Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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gate-house ruled the section 3 vocabulary closed at four case-insensitive
tokens and named Staff (role pep-shaped unchanged). Both files were changed
the same day, as this repository had committed to. INTENT.md now governs.
layer.yaml is marked derived from INTENT.md and carries no standard or
companion version. The reasoning behind `surface` stays in layer.yaml as
history.
INFD-IN-0006 is closed. INFD-IN-0007 asks once more how section 3.4's Staff
definition fits a deterministic, non-agentic, evidence-holding repository.
It is a question only: nothing waits on it.
Section 4 answer: yes, as a Staff / pep-shaped / evidence-source row. The
emission guarantee is owed per event class: presentation (volume),
disposition (rare), stance-application (rare). See
docs/section-4-catalog-row.md.
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The custodian's record was corrected on 2026-09-21 while this request was being
written. railiance-master had already established — with fuller citations than
this repository had — that flex-auth's validator set {Staff, Engine, Tooling} is
not §3's enumeration: §3 has four rows and `Taxonomy` is the first, defined in
§3.1, catalogued in §4, mapped in §7 and given its own §17. It added the sharper
finding this repository had not reached: §3's table writes `Engines` while §4
types eight rows `Engine`, so two faithful conformance runs disagree about every
engine in the estate.
This repository reached the first half independently and before seeing the
correction, and now records it rather than re-arguing it. The consequence is
what matters: `surface` is the only surveyed value outside §3 itself, and the
only one that needs a ruling on whether the vocabulary is closed. The two cases
do not behave alike and should not be ruled on together — which is what the
corrected record says, and this repository agrees.
One point carries over into the closed outcome: if §3's vocabulary is ruled
closed, the closed set should be written out as declaration values rather than
inferred from table row labels. `Engines`/`Engine` is what happens otherwise,
and it is B1's shape one level further in.
Position unchanged; the declared value remains unchanged pending the ruling.
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The custodian's estate-wide sweep (2026-09-21), extending flex-auth's boundaries
review FLEX-WP-0030, found this repository declaring `layer: surface` against a
§3 vocabulary that does not enumerate it. flex-auth's validator admits only
{Staff, Engine, Tooling}, so this fails on the value rather than on casing or on
B1's precedence question. It was never raised here directly and it is not the
nine-repository defect: both our files say `surface`, in the same casing.
`surface` denotes the presentation-and-binding tier — the runtime a human
touches, where a decision rendered elsewhere is shown to a named person, that
person binds their identity to the act, and the evidence that the presentation
happened is produced. It was chosen by elimination on 2026-09-09 (f6376dd),
because GH-DEC-2026-012 R1 ruled us out of Engine and left the layer ours to
declare, and each remaining value is false of us: not Staff (deterministic by
construction, and holding state audit-core depends on at runtime, which §3.4
forbids Staff), not Tooling (we persist nothing another layer reads), not
Taxonomy (we are nothing but a runtime position). Faced with a false value that
satisfies a validator or the true word and a finding, the true word was written.
Position: `surface` names a real tier §3 does not enumerate. The sharpest form
is that a standing ruling plus a closed vocabulary leaves this repository no
conforming declaration available — the §9.1 defect applied to conformance that
§11 names against itself. But the ruling is gate-house's and we do not claim it
must go our way: if the vocabulary is ruled closed and a value named, both files
change the same day without argument. We ask only that such a ruling show how
§3's determinism cut reaches that value given GH-DEC-2026-012 R1, because the
next repository in this position will reason from it — and the tier a human
touches having no owner is exactly what produced approval-engine's unowned
inbox, key-cape's blocked client_id, and this repository.
Two observations offered: flex-auth's validator admits three values where §3
enumerates four, so railiance-master's `Taxonomy` fails the validator rather
than the standard and is separable without any ruling, leaving `surface` as the
only surveyed value outside §3 itself; and §3's row label is `Engines` while
declarations use `Engine`, which should be written out as declaration values if
the set is ruled closed.
