informed-decision/SCOPE.md
tegwick c5367a5a54 Record native sender acceptance and retained audit readback gate
Assistant: codex
Assistant-Model: gpt-6-astra
Assistant-Session: 01a07ff8-19d0-7820-b4d0-1353833cb7fc
2026-09-11 14:23:07 +02:00

189 lines
10 KiB
Markdown

# SCOPE
> Implemented-and-first-cut boundary for agents and contributors. Aspirational
> direction belongs in `INTENT.md`; the current stage belongs in `GOAL.md`;
> current work and gates belong in `workplans/`.
## Status — 2026-09-11
**The protected browser review, policy consumer, Approval Engine adapter,
durable evidence store and scheduled Audit Core delivery are implemented.
The approval surface is not deployed.**
What exists and is tested (371 automated tests and 11 container checks; the
previous browser milestone passed 12 Chromium checks). Component tests use
actual Flex Auth, Approval Engine and Audit Core with synthetic identity/custody:
- layer and stance declarations — `layer.yaml`, `pep-stance.yaml`,
`informed_decision/stance.py`, with published-equals-shipped asserted;
- the governed canonicalizer and schema, with the three published vectors
reproducing byte for byte and all four isolation properties pinned;
- the **domain core**: `memo.py` (the Decision Memo, its versions and the
binding document), `presentation.py` (the sole writer of `view_hash`),
`disposition.py` (the verb vocabulary and guards `G_NOAGENT`, `G_STEP`,
`G_PRES`, `G_ACTOR`, `G_ACK`, `G_REASONS`, `G_SEALED`), `provenance.py` (claim routes,
A-16), `evidence.py` (the local outbox and commitment records);
- `approval_client.py` — the seam to `approval-engine` plus a fake;
- `oidc.py` and `web.py` — public-client PKCE sign-in, verified human/MFA
profile, bounded server-side sessions, protected cookies and CSRF sign-out;
- `approval_http.py` and `http_transport.py` — get-by-id and human-entry
transport, declared-control checks, real entry correlation, no consume route
or automatic mutation retry. Protected browser actions use this adapter;
- `store.py` / `records.py` — private durable packet/memo/presentation/
disposition storage, append-only acknowledgments, transactional outbox and
submission correlation, safe reservation and backup/restore;
- `audit.py` — idempotent Audit Core delivery, bounded retry/blocked states,
explicit per-class count/time-basis comparison. Heartbeats are generated
without hiding undelivered evidence;
- `policy.py` / `review.py` / `ui.py` — fresh entitlement before rendering and
actions, exact response pins, immutable observations, required highlights,
accept/return/discuss/decline and visible original/unresolved entry state;
- `runtime.py` — explicit owner configuration, rotating credential-file readers,
30-second audit draining, heartbeat/reconciliation and delivery readiness.
- `Containerfile`, `container.py`, `requirements.lock` and deployment renderer —
a locally built/scanned image, private projected-config handoff, one serving
writer, backup/inspection commands and eight review-only Kubernetes objects.
Network-isolated container restart/restore preserves unresolved submissions.
The 2026-09-11 fsGroup startup correction handles newly created private
directories on Kubernetes volumes; unsafe existing directories still refuse.
Its full local suite passes 335 tests with 39 optional checks skipped. The
corrected local image 92cde609 passes 11 container checks, and its source
adapter passes native audit delivery/retry/scope checks. Independent archive
readback, bearer lifecycle and service image scan/publication remain open.
Remaining: native policy package/caller/assignment admission, registered human
login and deployed binding, independent production audit custody, image
publication/cutover, platform backup/restore and operator recovery admission.
The legacy `evidence.Outbox` remains an
in-memory test double; the new `Store` supplies durable atomicity. Browser
sessions are ephemeral, with no approval state.
Without owner runtime configuration `/readyz` returns 503. With it, readiness
requires recent audit delivery health; it does not assert native admission.
The origin's last observed deployment was an nginx placeholder on 2026-09-10.
See [browser-authentication.md](docs/browser-authentication.md) and
[durable-review-evidence.md](docs/durable-review-evidence.md) and
[protected-browser-review.md](docs/protected-browser-review.md).
The [deployment packet](deploy/README.md) records native wiring observations,
the missing Approval Engine namespace and remaining owner admission.
`INFD-WP-0001-T08` remains open for the live end-to-end proof, which is gated on
`APPROVAL-WP-0002-T01` and a deployed `approval-engine`.
## One-liner
informed-decision is the presentation and binding surface for decisions: it
renders a Decision Memo to the human who holds the mandate, records what was
shown, and binds their identity to the act — and owns the browser-facing
approver UI that `approval-engine` deliberately does not contain.
## Layer
**PEP-shaped**, ruled by `GH-DEC-2026-012`. Not an Engine. Companion §5 owed,
statute §6.4 in full. Declared in `layer.yaml` in this repository's own voice.
