informed-decision/docs/intake-dependency-requirements.md
tegwick c1cf6cf54c Implement offline workload intake and record blocked owner dependencies
Assistant: codex
Assistant-Model: gpt-6.1-sol
Assistant-Session: 01a1029c-c003-7283-acc9-930b434e6cae
2026-10-03 18:45:10 +02:00

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Intake implementation and dependency acceptance — 2026-10-03

Work record: INFD-WP-0005. These are requirements for owner implementation; this document grants no deployment or credential-custody change.

Local implementation: intake_service.IntakeService is a separate WSGI app with only POST /v1/memos; TokenReview checks an injected Kubernetes response; intake_approval.IntakeApprovalClient sends create-only approval requests through a bounded transport. Store schema 3 migrates existing schema 1/2 databases and adds the submission ledger and integration outbox. Packet bytes, pinned memo, ready ledger and posed/notification jobs commit in one transaction. Terminal human dispositions queue hub resolution in their existing evidence transaction. IntakeDeliveryWorker dispatches injected audit, notification and hub transports with leases, stable ids, bounded retries and a disabled-by-default write-back. No listener is composed into the deployed runtime yet; shipped registries are empty, so no caller is admitted. No live deployment occurred.

railiance-platform — T05, T10

Existing request: cd811073-d6db-41cf-8a57-10df0b360eab.

Deliver a reviewed deployment change with:

  • ESO custody for platform/workloads/informed-decision/sitting-requester, mounted read-only to the intake workload; exact-path read grant, sibling-path refusal, safe secret metadata handling and no values in evidence.
  • Separate private intake port and Service, absent from public ingress; NetworkPolicy admitting only registered submitter namespaces/service accounts.
  • TokenReview RBAC for the review workload, API-server CA verification and an authenticated, bounded TokenReview transport. Project submitter tokens for audience informed-decision-intake; do not reuse browser or audit tokens.
  • Project the reviewed JSON registries so removal is visible on the next request without image rebuild. Review additions independently of the admitted submitter.
  • Workload OIDC client-credentials exchange yielding only approval:create, subject informed-decision, platform tenant and service principal provenance. Bind it to IntakeApprovalClient; no approve/read/consume scopes.

Acceptance: wrong audience, unknown SA, removed grant and absent custody fail closed; one approved dev pose creates one human-control draft. Record immutable image/config references and founder approval before any live change.

access-engine — T06, T10

Existing request: 306bcdd2-4fe4-4ccf-8aac-590c2abe51c4.

Deliver the §5.2 attribute admission branch, generated class/submitter data, drift check, exact-record compatibility branch and versioned request/response fixtures. Confirm field placement for review_group, memo_class, intake_submitter, approval_requester, approval_human_control, memo_version, approval_id and approval_binding_digest. Keep human authentication-derived identity, verified groups and act-time MFA freshness. No view_hash in PDP context. The approval fact must be read live and matched to the memo pin independently of an allow.

Acceptance: unknown class/submitter, requester mismatch, false human_control, digest mismatch and stale MFA refuse; existing exact-record memos still work. Consumer changes must update both policy request construction and Store's strict policy-observation context comparison, with live engine reads before checks. Do not activate consumer attributes against the current exact-only pin. Signed PDP attribution remains the separately declared FLEX-WP-0024 gap.

approval-engine — T05 recovery and production close-down

Existing request: 59c5ee82-c706-4432-bab4-24af64031d39.

Confirm native service creation response fields and optional requested_via. Provide idempotent creation or a lookup/recovery contract for lost create replies. Current local behavior reserves before POST: creating without a receipt returns approval_create_unresolved and never reposts. created with a persisted receipt can retry the atomic local load without creating another approval. An unresolved create needs owner-assisted receipt reconciliation; never manufacture a digest or infer approval state. Idempotent creation is a close-down requirement, not a condition on offline tests or initial dev rollout.

audit-core — T07

Existing request: 23b670ac-809e-49bf-9233-e0b62cf0a039.

Register informed-decision.memo.posed for source informed-decision and tenant platform; accept the locally retained event envelope containing memo/approval ids, carried binding digest, authenticated forwarding submitter, memo class and submission digest. No packet, brief, or secret content. Confirm sender custody, Idempotency-Key receipts and heartbeat/reconciliation requirements for the new class. Provide positive/duplicate/refusal fixtures. Only then connect posed jobs to AuditCoreSink and include the class in runtime readiness/reconciliation.

state-hub — T07, T08

Existing request: e30dea31-90e3-4fc0-954a-ed8412b52aca.

Deliver forwarding with the projected intake-audience SA token, bounded envelope, stable idempotency key, durable retry and receipt retention. Identify the actual SA to review into the submitter registry. Forwarding proves the hub identity; drafted_by remains asserted and must be visibly described that way. Add a dev fixture for pose/replay/conflict and a deduplicated notification contract using our stable delivery id. Notifications carry only id/question/class/submitter; the signed-in overview is the authoritative review entry point.

Confirm resolve semantics: terminal human accept/decline only; return/discuss and resolves: never do not resolve. A 409 must allow reading an existing resolution to correlate it. Delivery failure retains local evidence and retries; other-memo conflicts block for review. Bind the hub transports and schedule IntakeDeliveryWorker in the runtime after these contracts are accepted. Keep INFD_HUB_WRITEBACK unset until deployment approval and end-to-end evidence.

gate-house and founder — T09, T10

Reply 4a290496-5aa7-4488-a01d-f8fde925a54b answers the doctrine check: no human act is required when posing. GH-DEC-2026-023 is still proposed; this reply is not a ratified decision or live rollout approval. Spec now records C1–C6 and F1–F3. Production close-down additionally requires authenticated drafting identity, independent list review, signed claims/receipts, volume budgets and retirement of exact-record admission after its memos become terminal.

T10 resumes after T05–T08 acceptance and founder approval for the concrete rollout. Record dev positive/negative traces first, then one live human answer with audit and write-back receipts. The provisioning sitting's human binding remains blocked in INFD-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-03-T02.

Verification

uv run --extra dev python -m pytest -q: 437 passed, 67 skipped (optional component fixtures are not enabled in this run). After the final receipt-recovery concurrency guard and nonempty-entry response refusal, the affected intake, runtime migration, durable store and write-back suites: 63 passed, 1 skipped. git diff --check passed. State Hub consistency reconciled the blocked plan, completed T04/T09 and waiting T07; no registrar fallback was required.