The declared value is UNCHANGED on purpose. Changing it ahead of the ruling
would pre-empt gate-house and throw away the evidence of what was concluded.
layer.yaml, INTENT.md and AGENTS.md now say so in place, so the value is not
read as unexamined and no later agent silently "fixes" it. AGENTS.md's layer
section was also stale — it still said layer.yaml was unwritten.
28 layer conformance tests pass.
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FLEX-WP-0028 admitted a dedicated package. Runtime ConfigMap and
NetworkPolicy now pin flex-auth-informed-decision-sitting. Memos are
in the live store for the existing named recipient. No human bind.
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Warden failed closed on leftover JSON after a successful create.
Objects are requested, no entries. Flex Auth package draft pins the
seven ids; c01 skipped. No human bind.
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Auth returned clean at 20:27Z but the child left a preflight receipt
with no error. Named failures, refuse public bao.coulomb.social, and
overwrite a failed receipt. Wrapper is executable for attended-exec.
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Installed warden does not list informed-decision-sitting-requester-login.
OPERATOR.md now requires WARDEN_ROUTING_CATALOG and BAO_ADDR on the
OpenBao tunnel. No POST from this shell.
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Verifier + attended reader on a new informed-decision KV path, not a
widening of CCR-2026-0024/0025. Intents still match approval-engine
canonical binding. No secret, no apply, no bind.
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Names informed-decision-sitting-requester (approval:create only, no
approve/consume, no redirect). Eight binding intents are drafted and
not posted; c01 stays undecided vs secrets-engine-requester. No secret,
no live registration, no bind.
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audit-core rollout made origin /readyz 200. Remaining gates are the
T03-only Flex Auth package, no approval:create requester for these
eight acts, and a live KeyCape subject. Attach writes bound copies
from a created receipt; it does not bind.
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T08 historically bound three SECRETS-WP-0010-T03 memos on this origin.
Live accept is closed: /readyz 503 because audit-core has no ready
endpoints. Compact drafts still lack approval_id. Operator packet and
preflight record the gates; T03 stays wait.
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Updated by fix-consistency on 2026-09-14:
- update .custodian-brief.md for informed-decision
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INFD-WP-0002 T01–T02: eight one-question memos for net-kingdom-admins,
batch contract without approve-all, no live bind (T08 still open).
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Set flavor on open workplans from origin/prose/status. Copy existing
depends_on aliases only. Do not promote residuals.
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Draft Umlaufmappe groupings of one-question memos so founder sign-off
can happen in a compact sitting once Stage 1 can bind.
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T07's note and the registration doc said publishing would close
KEY-WP-0013-T02, blocked since 2026-09-08. Checked against key-cape: T02 is
done, T05 (which actually held the human registration) is done, and key-cape
closed KEY-WP-0030, a follow-up this repo prompted. The issuer side of the gap
that created this repository is already discharged.
Submitting the registration closes INFD-WP-0001-T07, not a key-cape task.
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approval-engine met the condition. Verified here rather than taken on report:
their docs/approval-claim.md carries "Presentation exclusion — GH-DEC-2026-015
§4" in normative language, and I ran
tests/test_claim_contract.py::test_presentation_changes_cannot_change_the_approved_act
myself — 1 passed. That test pins the digest input set from BOTH sides, and the
narrowing half is what makes it real: without it a digest over four fields, or
over a constant, would pass the widening half perfectly.
view_hash now carries binding.digest and the act-scope is no longer
independently canonicalized here, so the act has exactly one canonicalization
computed by the layer that owns it. approval_binding_digest is validated for
shape and refused without its approval id — it is carried, never computed.
The three published vectors are unchanged: they do not carry the new key, so
pick omits it. Asserted, not assumed.
The cycle condition did not disappear, its protection moved — from refusing
nesting to approval-engine's normative exclusion. layer.yaml carries it as
cycle_condition with a test, so a future widening meets a rule rather than
silence.
