info-tech-canon/infospace/interfaces/security-canon-boundary.md
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Re-verify both extension boundaries against the enlarged index (T04)
Neither boundary has an ownership conflict now that declarations cover the
corpus, so the central claim of both acceptances holds. Name resolution is a
different matter, and it had never been checked: both original reviews verified
their import manifests by file hash, every hash matched, and that was recorded
as evidence. A hash proves the reviewed file is the pinned file; it says nothing
about whether the concept named in the manifest exists in it.

SecurityCanon: five of twelve imports named concepts their pinned artifact does
not define, corrected on that side to eleven imports. InterfaceCanon: twenty-one
of twenty-five resolve exactly, and two of the four failures were this
repository's omission — SoftwareSystem and SoftwareComponent are Landscape seed
concepts that extraction cannot read and are now declared, making those pins
correct. Interface and Endpoint resolve to the Network Model, which the accepted
clarifications already treat as contextual rather than exact aliases; those pins
are InterfaceCanon's to correct.

Both boundary files carry the re-verification and its method limit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 3588@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 24b80f66-e5a7-4e61-99fe-2d422e6d17da
2026-09-20 23:27:47 +02:00

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Markdown

# SecurityCanon extension boundary
Status: accepted for the semantic boundary documented below, reviewed by Claude
in the InfoTechCanon repository on 2026-09-20. This is an agent review, not a
claim of separate human sign-off or a published peer merge.
Review target: security-canon draft 0.2.0 at
`b1fa25ebe3204b5da0febf70190533711c19fbce`.
InfoTechCanon review base and import source:
`e1f98da015f32545254747c8e9f59b780c423d5b`.
SecurityCanon supplies an architecture-layer vocabulary for authority
relationships — the Mode of Authority — and references shared InfoTechCanon
concepts. InfoTechCanon retains the shared roots, the access-control model, the
identity model, and the CARING access governance standard.
## Accepted dispositions
- **Layer separation.** Mode of Authority describes the relationship in which
authority is exercised; CARING analyses how an access-control implementation is
composed. Both may describe the same system without either subsuming the
other. Recorded on the SecurityCanon side as SEC-ADR-001.
- **Auth Mode is orthogonal to access operation.** `read + USE` and
`read + OBSERVE` share an operation and differ in authority relationship.
AccessOperations remains owned by ITC-ACCESS and is imported, not redefined.
- **Auth Mode is orthogonal to CARING Canonical Role and Plane.** The three
answer different questions. The CARING `Operator` role and the `OPERATE` auth
mode are not the same concept and neither is renamed; a disambiguation page in
SecurityCanon is the required companion.
- **Actor/Subject is not reused.** ITC-ACCESS owns `Subject` and binds it as
"Subject is the access-control view of an actor", with actor semantics owned by
the Organization Model. SecurityCanon renamed its on-behalf-of dimension to
`AuthorityContext` rather than overloading either word. No change is required
in InfoTechCanon.
- **Scope, AccessOperations, PrincipalType and Purpose are imports.** They retain
their InfoTechCanon owners. Purpose resolves to the Purpose and Demand
extension rather than being defined in SecurityCanon.
- **EvidenceBoundary is a new concept, not an alias of the CARING Audit Plane.**
The Audit Plane names a surface; EvidenceBoundary asks whether the observed
actor can alter, suppress or bypass the evidence used to observe it.
- **No InfoTechCanon concept is transferred.** This boundary creates no removal,
relocation or deprecation in InfoTechCanon, so the InfoTechCanon corpus is
unchanged by it.
## Evidence and limits
Reviewed `infospace/vocabulary/mode-of-authority/SecurityCanonModeOfAuthority.md`,
`auth-modes.yaml`, `dimensions.yaml`, `imports.json`,
`infospace/mappings/mode-of-authority-to-infotechcanon.md` and
`infospace/interfaces/federation.yaml` at the SecurityCanon revision above.
All five manifest SHA-256 values match Git blobs at the declared InfoTechCanon
source revision, and those files are unchanged in the review checkout:
InfoTechCanonCore, InfoTechCanonAccessControlModel, InfoTechCanonIdentityModel,
InfoTechCanonOrganizationModel, and InfoTechCanonPurposeDemandExtension.
None of the seven concepts SecurityCanon declares — AuthMode, AuthorityContext,
AuthorityRealm, AuthorityProvenance, Activation, EvidenceBoundary,
AccessSituation — appears in any InfoTechCanon `owned_concepts` declaration, so
this boundary introduces no ownership conflict.
Limits of this acceptance:
- Scoped to SecurityCanon draft 0.2.0. No stable promotion is asserted.
- Acceptance covers the semantic boundary and import declarations. It records no
consumer adoption, no runtime claim, and no conformance statement.
- A proposal to generalise CARING section 32 beyond non-human subjects is
referenced by SecurityCanon but is **not** accepted here. It would be an
InfoTechCanon change requiring its own review.
- The G7 validator in `prj-canon-federation` pins card paths for
info-tech-canon, commerce-canon and the-custodian. Registering the
security-canon card is that project's change; this review does not make it.
## Re-verification — 2026-09-20 (INFO-WP-0027-T04)
Re-run against the enlarged InfoTechCanon ownership index (750 entries, up from
164) after INFO-WP-0027-T02 gave every defining artifact an `owned_concepts`
declaration. The original acceptance compared SecurityCanon's concepts against
the declarations that existed then; this re-runs it against declarations that
now cover the corpus.
**No ownership conflict.** None of the nine SecurityCanon-owned concepts —
AuthMode, AuthorityContext, AuthorityRealm, AuthorityProvenance, Activation,
EvidenceBoundary, AccessSituation, Time, and the dimension slot for Environment —
collides with an InfoTechCanon declaration. The boundary's central claim holds.
**Five of the twelve declared imports do not resolve by name.** The original
review verified the manifest by file hash, and every hash matched; it never
checked that the named concept exists in the named artifact. The enlarged index
makes that checkable:
| Import | Pinned to | Resolves to | Finding |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `Artifact` | InfoTechCanonCore | `model/devsecops` | Core owns `CanonArtifact`, "any identifiable unit of canon content". There is no Core `Artifact`. The name now resolves to the DevSecOps build artifact, a different concept. |
| `Ownership` | InfoTechCanonCore | `model/organization` | The kernel map assigns Ownership and Stewardship to Organization. The pin names the wrong artifact. |
| `Relationship` | InfoTechCanonCore | `model/identity` | Core owns `RelationshipDefinition`; the identity model owns `Relationship` as its actor-linking taxonomy. The pin names the wrong artifact and arguably the wrong concept. |
| `AccessOperations` | InfoTechCanonAccessControlModel | unowned | ITC-ACCESS defines `Operation`, "a system-specific or API-specific action". `AccessOperations` is SecurityCanon's own compaction of it. |
| `PrincipalType` | InfoTechCanonIdentityModel | unowned | The name appears nowhere in the identity or access-control models. |
These are SecurityCanon-side manifest corrections, not InfoTechCanon changes. No
InfoTechCanon concept is renamed, moved or removed to accommodate them, and the
semantic boundary recorded above is unaffected: each case is a citation naming
the wrong artifact or a name InfoTechCanon never used, not a contested concept.
**Method limit, now closed.** Hash verification proves the reviewed file is the
file that was pinned. It says nothing about whether the concept named in the
manifest exists in it. Both checks are needed, and only the first was run in the
original acceptance.