving it out of
demand/ to the evaluation pack as source-demand.md and removing demand/.
- T05: add consumer-adoption-brief.md for downstream repos.
- Update test artifact/standard counts (60->61, standards 2->3).
- Mark T03/T04/T05 done; workplan and registry status -> finished.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