One thing not assumed. Both gate-house and approval-engine said our binding
slice canonicalizes principal and target, two of their five fields. target
plainly is act material and is now dropped. But their principal is the party ON
WHOSE BEHALF the approval was issued, while ours is the person being BOUND — the
approver. Different roles, and dropping ours would remove who was shown this
from view_hash and gut the promise. Kept it, declared principal_role_overlap
open in layer.yaml, tested that changing the approver still moves view_hash, and
raised it rather than silently resolving it either way.
L0/L2 are unaffected: with no approval there is no digest to defer to, and
test_act_scope_still_binds_when_there_is_no_carried_digest pins that.
100 tests pass.
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__pycache__ was committed alongside the domain core. Untracked and ignored.
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Updated by fix-consistency on 2026-09-10:
- update .custodian-brief.md for informed-decision
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approval-engine APPROVAL-WP-0002-T01 is still progress and its namespace has no
pods, so the live end-to-end proof cannot run. Built everything that does not
depend on it, with the engine behind a Protocol plus a fake carrying its real
refusal semantics, so its arrival is a wiring change rather than a build.
- memo.py: the Decision Memo, versions, binding document. Principal, Scope,
Awareness and Hat are dataclasses rather than dicts because the canonicalizer
requires a shape and a missing key should fail at construction rather than
deep inside hashing — which is exactly how it failed twice while building
this. Field names follow the governed canonicalizer (item_id, severity,
locator): the published vectors are the contract, so the object was aligned to
them rather than the reverse.
- presentation.py: the sole writer of view_hash. One writer, one canonicalizer,
one place to audit. Acknowledgment is an explicit method call and nothing
infers it from scroll, dwell or focus.
- disposition.py: verbs and guards G_NOAGENT, G_STEP, G_PRES, G_ACK, G_REASONS,
G_SEALED. accept is ABSENT from weak steps rather than present-and-disabled,
because a greyed-out accept still teaches the wrong model. Only accept reaches
the engine; a memo return is not represented there at all.
- provenance.py: claim routes per A-16. assert_human_control_dischargeable
refuses a registration-supplied human, so PR-11's limitation fires at the
point of use instead of sitting in a document.
- evidence.py: local outbox, commitment-only records carrying the
GH-DEC-2026-014 §4 existence assertion, per-class reconciliation counts, and a
custody-locator guard that rejects credentialed URLs (PR-12).
- approval_client.py: 409 duplicate_approver is success, 409 conflict terminal,
503 fail-closed, approval:consume refused before a token is requested.
87 tests pass, including every negative case in the Use Case Catalog and that a
fail-closed outcome is recorded as a stance application with no verb field —
never as a decline, because the human did not make one.
T08 stays progress: the live proof is the remainder.
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The two strings approval-engine asked for on 2026-09-08 are submitted:
client_id informed-decision-approver, redirect
https://decisions.coulomb.social/auth/callback. This discharges the gap that
created this repository.
The submission declares the tenant provenance rather than letting it read as a
directory fact, and raises PR-11 back to key-cape: principal_type: human is a
property of the client registration, structurally the same shape as the
gap-route tenant, so GH-DEC-2026-016 §5 now depends on that claim in a way it
did not last week.
heartbeat_classes sent to audit-core — three classes at 86400, including
presentation with the reasoning for declaring one on a class their guidance put
outside it, offered for them to overrule.
The GH-DEC-2026-015 activation condition relayed to approval-engine: state the
five-field set as normative and add a test that fails if the digest input set
changes. Their reasoning exists in substance already; what is missing is that a
contributor can make that change today with nothing stopping them.
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Origin and evidence path both landed today.
T07 origin: railiance-apps deployed decisions.coulomb.social and corrected the
hostname in this repo — not the decide.coulomb.social this workplan proposed.
Verified here rather than taken on report: both paths 200, TLS verify 0, Let's
Encrypt cert valid to 2026-12-09.