It emits one PIP-like fact — *what was presented* — as a claim, under three
limits that are the substance of the permission rather than caveats on it:
1. the claim carries presentation and nothing else, and must never carry,
restate, summarise or imply a decision or verdict;
2. the claim must never be an input to the decision it presents for;
3. the evidence copy reaches `audit-core` **independently** of this repository.
Limit 2 is load-bearing: the argument that a renderer attesting its own
rendering is not self-dealing was accepted *because* that limit holds.
## Core Idea
A decision surface is not a workflow engine and not a decision point. This
repository owns the Decision Memo object, the presentation record, the
canonicalization producing `view_hash` / `awareness_hash`, the disposition
vocabulary, and the evidence bundle export. It does not evaluate whether an act
is permitted, does not hold approval current-state, and does not archive the
trail.
## In Scope — first cut (Stage 1)
**Built and tested:**
- Canonicalization of the binding and awareness documents, with the three
published vectors reproducing byte for byte and all four isolation properties
pinned (`tests/test_canonicalize.py`).
- The Decision Memo schema and worked examples, governed under `schemas/`.
- The unreachable-engine stance map, built to v0.8 obligation 3, with
published-equals-shipped asserted by test (`tests/test_layer_conformance.py`).
**Built with durable custody and protected HTTP integration:**
- The presentation record: what was rendered, to whom, when, in which locale and
UI release.
- Required-highlight acknowledgment as a precondition of binding.
- The disposition vocabulary and its legality tables. Only `accept` reaches
`approval-engine`; `return`, `discuss`, `escalate` and the rest are
memo-level.
- The browser-facing OIDC client: authorization-code + S256 PKCE against
`key-cape`, scopes `[openid, approval:read, approval:approve]`.
- An L3 approver surface calling `approval-engine`'s approval-entry mutation.
**Specified, not built:**
- The evidence bundle as an offline-verifiable export.
- German browser acceptance and the broader step/awareness UI. The current
browser profile refuses unsupported locale/step/level rather than overstating it.
## Out of Scope
- Authorization decisions — `access-engine`, always and only (statute §6).
- The approval object, its state machine, validity and consumption —
`approval-engine`. Never cached, never inferred, never `approval:consume`.
- Approval doctrine — `gate-house`.
- Identity and authentication — `key-cape`. Imported, never invented. The
`assurance` shape is `key-cape`'s and is cited, not restated.
- The evidence archive — `audit-core`.
- Credentials materialized after a decision — `secrets-engine`.
- Notification transport, ticketing, general workflow.
- **An approvals inbox.** Foreclosed upstream as well as here:
`approval-engine` exposes get-by-id only and will not add a list.
- L4/L5, QES, QTSP, qualified archival retention.
- The mandate graph — so a Stage 1 `escalate` is an assertion, not a verified
claim.
## What this repository does not claim
Stated here because a scope file that only lists capabilities overstates them.
- **The decision path is not validated.** `GH-DEC-2026-010` requires a decision
be attributable to `access-engine`; no consumer can satisfy that today because
the envelope is unsigned (`FLEX-WP-0024`). This surface records
`decision_attributable: false` and must not describe validation as complete.
- **The residual is open.** A compromised surface can present X and attest Y.
`GH-DEC-2026-012` states it is not closed and does not credit this repository
with closing it.
- **`view_hash` is not inside the approval entry.** `POST /entries` discards its
body by design. Correlation is `(approval_id, subject, approved_at)`, so an
auditor holding only the approval object cannot reach the presentation.
- **Commitment-only evidence is not reconstructability.** `GH-DEC-2026-014`
granted it for Stage 1 and bounded it: it satisfies non-alteration, and moves
integrity out of our control while leaving *availability* entirely inside it.
The party that can withhold the content is the party the evidence is about.
Narrowed by the required existence assertion; not closed.
- **The registration-bound tenant is a declared bounded gap**, not the terminal
state. `GH-DEC-2026-013` ruled directory-sourced terminal and admitted
`key-cape`'s shape because its distinguishing case fails closed. Build to it
as transitional.
- **Nothing is deployed**, so nothing is observed in production and nothing is
contained automatically.
## Open
- **Native browser registration and human proof** — T07 supplied the real
origin and submitted the contract. T08 retains registration rollout and a real
human login accepted by the deployed Approval Engine.
- **`audit-core` custody and live delivery** — source registration and cadence
have owner returns (`AUDIT-IN-0003`, `AUDIT-WP-0009` T04/T06/T07); native
credentials, independent receipt and reconciliation still require proof before
T08 ships.
*Closed 2026-09-10:* the human token tenant (`GH-DEC-2026-013`, `key-cape`
`329e48f`) and the evidence payload question (`GH-DEC-2026-014`).