T08: audit-core registered the source with every field as proposed and landed
the detection half. INFD-IN-0003 closed. Their refinements booked — reconciliation
on the high-volume class too, since rate detects a stream stopping but never a
stream missing the particular renders that mattered, which is exactly our threat
model; and PR-12, the custody locator must be a stable non-secret identifier
because redact scans data and an existence declaration arriving without its
pointer looks complete while being useless.
INFD-IN-0004 ruled as GH-DEC-2026-015: gate-house reversed itself and nesting is
permitted for this pair. The decisive ground was not the cycle argument we led
with — our binding slice canonicalizes principal and target, two of the five
digest fields, so co-reference left us performing a partial recomputation of one
act in a second vocabulary, closer to the translation R3 forbade than nesting
is. Our ordering objection was withdrawn as mistaken.
The permission is conditioned and NOT ACTIVE until approval-engine states its
presentation exclusion as normative and tested. layer.yaml is deliberately
unchanged and carries nesting_permission_active false — we do not activate on
our own initiative.
GH-DEC-2026-016 ruled NC-03. Its §5 is live rather than hypothetical and is
booked as PR-11: principal_type: human is a property of the client registration,
structurally the same shape as the gap-route tenant, so a human-in-the-loop
control must not be discharged on it as verified humanity.
T07 stays progress: the submission to key-cape is written but unsent, blocked by
the local permission classifier rather than by any repository.
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decisions.coulomb.social answers 200 over an issued Let's Encrypt certificate as
of 2026-09-10 14:32 UTC. The condition this document set for its own submission
— a real origin rather than a plausible one — is met.
T07 stays progress: the remaining acceptance criteria are that the contract
actually reaches key-cape and that a token issued against the registration is
accepted by approval-engine's verifier, which cannot be shown until
approval-engine is deployed.
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The operator assigned decisions.coulomb.social, not the decide.coulomb.social
this workplan proposed. Redirect URIs match byte-exactly at /authorize, so the
proposal is corrected in place rather than reconciled after submission — a
one-character miss presents as a rejected approval, not as a registration
defect.
DNS resolves. The Ingress and certificate are written in railiance-apps
(manifests/informed-decision-ingress.yaml, dry-run clean) but not applied, so
T07 stays progress: DNS alone is not an origin, and a host that does not answer
over TLS fails the same way a wrong hostname does, only later.
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approval-engine answered R3 and recommends exactly the option GH-DEC-2026-012
refused: that our binding document carry their binding.digest as a field rather
than re-canonicalize action/actor/principal/purpose/target ourselves. We cannot
comply with both, so this is raised as a finding rather than resolved.
It is not a wording difference. Our binding slice canonicalizes principal and
target, two of the five fields in their digest, so co-reference by identifier
alone leaves two independent canonicalizations of one act linked by a shared id.
GH-DEC-2026-012 manages that with an authority rule; approval-engine's proposal
removes it. Both are coherent and they are not the same design.
New information the refusal may not have had: their digest covers exactly five
act fields, and they state that widening it to cover presentation would be a
defect since a new UI release would invalidate every prior approval. The
GH-DEC-2026-008 cycle condition is mutual containment, so if their digest
structurally cannot contain view_hash the containment is one-directional. Not
asserted as settling it — that cycle was found by two engines independently
within hours, and "the cycle cannot arise here" is the belief such failures
punish.
Deliberately not adopted, despite coming from the layer that owns the digest and
despite our having offered to let them settle R3. Gate House was right that a
bilateral agreement produces agreement rather than an authority rule, and that
applies to this one too. layer.yaml is unchanged and carries a
linkage_under_review marker rather than a silent edit.
Also carries the smaller doctrine question approval-engine handed on: whether
approver evidence should be human-only at the engine, since
entries[].principal_type is auditable after the fact and stops nothing, and
there is no upstream backstop for humans-bind-agents-draft.
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Updated by fix-consistency on 2026-09-10:
- update .custodian-brief.md for informed-decision
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